14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Madrid v. Gomezgreen1 sentence2026(See generally Madrid v. Gomez (E.D.Cal. 1995) 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1156 [describing the “unwritten but widely understood code” designed to “encourage prison employees to remain silent regarding the improper behavior of their fellow employees, particularly where excessive force has been alleged”].) 2 discipline constituted retaliation for engaging in protected activity under the MOU and Dills Act was not an issue before the SPB. | 1 | 1 |
Dickerson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014Code, §§911, 954; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ] (Roberts) [courts may not imply an unwritten exception to statutory privileges]; Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ] (Dickerson) [rejecting a “stockholder exception” to attorney-client privilege].) Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he privilege is absolute and disclosure may not be ordered, without regard to relevance, necessity or any particular circumstances peculiar to the case.’ ” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 [ 101 2014Code, §§911, 954; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ] (Roberts) [courts may not imply an unwritten exception to statutory privileges]; Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ] (Dickerson) [rejecting a “stockholder exception” to attorney-client privilege].) Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he privilege is absolute and disclosure may not be ordered, without regard to relevance, necessity or any particular circumstances peculiar to the case.’ ” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 [ 101 | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. City of Palmdalegreen2 sentences2014Code, §§911, 954; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ] (Roberts) [courts may not imply an unwritten exception to statutory privileges]; Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ] (Dickerson) [rejecting a “stockholder exception” to attorney-client privilege].) Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he privilege is absolute and disclosure may not be ordered, without regard to relevance, necessity or any particular circumstances peculiar to the case.’ ” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 [ 101 2014Code, §§911, 954; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ] (Roberts) [courts may not imply an unwritten exception to statutory privileges]; Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ] (Dickerson) [rejecting a “stockholder exception” to attorney-client privilege].) Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he privilege is absolute and disclosure may not be ordered, without regard to relevance, necessity or any particular circumstances peculiar to the case.’ ” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 [ 101 | 1 | 1 |
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014Code, §§911, 954; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ] (Roberts) [courts may not imply an unwritten exception to statutory privileges]; Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ] (Dickerson) [rejecting a “stockholder exception” to attorney-client privilege].) Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he privilege is absolute and disclosure may not be ordered, without regard to relevance, necessity or any particular circumstances peculiar to the case.’ ” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 [ 101 2014Code, §§911, 954; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ] (Roberts) [courts may not imply an unwritten exception to statutory privileges]; Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ] (Dickerson) [rejecting a “stockholder exception” to attorney-client privilege].) Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he privilege is absolute and disclosure may not be ordered, without regard to relevance, necessity or any particular circumstances peculiar to the case.’ ” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 [ 101 | 1 | 1 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. B.T.green1 sentence2014In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1504 (Nickolas T.) recently rejected a similar effort to interpret a “nonoffending parent” requirement into the statute. | 1 | 1 |
Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Boardgreen1 sentence2011(H-CHH, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1213 .) The court explained that “[a] regulating authority may not adopt rules which preclude the exercise of free expression in an appropriate place, even on the ground another place is available. [Citations.]” (Ibid., disapproved on other grounds in Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 869, fn. 12 .) 4 And, absent definite, objective written criteria for providing or refusing a location for free speech, a regulation is constitutionally invalid. | 1 | 1 |
Alameida v. State Personnel Boardgreen1 sentence2007(Alameida, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 62, fn. 10 ; but cf. Brogan v. United States (1998) 522 U.S. 398, 399 [ 139 L.Ed.2d 830 , 118 S.Ct. 805 ] [rejecting argument that federal statute criminalizing making of false statements has an unwritten exception for the “ ‘exculpatory no,’ ” a simple denial of guilt].) Also, appellants were charged only a few months after the statute of limitations had expired on the underlying misconduct, and they were charged with lying within the limitations period of section 19635. | 1 | 1 |
Iverson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2005Moreover, even properly adopted local rules are only valid to the extent they do not conflict with existing law or the California Rules of Court. 16 This is true of a local courtroom rule, 17 as well as of an informal court policy. 18 “While trial judges have ‘inherent power to control litigation before them, . . .’ they have ‘ “no authority to issue local courtroom rules *917 which conflict with any statute” or are “inconsistent with the law.” . . .’ (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ], citations omitted.) If a trial court adopt 2005Moreover, even properly adopted local rules are only valid to the extent they do not conflict with existing law or the California Rules of Court. 16 This is true of a local courtroom rule, 17 as well as of an informal court policy. 18 “While trial judges have ‘inherent power to control litigation before them, . . .’ they have ‘ “no authority to issue local courtroom rules *917 which conflict with any statute” or are “inconsistent with the law.” . . .’ (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ], citations omitted.) If a trial court adopt | 1 | 1 |
