voluntary payment rule in Arkansas

2011Vandiver v. Banks, 331 Ark. 386, 393 , 962 S.W.2d 349, 353 (1998).

2011Vandiver v. Banks, 331 Ark. 386, 393 , 962 S.W.2d 349, 353 (1998).

2001In TB of Blytheville, Inc. v. Little Rock Sign & Emblem, Inc., 328 Ark. 688 , 946 S.W.2d 930 (1997), this court noted that in its past application of the voluntary payment rule, we said: “When one pays money on demand that is not legally enforceable, the payment is deemed voluntary.

2001In TB of Blytheville, Inc. v. Little Rock Sign & Emblem, Inc., 328 Ark. 688 , 946 S.W.2d 930 (1997), this court noted that in its past application of the voluntary payment rule, we said: “When one pays money on demand that is not legally enforceable, the payment is deemed voluntary.

2024Absent fraud, duress, mistake of fact, coercion, or extortion, voluntary payments cannot be recovered.” Douglas v. Adams Trucking Co., 345 Ark. 203, 212 , 46 S.W.3d 512, 518 (2001) (quoting TB of Blytheville, Inc. v. Little Rock Sign & Emblem, Inc., 328 Ark. 688 , 693–94, 946 S.W.2d 930, 932 (1997)).

2024Absent fraud, duress, mistake of fact, coercion, or extortion, voluntary payments cannot be recovered.” Douglas v. Adams Trucking Co., 345 Ark. 203, 212 , 46 S.W.3d 512, 518 (2001) (quoting TB of Blytheville, Inc. v. Little Rock Sign & Emblem, Inc., 328 Ark. 688 , 693–94, 946 S.W.2d 930, 932 (1997)).

2022See Philip Morris Cos., Inc. v. Miner, 2015 Ark. 73, at 13 , 462 S.W.3d 313, 321 (holding affirmative defenses based on the statute of limitations, failure to mitigate damages, and the voluntary-payment rule were secondary to the common questions).

2022See Philip Morris Cos., Inc. v. Miner, 2015 Ark. 73, at 13 , 462 S.W.3d 313, 321 (holding affirmative defenses based on the statute of limitations, failure to mitigate damages, and the voluntary-payment rule were secondary to the common questions).

2015These are secondary to the “common questions concerning” Philip Morris’s “alleged wrongdoing that must be resolved for all class members.” Id.; see also Fraley, 339 Ark. at 335 , 5 S.W.3d at 431 (“[Consideration of affirmative defenses at the class certification stage is an improper intrusion into the merits of the case.”).

2015These are secondary to the “common questions concerning” Philip Morris’s “alleged wrongdoing that must be resolved for all class members.” Id.; see also Fraley, 339 Ark. at 335 , 5 S.W.3d at 431 (“[Consideration of affirmative defenses at the class certification stage is an improper intrusion into the merits of the case.”).

2011See also ACW, Inc. v. Weiss , 329 Ark. 302 , 3116 , 947 S. W.2d 770 (1997) (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that in light of the enactment of a refund statute, the voluntary-payment rule "is of no consequence").

2011See also ACW, Inc. v. Weiss , 329 Ark. 302 , 3116 , 947 S. W.2d 770 (1997) (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that in light of the enactment of a refund statute, the voluntary-payment rule "is of no consequence").

2011See Omega Tube Conduit Corp. v. Maples , 312 Ark. 489 , 497-98 , 850 S.W.2d 317 (1993) (holding that mistakenly paid taxes on manufacturing inventory were not subject to a refund) and Arysta Lifescience North America, LLC v. Foreman , Independence County Circuit Court No. 2009-364-4 (holding that the plaintiff itself assessed the manufacturing inventory and that the error "cannot be determined from looking at the tax books themselves").

2011See Omega Tube Conduit Corp. v. Maples , 312 Ark. 489 , 497-98 , 850 S.W.2d 317 (1993) (holding that mistakenly paid taxes on manufacturing inventory were not subject to a refund) and Arysta Lifescience North America, LLC v. Foreman , Independence County Circuit Court No. 2009-364-4 (holding that the plaintiff itself assessed the manufacturing inventory and that the error "cannot be determined from looking at the tax books themselves").

2007See, e.g., Weiss v. Chavers, 357 Ark. 607, 614 , 184 S.W.3d 437, 441 (2004) (applying the voluntary-payment rule and its exceptions, and holding that taxes paid after the filing of the illegal-exaction complaint were involuntarily paid while taxes paid before the filing were voluntary).

2007See, e.g., Weiss v. Chavers, 357 Ark. 607, 614 , 184 S.W.3d 437, 441 (2004) (applying the voluntary-payment rule and its exceptions, and holding that taxes paid after the filing of the illegal-exaction complaint were involuntarily paid while taxes paid before the filing were voluntary).

2004In Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868 , 120 S.W.3d 545 (2003) (" McFadden I "), we noted that the parties agreed that some portion of the benefits paid to the retirees was post-tax contributions being returned.

2004In Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868 , 120 S.W.3d 545 (2003) (" McFadden I "), we noted that the parties agreed that some portion of the benefits paid to the retirees was post-tax contributions being returned.

2004After considering the arguments of the parties, this court held in McFadden II that with respect to the refund method, "the trial court did not err in refusing to apply 26 U.S.C. § 72 to employment-related retirement plans." Further we held, "Because the trial court erred in refusing to apply the voluntary-payment rule to illegally-exacted taxes paid in the years prior to 1999, we reverse and remand on this point with instructions to fashion a remedy consistent with this opinion." McFadden II, 356 Ark. at 131 , 148 S.W.3d 248 .

2004After considering the arguments of the parties, this court held in McFadden II that with respect to the refund method, "the trial court did not err in refusing to apply 26 U.S.C. § 72 to employment-related retirement plans." Further we held, "Because the trial court erred in refusing to apply the voluntary-payment rule to illegally-exacted taxes paid in the years prior to 1999, we reverse and remand on this point with instructions to fashion a remedy consistent with this opinion." McFadden II, 356 Ark. at 131 , 148 S.W.3d 248 .