dchra claim in District of Columbia

2008The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the DCHRA claim, and also determined that Count II did not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but that the court had jurisdiction over the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 6 .McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 .

2008The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the DCHRA claim, and also determined that Count II did not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but that the court had jurisdiction over the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 6 .McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 .

2025See Passaic Daily, 736 F.2d at 1549 (upholding order directing that columnist fired for discriminatory reasons be reinstated, but vacating directive that the paper “resume publication of [his] weekly column”); but see Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1131 (Because “a newspaper cannot be required to publish a particular reporter’s work,” it cannot “be 116 constitutionally required to employ the individual as a reporter.”). 7 So the tough work in this case begins, and ends, in determining whether the Post’s reassignment decision was an editorial judgment, and the majority does not undertake that task.

2025See id. at 159-61 . 26 of equitable tolling is a fact-specific question that turns on balancing the fairness to both parties” and involves factors like “the benefitting party’s vigilance, the presence of unexplained or undue delay, whether tolling would work an injustice to the other party, and the importance of ultimate finality in legal proceedings.” Neill v. D.C.

2025See id. at 159-61 . 26 of equitable tolling is a fact-specific question that turns on balancing the fairness to both parties” and involves factors like “the benefitting party’s vigilance, the presence of unexplained or undue delay, whether tolling would work an injustice to the other party, and the importance of ultimate finality in legal proceedings.” Neill v. D.C.

2023It would be contrary to the legislative objective that the DCHRA be “broad[ly] remedial” to read the first sentence of § 2-1403.16(a) as denoting that the filing of any complaint with OHR pursuant to the DCHRA would bar a complainant from thereafter filing a DCHRA lawsuit based on different conduct. 4 See Locklear v. Dubliner, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1342, 1343 (D.D.C. 1989) (explaining that the HRA was designed to “expand the remedies,” not to focus all claims into an administrative channel).

2022While “an employer has an obligation to engage in an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation, such an obligation is only triggered where the employee has actually requested a reasonable accommodation.” Badwal v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of D.C., 139 F. Supp. 3d 295, 313 (D.D.C. 2015) (analyzing DCHRA claim) (emphasis in original).

2016See also Mitchell v. Amtrak, 407 F.Supp.2d 213, 241 (D.D.C.2005) (observing that allowing a DCHRA claim against individual management and supervisory employees involved in committing the allegedly discriminatory conduct is consistent with the status of the DCHRA as a remedial statute that " ‘must be generously construed’ ”). 12 .

2016See also Mitchell v. Amtrak, 407 F.Supp.2d 213, 241 (D.D.C.2005) (observing that allowing a DCHRA claim against individual management and supervisory employees involved in committing the allegedly discriminatory conduct is consistent with the status of the DCHRA as a remedial statute that " ‘must be generously construed’ ”). 12 .

2010March 29, 2010) (dismissing "DCHRA claim insofar as it seeks unliquidated damages” for failure to provide "the required notice” pursuant to § 12-309); Faison v. District of Columbia, 664 F.Supp.2d 59, 68-69 (D.D.C.2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims under the DCHRA for failure to comply with notice statute, despite compliance with DCHRA's statute of limitations); Caudle v. District of Columbia, No. 08-00205, 2008 WL 3523153 , *4 (D.D.C.

2010Aug. 13, 2008) (dismissing claims for unliquidated damages under the DCHRA because plaintiffs failed to comply with mandatory notice requirements of § 12-309); Giardino v. District of Columbia, 252 F.R.D. 18, 24 (D.D.C.2008) ("Because the plaintiffs failed to comply with *1088 § 12-309, their claims against the District based on the DCHRA will be dismissed.”). 3 .

2008See also In re Estate of Curseen, 890 A.2d 191, 193-94 (D.C.2006). 8 .

2008See also In re Estate of Curseen, 890 A.2d 191, 193-94 (D.C.2006). 8 .

2008These include "selectfing] employees competent and fit for the work assigned to them and ... refrainfing] from retaining the services of an unfit employee.” Griffin, 925 A.2d at 575 (quoting Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C.1951)). 9 .At the same time, we recognized that common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress "may be predicated on the same conduct as a DCHRA claim,” precisely because such claims do "not impose liability for a harm that is not a cognizable injury under the common law.” 925 A.2d at 579 (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 .

2008These include "selectfing] employees competent and fit for the work assigned to them and ... refrainfing] from retaining the services of an unfit employee.” Griffin, 925 A.2d at 575 (quoting Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C.1951)). 9 .At the same time, we recognized that common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress "may be predicated on the same conduct as a DCHRA claim,” precisely because such claims do "not impose liability for a harm that is not a cognizable injury under the common law.” 925 A.2d at 579 (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 .

2008These include "selectfing] employees competent and fit for the work assigned to them and ... refrainfing] from retaining the services of an unfit employee.” Griffin, 925 A.2d at 575 (quoting Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C.1951)). 9 .At the same time, we recognized that common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress "may be predicated on the same conduct as a DCHRA claim,” precisely because such claims do "not impose liability for a harm that is not a cognizable injury under the common law.” 925 A.2d at 579 (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 .

