res adjudicata doctrine in California

1928(In re Perkins, 2 Cal. 424; Matter of Ring, 28 Cal. 247 ; In re Zany, 164 Cal. 724 [ 130 Pac. 710 ].) Section 1506 provides only for an appeal to the district court of appeal by the people from a final order made upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or information in a court of record.

1904(Church on Habeas Corpus, sec. 386; In re Ring, 28 Cal. 247 -251; Bradley v. Beetle, 153 Mass. 154 ; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182 .) Under our statute, a judgment on habeas corpus remanding a petitioner is not, as a matter of law, a bar to a subsequent application of the same kind to the same or another court (In re Ring, 28 Cal. 247 ), and it certainly can have no such effect in this proceeding.

1883It was said in Ford v. Doyle, 44 Cal. 635 , that the doctrine of res adjudicata, in its strict sense, does not apply to motions made in the course of practice, and the court may, upon a proper showing, allow a renewal of a motion once decided.

1873In Doyle v. Ford, 44 Cal. 635 , in which there was an application for an alias writ of possession, we said: “The doctrine of res adjudicata, in its strict sense, does not apply to such motions made in the course of practice, and the Court may, upon a proper showing, allow a renewal of a motion of this kind once decided.

1928(In re Perkins, 2 Cal. 424; Matter of Ring, 28 Cal. 247 ; In re Zany, 164 Cal. 724 [ 130 Pac. 710 ].) Section 1506 provides only for an appeal to the district court of appeal by the people from a final order made upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or information in a court of record.

1928(In re Perkins, 2 Cal. 424; Matter of Ring, 28 Cal. 247 ; In re Zany, 164 Cal. 724 [ 130 Pac. 710 ].) Section 1506 provides only for an appeal to the district court of appeal by the people from a final order made upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or information in a court of record.

1928(In re Perkins, 2 Cal. 424; Matter of Ring, 28 Cal. 247 ; In re Zany, 164 Cal. 724 [ 130 Pac. 710 ].) Section 1506 provides only for an appeal to the district court of appeal by the people from a final order made upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or information in a court of record.

1912A., N. S., 800, 96 Pac. 893 ], and 147 Cal. 249 , [ 81 Pac. 958 ], and that, therefore, regardless of whether the court was right or wrong in its construction of the scope and effect of the allegations of the cross-complaint and of the findings referred to, the question of the sufficiency of that pleading is now inhumed beneath the doctrine of res adjudicata, and that said question is, consequently, so far as this action is concerned, no longer open to review.

1911This is especially true when the decision did not involve a mere question of the proper form or time of proceeding, but was the determination of a substantial matter of right, upon which the parties interested had a right to be heard upon issues of law or fact, or both, and these issues, or some of them, were necessarily decided by the court as the basis of the order which it finally entered granting or denying the relief sought.” In Comm’rs of Wilson County v. McIntosh, 30 Kan. 234 , [ 1 Pac. 572 ], it is said: ' “We think there is a growing disposition to enlarge the scope of the doctrine of

1907This ruling was affirmed in In re Davis’s Estate, ante, p. 318, [ 86 Pac. 183 ], the court saying: “Whether or not this be a proper case for applying the doctrine of res adjudicata or that of the law of the ease, we are satisfied with the conclusion reached and adhere to it.” In O’Callaghan v. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 117 , [25 Sup. Ct. 727], the United States supreme court has decided a practically similar question in the same way.

1907(Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 654 , [ 22 Pac. 26 ].) Considered by the rule of res adjudicata the authorities are conclusive, and no clear distinction can be drawn between the rule of res adjudicata and the rule of finality of decision declared in the latter case.

1907J., states the rule of the law of the case as follows: “A previous ruling by the appellate court upon a point distinctly made may be only authority in other cases, to be followed and affirmed, or to be modified or overruled according to its intrinsic merits; but in the ease in which it is made it is more than authority; it is a final adjudication, from the consequences of which the court cannot depart, nor the parties relieve themselves.” The reason for the rule of the law of the case is said in some of the cases to rest upon the doctrine of res adjudicata (Soule v. Dawes, 14 Cal. 250 ); in ot

1907But, if the judgment in either tribunal is rendered for a reason or upon a ground not involving the merits of the controversy, no such ‘effect can result.’’ (Pyle v. Piercy, 122 Cal. 383 , [ 55 Pac. 141 ] ; South San Bernardino Co. v. San Bernardino Nat.

1907But, if the judgment in either tribunal is rendered for a reason or upon a ground not involving the merits of the controversy, no such ‘effect can result.’’ (Pyle v. Piercy, 122 Cal. 383 , [ 55 Pac. 141 ] ; South San Bernardino Co. v. San Bernardino Nat.

1907Among them, as fairly illustrative of the principle involved, we cite the following: Oakand v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160 , [ 50 Pac. 277 ], in which Mr. Justice Harrison, with usual perspicuity, states the rule in this manner: “The doctrine of res adjudicata, or estoppel by reason of a former judgment, rests upon the principle that a cause of action which has been once determined upon its merits by a competent tribunal, between parties over whom that tribunal had jurisdiction, cannot afterward be litigated by them in another proceeding, either in the same or a different tribunal, a

1907Among them, as fairly illustrative of the principle involved, we cite the following: Oakand v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160 , [ 50 Pac. 277 ], in which Mr. Justice Harrison, with usual perspicuity, states the rule in this manner: “The doctrine of res adjudicata, or estoppel by reason of a former judgment, rests upon the principle that a cause of action which has been once determined upon its merits by a competent tribunal, between parties over whom that tribunal had jurisdiction, cannot afterward be litigated by them in another proceeding, either in the same or a different tribunal, a

1907This ruling was affirmed in In re Davis’s Estate, ante, p. 318, [ 86 Pac. 183 ], the court saying: “Whether or not this be a proper case for applying the doctrine of res adjudicata or that of the law of the ease, we are satisfied with the conclusion reached and adhere to it.” In O’Callaghan v. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 117 , [25 Sup. Ct. 727], the United States supreme court has decided a practically similar question in the same way.

1904(Church on Habeas Corpus, sec. 386; In re Ring, 28 Cal. 247 -251; Bradley v. Beetle, 153 Mass. 154 ; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182 .) Under our statute, a judgment on habeas corpus remanding a petitioner is not, as a matter of law, a bar to a subsequent application of the same kind to the same or another court (In re Ring, 28 Cal. 247 ), and it certainly can have no such effect in this proceeding.

1904(Church on Habeas Corpus, sec. 386; In re Ring, 28 Cal. 247 -251; Bradley v. Beetle, 153 Mass. 154 ; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182 .) Under our statute, a judgment on habeas corpus remanding a petitioner is not, as a matter of law, a bar to a subsequent application of the same kind to the same or another court (In re Ring, 28 Cal. 247 ), and it certainly can have no such effect in this proceeding.