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14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. DeHerreragreen2 sentences2011See People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734, 741 (Colo.1985). 1985(Emphasis added.) This instruction is erroneous in that the statutory definition of “knowingly” contained in section 18-1-501(6), 8 C.R.S. (1978), does not include the phrase “or reasonably should be aware.” See People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo.1985) (the phrase “reasonably should be aware” erroneously incorporates a reasonable care standard into the culpable mental state of knowingly). | 2 | 3 |
Oram v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2025See Oram v. People, 255 P.3d 1032, 1038 (Colo. 2011) (“The mental state of knowingly is a subjective rather than an objective standard and does not include a reasonable care standard.”); People v. Bryant, 2018 COA 53, ¶¶ 98-100 , 428 P.3d 5 669, 685-86 (holding that the mental state of “knowingly” is a subjective standard). ¶ 14 Thus, the court properly applied the mental state of “knowingly” to the conduct element but not to the circumstances element. 2018He therefore asked the trial court to use the following mens rea instruction, taken from People v. Heywood, 2014 COA 99, ¶ 18 , which quotes Oram v. People, 255 P.3d 1032, 1038 (Colo. 2011): The mental state of “knowingly” is a subjective, rather than an objective, standard and does not include a reasonable care standard. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Bettisgreen2 sentences2003People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375, 380 (Colo.1982) ("distinction between acting recklessly and acting with criminal negligence is the difference between, on the one hand, becoming aware yet consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from one's conduct, and, on the other, failing to perceive, through a gross deviation from the reasonable care standard, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from one's conduct"); People v. Bettis, 43 Colo.App. 104 , 602 P.2d 877, 878 (1979) (between recklessness and criminal negligence "the distinction is between becom 2003People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375, 380 (Colo.1982) ("distinction between acting recklessly and acting with criminal negligence is the difference between, on the one hand, becoming aware yet consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from one's conduct, and, on the other, failing to perceive, through a gross deviation from the reasonable care standard, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from one's conduct"); People v. Bettis, 43 Colo.App. 104 , 602 P.2d 877, 878 (1979) (between recklessness and criminal negligence "the distinction is between becom | 2 | 2 |
Parodi v. Washoe Medical Center, Inc.green2 sentences2014Ctr., Inc., 111 Nev. 365 , 892 P.2d 588, 591 (1995), disapproved of an instruction that “a nurse is not negligent if, in exercising her best judgment, she selects one of the approved methods, which later turns out to be a wrong selection.” The court ruled broadly, “agree[ing] with the growing number of courts that have rejected the error-in-judgment instruction.” Id. ¶ 26 Although the hospital does not cite any out-of-state authority, some courts have upheld professional judgment instructions in eases against nurses. ¶ 27 For example, in Gerard v. Sacred Heart Med. 2014Ctr., Inc., 111 Nev. 365 , 892 P.2d 588, 591 (1995), disapproved of an instruction that “a nurse is not negligent if, in exercising her best judgment, she selects one of the approved methods, which later turns out to be a wrong selection.” The court ruled broadly, “agree[ing] with the growing number of courts that have rejected the error-in-judgment instruction.” Id. ¶ 26 Although the hospital does not cite any out-of-state authority, some courts have upheld professional judgment instructions in eases against nurses. ¶ 27 For example, in Gerard v. Sacred Heart Med. | 1 | 1 |
Veliz v. American Hosp., Inc.green1 sentence2014Hosp., Inc., 414 So.2d 226, 227-28 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982), disapproved of an “honest errors of judgment” instruction because, when given along with a reasonable care instruction, “the jury could have found the defendant not liable because it believed the nurse on duty made an honest mistake of judgment while at the same time it also could have believed her conduct constituted a clear departure from the required standard of care.” • Parodi v. Washoe Med. | 1 | 1 |