Sierra Craft, Inc. v. Magnum Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2005Moreover, even properly adopted local rules are only valid to the extent they do not conflict with existing law or the California Rules of Court. 16 This is true of a local courtroom rule, 17 as well as of an informal court policy. 18 “While trial judges have ‘inherent power to control litigation before them, . . .’ they have ‘ “no authority to issue local courtroom rules *917 which conflict with any statute” or are “inconsistent with the law.” . . .’ (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ], citations omitted.) If a trial court adopt 2005Moreover, even properly adopted local rules are only valid to the extent they do not conflict with existing law or the California Rules of Court. 16 This is true of a local courtroom rule, 17 as well as of an informal court policy. 18 “While trial judges have ‘inherent power to control litigation before them, . . .’ they have ‘ “no authority to issue local courtroom rules *917 which conflict with any statute” or are “inconsistent with the law.” . . .’ (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ], citations omitted.) If a trial court adopt | 1 | 1 |
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.green2 sentences2005Moreover, even properly adopted local rules are only valid to the extent they do not conflict with existing law or the California Rules of Court. 16 This is true of a local courtroom rule, 17 as well as of an informal court policy. 18 “While trial judges have ‘inherent power to control litigation before them, . . .’ they have ‘ “no authority to issue local courtroom rules *917 which conflict with any statute” or are “inconsistent with the law.” . . .’ (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ], citations omitted.) If a trial court adopt 2005Moreover, even properly adopted local rules are only valid to the extent they do not conflict with existing law or the California Rules of Court. 16 This is true of a local courtroom rule, 17 as well as of an informal court policy. 18 “While trial judges have ‘inherent power to control litigation before them, . . .’ they have ‘ “no authority to issue local courtroom rules *917 which conflict with any statute” or are “inconsistent with the law.” . . .’ (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ], citations omitted.) If a trial court adopt | 1 | 1 |
Dillon v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences1987It confers broad, unbridled discretion on Plaza management, permitting rejection on a determination the planned activity will "adversely affect the shopping center environment, atmosphere or image." Any procedure regulating expressive activity which confers such unbounded discretion permits a decision to be based impermissibly on the content of expression. ( Dillon v. Municipal Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 860, 869-870 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 777 , 484 P.2d 945 ].) (7) To be valid, the regulation of expression must provide definite, objective written guidelines for the exercise of discretion. ( Ibid. ; accor 1987It confers broad, unbridled discretion on Plaza management, permitting rejection on a determination the planned activity will "adversely affect the shopping center environment, atmosphere or image." Any procedure regulating expressive activity which confers such unbounded discretion permits a decision to be based impermissibly on the content of expression. ( Dillon v. Municipal Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 860, 869-870 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 777 , 484 P.2d 945 ].) (7) To be valid, the regulation of expression must provide definite, objective written guidelines for the exercise of discretion. ( Ibid. ; accor | 1 | 1 |
Dulaney v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences1987It confers broad, unbridled discretion on Plaza management, permitting rejection on a determination the planned activity will "adversely affect the shopping center environment, atmosphere or image." Any procedure regulating expressive activity which confers such unbounded discretion permits a decision to be based impermissibly on the content of expression. ( Dillon v. Municipal Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 860, 869-870 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 777 , 484 P.2d 945 ].) (7) To be valid, the regulation of expression must provide definite, objective written guidelines for the exercise of discretion. ( Ibid. ; accor 1987It confers broad, unbridled discretion on Plaza management, permitting rejection on a determination the planned activity will "adversely affect the shopping center environment, atmosphere or image." Any procedure regulating expressive activity which confers such unbounded discretion permits a decision to be based impermissibly on the content of expression. ( Dillon v. Municipal Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 860, 869-870 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 777 , 484 P.2d 945 ].) (7) To be valid, the regulation of expression must provide definite, objective written guidelines for the exercise of discretion. ( Ibid. ; accor | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brogan v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007(Alameida, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 62, fn. 10 ; but cf. Brogan v. United States (1998) 522 U.S. 398, 399 [ 139 L.Ed.2d 830 , 118 S.Ct. 805 ] [rejecting argument that federal statute criminalizing making of false statements has an unwritten exception for the “ ‘exculpatory no,’ ” a simple denial of guilt].) Also, appellants were charged only a few months after the statute of limitations had expired on the underlying misconduct, and they were charged with lying within the limitations period of section 19635. 2007(Alameida, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 62, fn. 10 ; but cf. Brogan v. United States (1998) 522 U.S. 398, 399 [ 139 L.Ed.2d 830 , 118 S.Ct. 805 ] [rejecting argument that federal statute criminalizing making of false statements has an unwritten exception for the “ ‘exculpatory no,’ ” a simple denial of guilt].) Also, appellants were charged only a few months after the statute of limitations had expired on the underlying misconduct, and they were charged with lying within the limitations period of section 19635. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Albillar
