14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1896–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.green1 sentence2013Certainly it would be a reproach to our law if an attorney . . . could thus deliberately misrepresent the terms of a writing and hold the client to a bargain which he never intended to make. [W]e cannot close our eyes to the fact that as a practical matter many people would sign such a contract without reading it, when prepared by an attorney, because of the fact that the drawing of contracts is a matter which the average person, and very rightly, feels is peculiarly a lawyer’s business. [¶] [I]t is the unquestioned rule that where the parties occupy a relation to one another which the law reg | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Ratterree Land Co.green1 sentence2013Certainly it would be a reproach to our law if an attorney . . . could thus deliberately misrepresent the terms of a writing and hold the client to a bargain which he never intended to make. [W]e cannot close our eyes to the fact that as a practical matter many people would sign such a contract without reading it, when prepared by an attorney, because of the fact that the drawing of contracts is a matter which the average person, and very rightly, feels is peculiarly a lawyer’s business. [¶] [I]t is the unquestioned rule that where the parties occupy a relation to one another which the law reg | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2009(See People v. Zemavasky, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 63 [redirect examination elicited that the witness saw the defendant “in the court charged with omitting to provide for three minor illegitimate children”]; People v. Pierce (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 193, 205 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 257 ] [redirect examination elicited that “defendant had almost killed [the witness’s] mother on other occasions by beating her until she was unable to stand”]; People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 38-39 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 756 P.2d 843 ] [redirect examination elicited evidence of a “prior homicide”].) In any event, even if we 2009(See People v. Zemavasky, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 63 [redirect examination elicited that the witness saw the defendant “in the court charged with omitting to provide for three minor illegitimate children”]; People v. Pierce (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 193, 205 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 257 ] [redirect examination elicited that “defendant had almost killed [the witness’s] mother on other occasions by beating her until she was unable to stand”]; People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 38-39 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 756 P.2d 843 ] [redirect examination elicited evidence of a “prior homicide”].) In any event, even if we | 1 | 1 |
People v. Zemavaskygreen2 sentences2009Defendant asked the court “to strike that last portion about pornography” and defense counsel asked the court “to instruct the jury to disregard everything after ... my mother abused me.” 6 The court refused these requests, noting that “[o]ne way or another you opened up that he believes his dad let him down” and therefore the prosecutor could “ask him what the other reasons are.” On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike A.’s testimony because, as stated in People v. Zemavasky (1942) 20 Cal.2d 56 [ 123 P.2d 478 ], “it is an unquestioned rule of eviden 2009Defendant asked the court “to strike that last portion about pornography” and defense counsel asked the court “to instruct the jury to disregard everything after ... my mother abused me.” 6 The court refused these requests, noting that “[o]ne way or another you opened up that he believes his dad let him down” and therefore the prosecutor could “ask him what the other reasons are.” On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike A.’s testimony because, as stated in People v. Zemavasky (1942) 20 Cal.2d 56 [ 123 P.2d 478 ], “it is an unquestioned rule of eviden | 1 | 1 |
People v. Piercegreen2 sentences2009(See People v. Zemavasky, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 63 [redirect examination elicited that the witness saw the defendant “in the court charged with omitting to provide for three minor illegitimate children”]; People v. Pierce (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 193, 205 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 257 ] [redirect examination elicited that “defendant had almost killed [the witness’s] mother on other occasions by beating her until she was unable to stand”]; People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 38-39 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 756 P.2d 843 ] [redirect examination elicited evidence of a “prior homicide”].) In any event, even if we 2009(See People v. Zemavasky, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 63 [redirect examination elicited that the witness saw the defendant “in the court charged with omitting to provide for three minor illegitimate children”]; People v. Pierce (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 193, 205 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 257 ] [redirect examination elicited that “defendant had almost killed [the witness’s] mother on other occasions by beating her until she was unable to stand”]; People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 38-39 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 756 P.2d 843 ] [redirect examination elicited evidence of a “prior homicide”].) In any event, even if we | 1 | 1 |
Lundberg v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences1978App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 436, 439 [ 71 Cal. Rptr. 684 , 445 P.2d 300 ]), it simply belies common sense to suggest that the Legislature acted beyond the scope of its broad "plenary power" in determining that the injured employee should be given the benefit of the medical doubt on this issue. 1978App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 436, 439 [ 71 Cal. Rptr. 684 , 445 P.2d 300 ]), it simply belies common sense to suggest that the Legislature acted beyond the scope of its broad "plenary power" in determining that the injured employee should be given the benefit of the medical doubt on this issue. | 1 | 1 |
