well-pleaded complaint rule in California

2017Analysis A. Preemption and IGRA In general, a plaintiff can avoid federal subject matter jurisdiction by pleading claims relying exclusively on state law, such as contractual claims. ( Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386 , 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 , 327.) The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule: federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly *420 pleaded complaint. ( Ibid. ) However, certain federal statutory schemes " 'convert [ ] an ord

2017Analysis A. Preemption and IGRA In general, a plaintiff can avoid federal subject matter jurisdiction by pleading claims relying exclusively on state law, such as contractual claims. ( Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386 , 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 , 327.) The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule: federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly *420 pleaded complaint. ( Ibid. ) However, certain federal statutory schemes " 'convert [ ] an ord

2007Thus, we must decide whether Linear's right to relief "depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element" of its claims. ( Christianson, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 809 , 108 S.Ct. 2166 .) "Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, as appropriately adapted to § 1338(a), whether a claim `arises under' patent law `"must be determined from what necessarily appeal's in the plaintiffs statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may i

2007(Christianson, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 809 .) “Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, as appropriately adapted to § 1338(a), whether a claim ‘arises under’ patent law ‘ “must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” ’ [Citations.] Thus, a case raising a federal patent-law defense does not, for that reason alone, ‘arise under’ patent law, ‘even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint,

1999We recognize that there is “an ‘independent corollary’ to the well-pleaded complaint rule, [citation], known as the ‘complete pre-emption’ doctrine.” (Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 393 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 2430 ], quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 22 [103 S.Ct. at pp. 2852-2853].) Under this doctrine, “[o]nce an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. [Citation.]” (Caterpillar,

1991Corp., various courts have determined that the interpretation of TRPA ordinances is a question of federal law (League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Crystal Enterprises (9 th Cir. 1982) 685 F.2d 1142, 1144 ) and subject to federal question jurisdiction (California Tahoe Regional Planning Agcy. v. Jennings, supra, 594 F.2d at p. 187; People, etc. v. City of South Lake Tahoe, supra, 466 F. Supp 527; Cal. Tahoe Regional Planning v. Harrah’s Corp. (1981) 509 F. Supp. 753, 755 ; Cal. Tahoe Regional Planning v. Sahara Tahoe Corp. (D.Nev. 1980) 504 F.Supp. 753, 755 .) 10 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule,

2017We therefore conclude that IGRA has the requisite extraordinary preemptive force necessary to satisfy the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule." ( Id . at p. 547.) In Great Western Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indians (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1407 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , Division Seven of the Second Appellate District also recognized the preemptive effect of IGRA.

2017We therefore conclude that IGRA has the requisite extraordinary preemptive force necessary to satisfy the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule." ( Id . at p. 547.) In Great Western Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indians (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1407 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , Division Seven of the Second Appellate District also recognized the preemptive effect of IGRA.

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1999Federal copyright law does not completely preempt state law; it preempts state law only to the extent state law purports to create rights “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by [17 United States Code] section 106 . . . .” ( 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a).) Generally speaking, those are the exclusive rights to copy, distribute, perform or display publicly, or prepare derivative works based on, the copyrighted work. ( 17 U.S.C. § 106 .) “State laws granting or protecting other rights (such as breach of contract, conversion, defamation, etc.) have no

1999Federal copyright law does not completely preempt state law; it preempts state law only to the extent state law purports to create rights “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by [17 United States Code] section 106 . . . .” ( 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a).) Generally speaking, those are the exclusive rights to copy, distribute, perform or display publicly, or prepare derivative works based on, the copyrighted work. ( 17 U.S.C. § 106 .) “State laws granting or protecting other rights (such as breach of contract, conversion, defamation, etc.) have no

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1999If the suit is one brought to enforce a right based upon a contract which relates to a copyrighted production, the suit is one which arises out of the contract and is not one arising under the copyright statute, and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 717-718, quoting Danks v. Gordon (2d Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 821, 827 .) It is part and parcel of the well-pleaded complaint rule that “[a] defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim. [Citations.]” (Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., supra, 522 U.S. at p. 475 [ 118 S.Ct. at p.

1991Corp., various courts have determined that the interpretation of TRPA ordinances is a question of federal law (League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Crystal Enterprises (9 th Cir. 1982) 685 F.2d 1142, 1144 ) and subject to federal question jurisdiction (California Tahoe Regional Planning Agcy. v. Jennings, supra, 594 F.2d at p. 187; People, etc. v. City of South Lake Tahoe, supra, 466 F. Supp 527; Cal. Tahoe Regional Planning v. Harrah’s Corp. (1981) 509 F. Supp. 753, 755 ; Cal. Tahoe Regional Planning v. Sahara Tahoe Corp. (D.Nev. 1980) 504 F.Supp. 753, 755 .) 10 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule,

1990(Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 676 [ 39 L.Ed.2d at p. 84 ].) When the complaint is in an area completely preempted by federal law, the well-pleaded complaint rule is supplemented, with regard to federal-question jurisdiction, by the “complete preemption doctrine.” Under that doctrine, it is settled that “once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” (Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386, 3

1990(Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 676 [ 39 L.Ed.2d at p. 84 ].) When the complaint is in an area completely preempted by federal law, the well-pleaded complaint rule is supplemented, with regard to federal-question jurisdiction, by the “complete preemption doctrine.” Under that doctrine, it is settled that “once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” (Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386, 3