2008These include "selectfing] employees competent and fit for the work assigned to them and ... refrainfing] from retaining the services of an unfit employee.” Griffin, 925 A.2d at 575 (quoting Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C.1951)). 9 .At the same time, we recognized that common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress "may be predicated on the same conduct as a DCHRA claim,” precisely because such claims do "not impose liability for a harm that is not a cognizable injury under the common law.” 925 A.2d at 579 (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 .

2007See, e.g., Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, 875 A.2d 669 , 670 & n. 1 (D.C.2005) (DCHRA claim combined with common law claims of breach of contract and defamation, the latter subsequently withdrawn); Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 366 (D.C.2003) (DCHRA claim combined with claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other alleged torts); Knight v. Georgetown University, 725 A.2d 472, 475 (D.C.1999) (suit for wrongful discharge based on DCHRA and alleged promissory estoppel); Roa

2007See Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 739 (D.C.2000) (citing a New York case, Monsanto v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514 , 529 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1988), which answered the question in the negative, applying New York law).

2007See Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 739 (D.C.2000) (citing a New York case, Monsanto v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514 , 529 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1988), which answered the question in the negative, applying New York law).

2007See, e.g., Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, 875 A.2d 669 , 670 & n. 1 (D.C.2005) (DCHRA claim combined with common law claims of breach of contract and defamation, the latter subsequently withdrawn); Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 366 (D.C.2003) (DCHRA claim combined with claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other alleged torts); Knight v. Georgetown University, 725 A.2d 472, 475 (D.C.1999) (suit for wrongful discharge based on DCHRA and alleged promissory estoppel); Roa

2007See, e.g., Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, 875 A.2d 669 , 670 & n. 1 (D.C.2005) (DCHRA claim combined with common law claims of breach of contract and defamation, the latter subsequently withdrawn); Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 366 (D.C.2003) (DCHRA claim combined with claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other alleged torts); Knight v. Georgetown University, 725 A.2d 472, 475 (D.C.1999) (suit for wrongful discharge based on DCHRA and alleged promissory estoppel); Roa

2007See, e.g., Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, 875 A.2d 669 , 670 & n. 1 (D.C.2005) (DCHRA claim combined with common law claims of breach of contract and defamation, the latter subsequently withdrawn); Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 366 (D.C.2003) (DCHRA claim combined with claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other alleged torts); Knight v. Georgetown University, 725 A.2d 472, 475 (D.C.1999) (suit for wrongful discharge based on DCHRA and alleged promissory estoppel); Roa

2007See, e.g., Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, 875 A.2d 669 , 670 & n. 1 (D.C.2005) (DCHRA claim combined with common law claims of breach of contract and defamation, the latter subsequently withdrawn); Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 366 (D.C.2003) (DCHRA claim combined with claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other alleged torts); Knight v. Georgetown University, 725 A.2d 472, 475 (D.C.1999) (suit for wrongful discharge based on DCHRA and alleged promissory estoppel); Roa

2007See, e.g., Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, 875 A.2d 669 , 670 & n. 1 (D.C.2005) (DCHRA claim combined with common law claims of breach of contract and defamation, the latter subsequently withdrawn); Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 366 (D.C.2003) (DCHRA claim combined with claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other alleged torts); Knight v. Georgetown University, 725 A.2d 472, 475 (D.C.1999) (suit for wrongful discharge based on DCHRA and alleged promissory estoppel); Roa

2007See Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 739 (D.C.2000) (citing a New York case, Monsanto v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514 , 529 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1988), which answered the question in the negative, applying New York law).

2007See Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 739 (D.C.2000) (citing a New York case, Monsanto v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514 , 529 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1988), which answered the question in the negative, applying New York law).

2007The court determined that both individuals were “proper defendants in plaintiffs DCHRA claim,” because: “The text and purpose of the DCHRA and Wallace , do not suggest it would be appropriate to follow Title VII here and preclude a claim against individual management and supervisory employees involved in committing the allegedly discriminatory conduct.” Id. at 241. 6 Earlier, in MacIntosh v. Building Owners & Managers Ass’n, 355 F.Supp.2d 223 (D.D.C.2005), the court concluded that the DCHRA “provides for individual liability” and refused to dismiss the complaint against two individual employee

2007Id. at 225, 228 . 7 *716 Other jurisdictions have imposed individual liability upon management and supervisory employees under state law in employment discrimination cases.

2007See, e.g., Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, 875 A.2d 669 , 670 & n. 1 (D.C.2005) (DCHRA claim combined with common law claims of breach of contract and defamation, the latter subsequently withdrawn); Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 366 (D.C.2003) (DCHRA claim combined with claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other alleged torts); Knight v. Georgetown University, 725 A.2d 472, 475 (D.C.1999) (suit for wrongful discharge based on DCHRA and alleged promissory estoppel); Roa