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13 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Estate of Anderegggreen2 sentences2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172-73 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Intern 2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Internal | 5 | 5 |
Haddock v. Quinngreen2 sentences2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Internal 2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172-73 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Intern | 5 | 5 |
Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc.green2 sentences2018See generally Lucchese Boot Co., 473 S.W.3d at 383–84 (refusing to read an unwritten clause into an arbitration agreement); see also Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”); Matter of Cmty. Med. 2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Internal | 4 | 6 |
Centerpoint Energy Entex v. Railroad Commission of Texasgreen2 sentences2015See CenterPoint Energy, 213 S.W.3d at 369 (“If the decision made during a ratemaking proceeding reflects a policy choice that has not been committed to a formal rule, it can be considered an ad hoc rulemaking.”); Witcher, 2013 WL 1876467 , at *8 (majority opinion concluding “a policy that establishes a bright-line rule that is applicable without regard to individual circumstances” met definition of “rule” under APA). 2013See CenterPoint Energy, 213 S.W.3d at 369 (“If the decision made during a ratemaking proceeding reflects a policy choice that has not been committed to a formal rule, it can be considered an ad hoc rulemaking.”); Witcher, 2013 WL 1876467 , at *8 (majority opinion concluding “a policy that establishes a bright-line rule that is applicable without regard to individual circumstances” met definition of “rule” under APA). | 3 | 3 |
In the Matter of the Community Medical Center A/K/A All Souls' Hospital, Debtor, the Community Medical Center A/K/A All Souls Hospital, Debtorgreen1 sentence2018Ctr., 623 F.2d 864, 866 (3rd Cir. 1980)(“[T]he court will not make a different or better contract than the parties themselves have seen fit to enter into . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
Lucchese Boot Co. v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2018See generally Lucchese Boot Co., 473 S.W.3d at 383–84 (refusing to read an unwritten clause into an arbitration agreement); see also Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”); Matter of Cmty. Med. | 1 | 1 |
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplangreen2 sentences2015See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 , 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1924 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); ReadyOne Indus., Inc. v. Carreon, 458 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014, no pet.). 2015See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 , 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1924 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); ReadyOne Indus., Inc. v. Carreon, 458 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
ReadyOne Industries, Inc. v. Roberto Carreongreen1 sentence2015See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 , 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1924 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); ReadyOne Indus., Inc. v. Carreon, 458 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
RAILROAD COM'N OF TEXAS v. WBD Oil & Gasgreen1 sentence2013See WBD Oil & Gas Co., 104 S.W.3d at 79 . 11 Further, the transcript from the TSSB’s enforcement hearing against AGAP—another viatical-settlement provider—does not demonstrate that the TSSB has adopted an unwritten rule or policy of regulating all viatical settlements as securities without regard to individual circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Stategreen1 sentence1998See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 578 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim.App.1979); Alejos v. State, 555 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (extensive discussion of evading arrest). [4] While Article 21.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that "it shall be sufficient to state one or more of the initials of the given name and the surname," we note that it would also be sufficient to state a given name and the surname. [1] The relevant part of the information read: [T]hen and there unlawfully and intentionally flee from Officer Lawson, a peace officer who Bobbie Grant knew to be a peace officer, who was law | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Qualcomm Incorporated v. Nokia Corporation
green
1 sentence2015Given that the agreement’s plain language purports to restrict the arbitrator’s power to hear only certain classes of disputes, we will not read an unwritten clause into the agreement that enlarges the arbitrator’s ability to rule on unenumerated (8th Cir. 2009); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366 , 1372–73 (Fed.Cir. 2006), we note that even under the FAA, the threshold question of what a contract says is a matter of state interpretational law. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. LaCross
green
1 sentence2015In Lacross, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 185-87 , the California court details the "why." Key is the unwritten presumption of "commercial intent." This presumption ofcommercial intent is exactly the same concept that permeates the (Tex.) Transp. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Jones
green
1 sentence1999We adhere to our holding in In re Jones, that the clerk of the supreme court and the State Bar have no authority to impose additional requirements without a change in the statute or rules. 978 S.W.2d at 653 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Alejos v. State
green
1 sentence1998See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 578 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim.App.1979); Alejos v. State, 555 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (extensive discussion of evading arrest). [4] While Article 21.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that "it shall be sufficient to state one or more of the initials of the given name and the surname," we note that it would also be sufficient to state a given name and the surname. [1] The relevant part of the information read: [T]hen and there unlawfully and intentionally flee from Officer Lawson, a peace officer who Bobbie Grant knew to be a peace officer, who was law | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Duron v. State
green
1 sentence1998Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). [2] While the court of appeals did not purport to do any evidentiary sufficiency analysis in its opinion, it must have performed an unwritten analysis because the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and entered an order of acquittal. [3] The essential elements of the crime of evading arrest are: (1) a person (2) intentionally flees (3) from a peace officer (4) with knowledge he is a peace officer (5) who is attempting to arrest defendant and (6) the attempted arrest is lawful. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.