Kendrick v. Pippingreen1 sentence2013See Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1071 (Eid, J., dissenting) ("instruction simply repeats the negligence formulation-namely, that the jury should consider the defendant's conduct in light of the cireumstances"); CJI-Civ. 4th 9:6 (defining "negligence" as acting in a way that "a reasonably careful person" would not "under the same or similar circumstances"); CJI-Civ. 4th 9:8 (defining "reasonable care" as the "degree of care which a reasonably careful person would use under the same or similar cireumstances"). 127 We reasoned in Young that the sudden emergency instruction clarified the applicable stand | 1 | 1 |
Knapp v. Stanfordgreen1 sentence2013See Knapp, 392 So.2d at 198 ("The emergency rule is not an exception to the general rule requiring reasonable care." (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shawgreen2 sentences2003People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375, 380 (Colo.1982) (“distinction between acting recklessly and acting with criminal negligence is the difference between, on the one hand, becoming aware yet consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from one’s conduct, and, on the other, failing to perceive, through a gross deviation from the reasonable care standard, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from one’s conduct”); People v. Bettis, 43 Colo.App. 104 , 602 P.2d 877, 878 (1979) (between recklessness and criminal negligence “the distinction is between becom 2003People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375, 380 (Colo.1982) ("distinction between acting recklessly and acting with criminal negligence is the difference between, on the one hand, becoming aware yet consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from one's conduct, and, on the other, failing to perceive, through a gross deviation from the reasonable care standard, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from one's conduct"); People v. Bettis, 43 Colo.App. 104 , 602 P.2d 877, 878 (1979) (between recklessness and criminal negligence "the distinction is between becom | 1 | 1 |
Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoosegreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Blueflame, 679 P.2d at 587-88 . 1987See, e.g., Blueflame, 679 P.2d at 587-88 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alamo Airways, Inc. v. Benum
green
2 sentences1975E.g., City of Jackson v. Brummett, 224 Miss. 501 , 80 So.2d 827 (1955); Shepard v. Graham Bell Aviation Service, 56 N.M. 293 , 243 P.2d 603 (1952); Alamo Airways, Inc. v. Benum, 78 Nev. 384 , 374 P.2d 684 (1962). 1975E.g., City of Jackson v. Brummett, 224 Miss. 501 , 80 So.2d 827 (1955); Shepard v. Graham Bell Aviation Service, 56 N.M. 293 , 243 P.2d 603 (1952); Alamo Airways, Inc. v. Benum, 78 Nev. 384 , 374 P.2d 684 (1962). | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Shephard v. Graham Bell Aviation Service, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1975E.g., City of Jackson v. Brummett, 224 Miss. 501 , 80 So.2d 827 (1955); Shepard v. Graham Bell Aviation Service, 56 N.M. 293 , 243 P.2d 603 (1952); Alamo Airways, Inc. v. Benum, 78 Nev. 384 , 374 P.2d 684 (1962). 1975E.g., City of Jackson v. Brummett, 224 Miss. 501 , 80 So.2d 827 (1955); Shepard v. Graham Bell Aviation Service, 56 N.M. 293 , 243 P.2d 603 (1952); Alamo Airways, Inc. v. Benum, 78 Nev. 384 , 374 P.2d 684 (1962). | 2 | 1975–1975 |
City of Jackson v. Brummett
green
2 sentences1975E.g., City of Jackson v. Brummett, 224 Miss. 501 , 80 So.2d 827 (1955); Shepard v. Graham Bell Aviation Service, 56 N.M. 293 , 243 P.2d 603 (1952); Alamo Airways, Inc. v. Benum, 78 Nev. 384 , 374 P.2d 684 (1962). 1975E.g., City of Jackson v. Brummett, 224 Miss. 501 , 80 So.2d 827 (1955); Shepard v. Graham Bell Aviation Service, 56 N.M. 293 , 243 P.2d 603 (1952); Alamo Airways, Inc. v. Benum, 78 Nev. 384 , 374 P.2d 684 (1962). | 2 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Bryant
green
1 sentence2025See Oram v. People, 255 P.3d 1032, 1038 (Colo. 2011) (“The mental state of knowingly is a subjective rather than an objective standard and does not include a reasonable care standard.”); People v. Bryant, 2018 COA 53, ¶¶ 98-100 , 428 P.3d 5 669, 685-86 (holding that the mental state of “knowingly” is a subjective standard). ¶ 14 Thus, the court properly applied the mental state of “knowingly” to the conduct element but not to the circumstances element. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Heywood
red
1 sentence2018He therefore asked the trial court to use the following mens rea instruction, taken from People v. Heywood, 2014 COA 99, ¶ 18 , which quotes Oram v. People, 255 P.3d 1032, 1038 (Colo. 2011): The mental state of “knowingly” is a subjective, rather than an objective, standard and does not include a reasonable care standard. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Young v. Clark
