application of the discovery rule in New Mexico

2023See Williams v. Stewart, 2005-NMCA-061, ¶ 16 , 137 N.M. 420 , 112 P.3d 281 (“Historically, the courts of this state have characterized the application of the discovery rule as a jury question, particularly when conflicting inferences may be drawn.”); see also Brown v. Behles & Davis, 2004-NMCA-028, ¶¶ 12, 18 , 135 N.M. 180 , 86 P.3d 605 (observing that the application of the discovery rule is generally a question of fact and holding that whether a reasonable person would have searched county records and discovered the basis for a legal malpractice claim is a question for the jury).

2023See Williams v. Stewart, 2005-NMCA-061, ¶ 16 , 137 N.M. 420 , 112 P.3d 281 (“Historically, the courts of this state have characterized the application of the discovery rule as a jury question, particularly when conflicting inferences may be drawn.”); see also Brown v. Behles & Davis, 2004-NMCA-028, ¶¶ 12, 18 , 135 N.M. 180 , 86 P.3d 605 (observing that the application of the discovery rule is generally a question of fact and holding that whether a reasonable person would have searched county records and discovered the basis for a legal malpractice claim is a question for the jury).

2020See, e.g., Brunacini v. Kavanagh, 1993-NMCA-157 , ¶ 30, 117 N.M. 122 , 869 P.2d 821 .

2020See, e.g., Brunacini v. Kavanagh, 1993-NMCA-157 , ¶ 30, 117 N.M. 122 , 869 P.2d 821 .

2023See Williams v. Stewart, 2005-NMCA-061, ¶ 16 , 137 N.M. 420 , 112 P.3d 281 (“Historically, the courts of this state have characterized the application of the discovery rule as a jury question, particularly when conflicting inferences may be drawn.”); see also Brown v. Behles & Davis, 2004-NMCA-028, ¶¶ 12, 18 , 135 N.M. 180 , 86 P.3d 605 (observing that the application of the discovery rule is generally a question of fact and holding that whether a reasonable person would have searched county records and discovered the basis for a legal malpractice claim is a question for the jury).

2023See Williams v. Stewart, 2005-NMCA-061, ¶ 16 , 137 N.M. 420 , 112 P.3d 281 (“Historically, the courts of this state have characterized the application of the discovery rule as a jury question, particularly when conflicting inferences may be drawn.”); see also Brown v. Behles & Davis, 2004-NMCA-028, ¶¶ 12, 18 , 135 N.M. 180 , 86 P.3d 605 (observing that the application of the discovery rule is generally a question of fact and holding that whether a reasonable person would have searched county records and discovered the basis for a legal malpractice claim is a question for the jury).

2022Given the discovery rule’s frequent application in other areas of law in which prescriptive periods exist, the Legislature’s addition of a discovery element regarding a statute of limitations supports the proposition that the standard discovery rule applies. {15} Just prior to the 1993 amendment of Section 61-1-3.1(A), our New Mexico Supreme Court held in Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Services, 1992- NMSC-042, ¶¶ 25-27, 114 N.M. 248 , 837 P.2d 442 , that in medical malpractice cases, the discovery rule controls, and “the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or with reasonab

2022Given the discovery rule’s frequent application in other areas of law in which prescriptive periods exist, the Legislature’s addition of a discovery element regarding a statute of limitations supports the proposition that the standard discovery rule applies. {15} Just prior to the 1993 amendment of Section 61-1-3.1(A), our New Mexico Supreme Court held in Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Services, 1992- NMSC-042, ¶¶ 25-27, 114 N.M. 248 , 837 P.2d 442 , that in medical malpractice cases, the discovery rule controls, and “the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or with reasonab

2023See Williams v. Stewart, 2005-NMCA-061, ¶ 16 , 137 N.M. 420 , 112 P.3d 281 (“Historically, the courts of this state have characterized the application of the discovery rule as a jury question, particularly when conflicting inferences may be drawn.”); see also Brown v. Behles & Davis, 2004-NMCA-028, ¶¶ 12, 18 , 135 N.M. 180 , 86 P.3d 605 (observing that the application of the discovery rule is generally a question of fact and holding that whether a reasonable person would have searched county records and discovered the basis for a legal malpractice claim is a question for the jury).

2008See, e.g., Williams v. Stewart, 2005-NMCA-061, ¶ 16 , 137 N.M. 420 , 112 P.3d 281 (“Historically, the courts of this state have characterized the application of the discovery rule as a jury question, particularly when conflicting inferences may be drawn.”).

