application of the discovery rule in Washington

2011Matson, 101 Wash.App. at 482 , 3 P.3d 805 .

2011Matson, 101 Wn.

2006The court held not only that the application of the discovery rule was a factual question, but also stated, without analysis, "likewise, if there is evidence to support plaintiffs' claim that the relationship was a continuing one so that the statute is tolled until the relationship is terminated, is also a factual question to be submitted to the jury on proper instructions." Hermann, 17 Wash.App. at 630 , 564 P.2d 817 (emphasis added). ¶ 18 The issue of tolling based on a continuing relationship arose again in a foreclosure action, Seattle First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. Siebol, 64 Wash.App. 401, 40

2006The court held not only that the application of the discovery rule was a factual question, but also stated, without analysis, "likewise, if there is evidence to support plaintiffs' claim that the relationship was a continuing one so that the statute is tolled until the relationship is terminated, is also a factual question to be submitted to the jury on proper instructions." Hermann, 17 Wash.App. at 630 , 564 P.2d 817 (emphasis added). ¶ 18 The issue of tolling based on a continuing relationship arose again in a foreclosure action, Seattle First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. Siebol, 64 Wash.App. 401, 40

2000Richardson v. Denend, 59 Wn.

2000Richardson v. Denend, 59 Wash.App. 92, 95 , 795 P.2d 1192 (1990) (citation omitted).

1998The Legislature enacted RCW 4.16.340 in order to overrule Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wn.2d 72, 80 , 727 P.2d 226 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held that the discovery rule did not apply in intentional tort cases where the plaintiff had suppressed the memory of abuse during the period of the statute of limitations. 1 Laws of 1991, ch. 212 (“RCW 4.16.340 [was enacted] to clarify the application of the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases [, and] . . . to reverse . . .

1998The Legislature enacted RCW 4.16.340 in order to overrule Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wn.2d 72, 80 , 727 P.2d 226 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held that the discovery rule did not apply in intentional tort cases where the plaintiff had suppressed the memory of abuse during the period of the statute of limitations. 1 Laws of 1991, ch. 212 (“RCW 4.16.340 [was enacted] to clarify the application of the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases [, and] . . . to reverse . . .

1988This court limited the application of the discovery rule in Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wn.2d 761 , 733 P.2d 530 (1987).

1988This court limited the application of the discovery rule in Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wn.2d 761 , 733 P.2d 530 (1987).

2020PSE argues that, “without a mechanism akin to the discovery rule (like equitable estoppel), businesses can escape penalties by failing to make accurate reports as otherwise required.” This court has noted that “RCW 4.16.310 legislatively restricts the application of the discovery rule,” under which a cause of action accrues when “‘the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts which give rise to the cause of action.’” Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman Assocs., Inc., 35 Wn.

2011Matson, 101 Wash.App. at 482 , 3 P.3d 805 .

1998App. 15 , 931 P.2d 163 , review denied, 132 Wn.2d 1008 (1997): This rule [the discovery rule] is a court doctrine designed to balance the policies underlying statutes of limitations against the unfairness of cutting off a valid claim where the plaintiff, due to no fault of her own, could not reasonably have discovered the claim’s factual elements until some time after the date of the injury.

1998We recently discussed the application of the discovery rule in Crisman v. Crisman, 85 Wn.

1983As stated in Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215 , 222 n.2, 543 P.2d 338 (1975): While important policy reasons support the accrual at discovery rule, we also recognize it may be desirable to place some outer limit upon the delayed accrual of actions in order to avoid an undue burden on potential defendants.

1983As stated in Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215 , 222 n.2, 543 P.2d 338 (1975): While important policy reasons support the accrual at discovery rule, we also recognize it may be desirable to place some outer limit upon the delayed accrual of actions in order to avoid an undue burden on potential defendants.