green
1 sentence2013See Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1071 (Eid, J., dissenting) ("instruction simply repeats the negligence formulation-namely, that the jury should consider the defendant's conduct in light of the cireumstances"); CJI-Civ. 4th 9:6 (defining "negligence" as acting in a way that "a reasonably careful person" would not "under the same or similar circumstances"); CJI-Civ. 4th 9:8 (defining "reasonable care" as the "degree of care which a reasonably careful person would use under the same or similar cireumstances"). 127 We reasoned in Young that the sudden emergency instruction clarified the applicable stand | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Quick
green
2 sentences1985Although it is undisputed that inclusion of the phrase “reasonably should be aware” erroneously incorporated a reasonable care standard into the culpable mental states of “knowingly” and “recklessly,” e.g., People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371 (Colo.1983); People v. Quick, 190 Colo. 171 , 544 P.2d 629 (1976), while in contrast the respective statutory definitions require an awareness for “knowingly” and a conscious disregard for “recklessly,” we are satisfied that the error in these definitional instructions did not cause any prejudice to the defendant. 1985Although it is undisputed that inclusion of the phrase “reasonably should be aware” erroneously incorporated a reasonable care standard into the culpable mental states of “knowingly” and “recklessly,” e.g., People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371 (Colo.1983); People v. Quick, 190 Colo. 171 , 544 P.2d 629 (1976), while in contrast the respective statutory definitions require an awareness for “knowingly” and a conscious disregard for “recklessly,” we are satisfied that the error in these definitional instructions did not cause any prejudice to the defendant. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Freeman
green
1 sentence1985Although it is undisputed that inclusion of the phrase “reasonably should be aware” erroneously incorporated a reasonable care standard into the culpable mental states of “knowingly” and “recklessly,” e.g., People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371 (Colo.1983); People v. Quick, 190 Colo. 171 , 544 P.2d 629 (1976), while in contrast the respective statutory definitions require an awareness for “knowingly” and a conscious disregard for “recklessly,” we are satisfied that the error in these definitional instructions did not cause any prejudice to the defendant. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Public Service Co.
green
2 sentences1982Plaintiffs’ tendered instruction was based on the decision of Federal Insurance Co. v. Public Service Co., 194 Colo. 107 , 570 P.2d 239 (1977), wherein our Supreme Court defined the standard of care required of electric utility companies in performing an “inherently dangerous activity.” Liquified propane gas is a “dangerous substance.” Grange Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Golden Gas Co., 133 Colo. 537 , 298 P.2d 950 (1956). 1982Plaintiffs’ tendered instruction was based on the decision of Federal Insurance Co. v. Public Service Co., 194 Colo. 107 , 570 P.2d 239 (1977), wherein our Supreme Court defined the standard of care required of electric utility companies in performing an “inherently dangerous activity.” Liquified propane gas is a “dangerous substance.” Grange Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Golden Gas Co., 133 Colo. 537 , 298 P.2d 950 (1956). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Grange Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Golden Gas Co.
green
2 sentences1982Plaintiffs’ tendered instruction was based on the decision of Federal Insurance Co. v. Public Service Co., 194 Colo. 107 , 570 P.2d 239 (1977), wherein our Supreme Court defined the standard of care required of electric utility companies in performing an “inherently dangerous activity.” Liquified propane gas is a “dangerous substance.” Grange Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Golden Gas Co., 133 Colo. 537 , 298 P.2d 950 (1956). 1982Plaintiffs’ tendered instruction was based on the decision of Federal Insurance Co. v. Public Service Co., 194 Colo. 107 , 570 P.2d 239 (1977), wherein our Supreme Court defined the standard of care required of electric utility companies in performing an “inherently dangerous activity.” Liquified propane gas is a “dangerous substance.” Grange Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Golden Gas Co., 133 Colo. 537 , 298 P.2d 950 (1956). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.