Cobb v. Lanegreen2 sentences1956(Whitaker v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 186 Cal. 432, 436 [ 199 P. 528 ] ; Cobb v. Lane, 122 Cal.App. 654, 657 [ 10 P.2d 528 ].) *486 Appellants seek to avoid application of the unquestioned rule that a defendant in an action for deceit must have intended to induce reliance by the plaintiff by relying upon Civil Code, section 1711. 1956(Whitaker v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 186 Cal. 432, 436 [ 199 P. 528 ] ; Cobb v. Lane, 122 Cal.App. 654, 657 [ 10 P.2d 528 ].) *486 Appellants seek to avoid application of the unquestioned rule that a defendant in an action for deceit must have intended to induce reliance by the plaintiff by relying upon Civil Code, section 1711. | 1 | 1 |
Whitaker v. Title Insurance & Tr. Co.green2 sentences1956(Whitaker v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 186 Cal. 432, 436 [ 199 P. 528 ] ; Cobb v. Lane, 122 Cal.App. 654, 657 [ 10 P.2d 528 ].) *486 Appellants seek to avoid application of the unquestioned rule that a defendant in an action for deceit must have intended to induce reliance by the plaintiff by relying upon Civil Code, section 1711. 1956(Whitaker v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 186 Cal. 432, 436 [ 199 P. 528 ] ; Cobb v. Lane, 122 Cal.App. 654, 657 [ 10 P.2d 528 ].) *486 Appellants seek to avoid application of the unquestioned rule that a defendant in an action for deceit must have intended to induce reliance by the plaintiff by relying upon Civil Code, section 1711. | 1 | 1 |
Brintle v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr 1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr | 1 | 1 |
In Re Peartgreen2 sentences1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr 1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr | 1 | 1 |
Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher, Inc.green2 sentences1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr 1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr | 1 | 1 |
Johnston v. Bakergreen2 sentences1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr 1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Webbgreen2 sentences1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr 1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr | 1 | 1 |
San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Stevinsongreen2 sentences1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr 1944Co. v. Stevinson (1912), 164 Cal. 221, 234 [ 128 P. 924 ]; Gruben v. Leebrick & Fisher (1938), 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 762, 765 [ 84 P.2d 1078 ]; see, also, Johnston v. Baker (1914), 167 Cal. 260, 264-265 [ 139 P. 86 ]; Moore v. Webb (1933), 219 Cal. 304, 309 [ 26 P.2d 22 , 89 A.L.R. 925 ]; In re Peart (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 472 [ 43 P.2d 334 ]; Brintle v. Board of Education (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [ 110 P.2d 440 ].) Moreover, the act directs that "Each producer delivering his surplus to a pool shall be credited for *816 his proportionate share of the surplus so delivered" and that "The pr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mazuran v. Stefanich
green
1 sentence2013Certainly it would be a reproach to our law if an attorney . . . could thus deliberately misrepresent the terms of a writing and hold the client to a bargain which he never intended to make. [W]e cannot close our eyes to the fact that as a practical matter many people would sign such a contract without reading it, when prepared by an attorney, because of the fact that the drawing of contracts is a matter which the average person, and very rightly, feels is peculiarly a lawyer’s business. [¶] [I]t is the unquestioned rule that where the parties occupy a relation to one another which the law reg | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Reis v. Biggs Unified School District
green
2 sentences2007DISCUSSION I Citing the unquestioned principle that a failure to answer a writ petition admits the truth of its allegations ( Reis v. Biggs Unified School Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 809, 814 , 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 393 ), plaintiff Imagistics renews its arguments that the trial court should have ignored the answers of defendant DGS because they were untimely. 2007DISCUSSION I Citing the unquestioned principle that a failure to answer a writ petition admits the truth of its allegations ( Reis v. Biggs Unified School Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 809, 814 , 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 393 ), plaintiff Imagistics renews its arguments that the trial court should have ignored the answers of defendant DGS because they were untimely. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
West v. Spencer
green
2 sentences1951(West v. Spencer, 238 Mo. 65 [ 141 S.W. 586 ].) The rulings below, of which complaint is here made, occurred in advance of, or at, the trial below and so were in every instance interlocutory in character and hence not appealable. 1951(West v. Spencer, 238 Mo. 65 [ 141 S.W. 586 ].) The rulings below, of which complaint is here made, occurred in advance of, or at, the trial below and so were in every instance interlocutory in character and hence not appealable. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Klein v. Markarian
green
2 sentences1929In Klein v. Markarian, 175 Cal. 37 [ 165 Pac. 3 ], the court say, quoting abundant authority: “It is an old and unquestioned rule of equity that, whatever right there may be to maintain an action at law for damages, a contract will not be specifically enforced unless it be complete and certain in its terms.” “A contract that is incomplete, uncertain or in *476 definite in its material terms will not be specifically enforced in equity.”. 1929In Klein v. Markarian, 175 Cal. 37 [ 165 Pac. 3 ], the court say, quoting abundant authority: “It is an old and unquestioned rule of equity that, whatever right there may be to maintain an action at law for damages, a contract will not be specifically enforced unless it be complete and certain in its terms.” “A contract that is incomplete, uncertain or in *476 definite in its material terms will not be specifically enforced in equity.”. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Beal v. United Properties Co.
