voluntary payment doctrine in Alabama

2003See Stone v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 771 So.2d 451 (Ala.2000), in which this Court held: "If a party with full knowledge of the facts wrongly interprets them, so that he misperceives their legal significance, that wrong interpretation does not constitute a mistake of fact.... [It] constitutes a mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact, and a mistake of law does not preclude the application of the voluntary-payment doctrine. "`... [I]t is equally well settled that money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts but by reason of mistake of law cannot be recovered.'" 771 So.2d at 458 (qu

2003See Stone v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 771 So.2d 451 (Ala.2000), in which this Court held: "If a party with full knowledge of the facts wrongly interprets them, so that he misperceives their legal significance, that wrong interpretation does not constitute a mistake of fact.... [It] constitutes a mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact, and a mistake of law does not preclude the application of the voluntary-payment doctrine. "`... [I]t is equally well settled that money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts but by reason of mistake of law cannot be recovered.'" 771 So.2d at 458 (qu

2004In Compass Bank v. Snow , 823 So.2d at 678, we held that, in addition to other manageability problems, a breach-of-contract claim against Compass Bank and Compass Bancshares, Inc., by account holders did not satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) "superiority" requirement, because class members were subject to potential counterclaim liability that threatened to "exceed any potential recovery." In U-Haul Co. of Alabama v. Johnson , 893 So.2d at 313 , we held that the "trial court exceeded its discretion in failing to address the voluntary-payment doctrine in its class-certification order," vacated the order

2004In Compass Bank v. Snow , 823 So.2d at 678, we held that, in addition to other manageability problems, a breach-of-contract claim against Compass Bank and Compass Bancshares, Inc., by account holders did not satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) "superiority" requirement, because class members were subject to potential counterclaim liability that threatened to "exceed any potential recovery." In U-Haul Co. of Alabama v. Johnson , 893 So.2d at 313 , we held that the "trial court exceeded its discretion in failing to address the voluntary-payment doctrine in its class-certification order," vacated the order

2006Cos. v. Whitson , 867 So.2d 1065 , 1076 (Ala. 2003): "`If a party with full knowledge of the facts wrongly interprets them, so that he misperceives their legal significance, that wrong interpretation does not constitute a mistake of fact. . . . [It] constitutes a mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact, and a mistake of law does not preclude the application of the voluntary-payment doctrine. "`". . . . [I]t is equally well settled that money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts but by reason of mistake of law cannot be recovered."' "[ Stone v. Mellon Mortgage Co. ,] 771 So.2d

2003See Stone v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 771 So.2d 451 (Ala.2000), in which this Court held: "If a party with full knowledge of the facts wrongly interprets them, so that he misperceives their legal significance, that wrong interpretation does not constitute a mistake of fact.... [It] constitutes a mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact, and a mistake of law does not preclude the application of the voluntary-payment doctrine. "`... [I]t is equally well settled that money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts but by reason of mistake of law cannot be recovered.'" 771 So.2d at 458 (qu

2013As this Court stated in Jones v. Crawford, 361 So.2d 518, 522 (Ala.1978): “The courts of this state have held many times that what has occurred between insuror and insured is of no concern to the defendant — that the sum received from insurance cannot be shown in mitigation of damages for the injury.” See also Sturdivant v. Crawford, 240 Ala. 383, 385 , 199 So. 537, 538 (1940) (“The amount paid by the insurance company does not even affect the measure of recovery.

2013As this Court stated in Jones v. Crawford, 361 So.2d 518, 522 (Ala.1978): “The courts of this state have held many times that what has occurred between insuror and insured is of no concern to the defendant — that the sum received from insurance cannot be shown in mitigation of damages for the injury.” See also Sturdivant v. Crawford, 240 Ala. 383, 385 , 199 So. 537, 538 (1940) (“The amount paid by the insurance company does not even affect the measure of recovery.

2013As this Court stated in Jones v. Crawford, 361 So.2d 518, 522 (Ala.1978): “The courts of this state have held many times that what has occurred between insuror and insured is of no concern to the defendant — that the sum received from insurance cannot be shown in mitigation of damages for the injury.” See also Sturdivant v. Crawford, 240 Ala. 383, 385 , 199 So. 537, 538 (1940) (“The amount paid by the insurance company does not even affect the measure of recovery.

2004See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Massey, 893 So.2d 314, 320 (Ala.2004) ("Because the trial court failed to address the compulsory counterclaims, or the defenses, the October 8, 2003, certification order does not reflect the necessary `rigorous analysis.'"); U-Haul Co. of Alabama v. Johnson, 893 So.2d 307, 313 (Ala.2004) (class-certification order vacated and case remanded for trial court to consider the effect of the "defendants' assertion of the voluntary-payment defense").

2004See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Massey , 893 So.2d 314 , 320 (Ala. 2004) ("Because the trial court failed to address the compulsory counterclaims, or the defenses, the October 8, 2003, certification order does not reflect the necessary `rigorous analysis.'"); U-Haul Co. of Alabama v. Johnson , 893 So.2d 307 , 313 (Ala. 2004) (class-certification order vacated and case remanded for trial court to consider the effect of the "defendants' assertion of the voluntary-payment defense").