2005The question of when [pjlaintiff knew or had reason to know of the alleged abuse and its impact is a question for the jury to decide.”); Montoya v. Kirk-Mayer, Inc., 120 N.M. 550, 554 , 903 P.2d 861, 865 (Ct.App. 1995) (stating that summary judgment is improper when equally logical but conflicting inferences can be drawn from undisputable basic facts); cf. Romero v. Sanchez, 83 N.M. 358, 362 , 492 P.2d 140,144 (1971) (holding, in a case involving an action to set aside a deed on grounds of fraud, that whether the claimant should, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, have investigated the pub

2005The question of when [pjlaintiff knew or had reason to know of the alleged abuse and its impact is a question for the jury to decide.”); Montoya v. Kirk-Mayer, Inc., 120 N.M. 550, 554 , 903 P.2d 861, 865 (Ct.App. 1995) (stating that summary judgment is improper when equally logical but conflicting inferences can be drawn from undisputable basic facts); cf. Romero v. Sanchez, 83 N.M. 358, 362 , 492 P.2d 140,144 (1971) (holding, in a case involving an action to set aside a deed on grounds of fraud, that whether the claimant should, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, have investigated the pub

2005The question of when [pjlaintiff knew or had reason to know of the alleged abuse and its impact is a question for the jury to decide.”); Montoya v. Kirk-Mayer, Inc., 120 N.M. 550, 554 , 903 P.2d 861, 865 (Ct.App. 1995) (stating that summary judgment is improper when equally logical but conflicting inferences can be drawn from undisputable basic facts); cf. Romero v. Sanchez, 83 N.M. 358, 362 , 492 P.2d 140,144 (1971) (holding, in a case involving an action to set aside a deed on grounds of fraud, that whether the claimant should, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, have investigated the pub

2005The question of when [pjlaintiff knew or had reason to know of the alleged abuse and its impact is a question for the jury to decide.”); Montoya v. Kirk-Mayer, Inc., 120 N.M. 550, 554 , 903 P.2d 861, 865 (Ct.App. 1995) (stating that summary judgment is improper when equally logical but conflicting inferences can be drawn from undisputable basic facts); cf. Romero v. Sanchez, 83 N.M. 358, 362 , 492 P.2d 140,144 (1971) (holding, in a case involving an action to set aside a deed on grounds of fraud, that whether the claimant should, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, have investigated the pub

2024But see Butler v. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Inc., 2006-NMCA- 084, ¶ 1, 140 N.M. 111 , 140 P.3d 532 (holding that a plaintiff must adequately plead, or argue in response to a motion to dismiss, the application of the discovery rule).

2024But see Butler v. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Inc., 2006-NMCA- 084, ¶ 1, 140 N.M. 111 , 140 P.3d 532 (holding that a plaintiff must adequately plead, or argue in response to a motion to dismiss, the application of the discovery rule).

2016Id. ¶ 9. “[W]here there are 7 disputed facts, it is generally the province of a jury to determine the date on which a 8 plaintiff became aware or should have become aware of the facts underlying his or her 9 claim.” Butler, 2006-NMCA-084, ¶ 27 ; see Medina v. Fuller, 1999-NMCA-011, ¶ 22 , 10 126 N.M. 460 , 971 P.2d 851 (stating the general rule that disputed questions of 11 material fact regarding whether a plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations are to 12 be decided by a jury).

2016Id. ¶ 9. “[W]here there are 7 disputed facts, it is generally the province of a jury to determine the date on which a 8 plaintiff became aware or should have become aware of the facts underlying his or her 9 claim.” Butler, 2006-NMCA-084, ¶ 27 ; see Medina v. Fuller, 1999-NMCA-011, ¶ 22 , 10 126 N.M. 460 , 971 P.2d 851 (stating the general rule that disputed questions of 11 material fact regarding whether a plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations are to 12 be decided by a jury).

2020See Yurcic v. City of Gallup, 2013-NMCA-039, ¶ 9 , 298 P.3d 500 . {24} Although our courts generally characterize the application of the discovery rule as a jury question, see id. ¶ 10, where there are undisputed facts that show that the plaintiff knew or should have become aware of the facts underlying his or her claim by a specific date, the district court may decide the issue as a matter of law.

2016Id. 3 {13} Our courts have generally characterized the application of the discovery rule as 4 a jury question, Yurcic, 2013-NMCA-039, ¶ 10 , and whether a claim has been timely 5 filed or whether good cause exists for delay in filing are questions of fact that become 6 issues of law only when the relevant facts are undisputed.