green
2 sentences2024Appellant’s aggregate sentence remained 22 years four months.6 APPELLANT’S FEDERAL CONVICTION On June 18, 2018, appellant, while still serving his prison sentence for this case at CDCR, entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney’s Office in case No. 1:16-CR-00069, that stated he had been charged in an indictment with conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering ( 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (a)(5)) based on the following elements: “First, beginning on or about March 23 through April 1, 2016, an enterprise, specifically the Dog Pound Gang, affecting interstate commerce existed; [¶ 2015In Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th 47 , the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the offense defined by section 186.22, subdivision (a) includes “an unwritten requirement that the ‘felonious criminal conduct’ that is promoted, furthered, or assisted be gang related[.]” (Albillar, at p. 51.) The court explained: “The gravamen of the substantive offense set forth in section 186.22(a) is active participation in a criminal street gang.… [T]he phrase ‘actively participates’ reflects the Legislature’s recognition that criminal liability attaching to 2All further statutory references are t | 4 | 2012–2024 |
People v. Manriquez
green
1 sentence2016An appellate court may not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless it is clearly abused.” (People v. Manriquez (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1492 .) Here, appellant sought to introduce testimony from Dr. Stefanidis on homeless culture and homeless encampments, including how homeless encampments work, the strong bonds between members, the dangers of being homeless, the safety created by encampments, the unwritten rule of homeless camps about personal space, and the reasonableness of feelings of discomfort and fear when personal space is infringed in camps. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Mitchell v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2014Code, §§911, 954; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ] (Roberts) [courts may not imply an unwritten exception to statutory privileges]; Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ] (Dickerson) [rejecting a “stockholder exception” to attorney-client privilege].) Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he privilege is absolute and disclosure may not be ordered, without regard to relevance, necessity or any particular circumstances peculiar to the case.’ ” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 [ 101 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2013Since briefing was completed in this case, our state’s highest court issued Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th 1125 . 2013Since briefing was completed in this case, our state’s highest court issued Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th 1125 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Chacon
green
1 sentence2013(Ibid.) The California Supreme Court reversed the judgments as to both guilt and penalty phases because the trial court refused to provide separate counsel for each defendant. ( Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 773-776.) The court then went on to address other issues it believed could arise on retrial, including the admissibility of Smith, DeBord, and Weber’s testimonies. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
H-CHH Associates v. Citizens for Representative Government
green
1 sentence2011(H-CHH, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1213 .) The court explained that “[a] regulating authority may not adopt rules which preclude the exercise of free expression in an appropriate place, even on the ground another place is available. [Citations.]” (Ibid., disapproved on other grounds in Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 869, fn. 12 .) 4 And, absent definite, objective written criteria for providing or refusing a location for free speech, a regulation is constitutionally invalid. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Campbell
green
1 sentence2000(Pen.Code, ї 1157; hereafter section 1157.) If the jury fails to so determine the degree, the crime "shall be deemed to be of the lesser degree." ( Ibid. ) The majority holds that, contrary to the plain language of these statutes, an unwritten exception exists to section 1157: According to the majority, murder is not always a crime divided into degrees, and a defendant should be convicted of first rather than second degree murder notwithstanding the jury's failure to determine the degree if the prosecution presents evidence that would support only a first degree murder conviction and the court | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Jack Carreras v. City Of Anaheim
green
1 sentence1987It confers broad, unbridled discretion on Plaza management, permitting rejection on a determination the planned activity will "adversely affect the shopping center environment, atmosphere or image." Any procedure regulating expressive activity which confers such unbounded discretion permits a decision to be based impermissibly on the content of expression. ( Dillon v. Municipal Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 860, 869-870 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 777 , 484 P.2d 945 ].) (7) To be valid, the regulation of expression must provide definite, objective written guidelines for the exercise of discretion. ( Ibid. ; accor | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.