green
2 sentences1929(Beal v. United Properties Co., 46 Cal. App. 287 [ 189 Pac. 346 ].) Amplification of this rule and illustrations of its application are countless, and readily found. 1929(Beal v. United Properties Co., 46 Cal. App. 287 [ 189 Pac. 346 ].) Amplification of this rule and illustrations of its application are countless, and readily found. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Calmon v. Sarraille
green
2 sentences1928(Calmon v. Sarraille, 142 Cal. 638 [ 76 Pac. 486 ].) It is alleged in paragraph 1 of defendants’ separate answer and defense that at and prior to the time of the negotiations leading up to the execution of the writings here in question appellant was and had been “the attorney and confidential adviser of the defendants herein.” While there is no specific finding covering this allegation, there is a blanket finding, VIII, “that all the allegations contained in the answer ... of the defendants are true.” This is a sufficient finding that the relation of attorney and client existed at the time of 1928(Calmon v. Sarraille, 142 Cal. 638 [ 76 Pac. 486 ].) It is alleged in paragraph 1 of defendants’ separate answer and defense that at and prior to the time of the negotiations leading up to the execution of the writings here in question appellant was and had been “the attorney and confidential adviser of the defendants herein.” While there is no specific finding covering this allegation, there is a blanket finding, VIII, “that all the allegations contained in the answer ... of the defendants are true.” This is a sufficient finding that the relation of attorney and client existed at the time of | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Burnett v. Stearns
neutral
1 sentence1923In the first place, section 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “Every material allegation of the complaint, not controverted by the answer, must, for the purposes of the action, be taken as true.” In Burnett v. Stearns, 33 Cal. 468, 474 , the supreme court said: “The finding should be confined to the facts in issue. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Colegrove Water Co. v. City of Hollywood
green
1 sentence1917(Colegrove Water Co. v. City of Hollywood, 151 Cal. 425 , [13 L. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Appeal of S. O. Houghton
green
1 sentence1916(See, also, Appeal of Houghton, 42 Cal. 35 .) It is not necessary to cite any more of the numerous authorities sustaining this well-known and unquestioned rule. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Shindler v. . Houston
green
1 sentence1915But complaint is made over the court’s refusal to give the following: “Mere wor'ds are not sufficient to prove a receipt or acceptance of the personal property to take an oral contract of sale of personal property, for a price exceeding two hundred dollars, out of the statute of frauds.” It is said that this refused instruction embodies an unquestioned principle of law, first declared in New York in Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261, [ 49 Am. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Gardet v. Belknap
neutral
1 sentence1915Dec. 316 ], and approved in this state in the very early cases of Gardet v. Belknap, 1 Cal. 399 , and *619 Malone v. Plato, 22 Cal. 103 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Malone v. Plato
neutral
1 sentence1915Dec. 316 ], and approved in this state in the very early cases of Gardet v. Belknap, 1 Cal. 399 , and *619 Malone v. Plato, 22 Cal. 103 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Blakeman v. Puget Sound Iron Co.
neutral
1 sentence1896Rep. 705 ; Blakeman v. Puget Sound Iron Co., 72 Cal. 321 .) From these authorities, which declare the unquestioned rule in this state, appellant argues that a pledgee of stock would be fully protected by his power to give notice to an intending purchaser of his prior claim thereon. | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.