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14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Irick v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013In other words, we must “decide whether the trial judge committed plain error by failing to intervene sua sponte.” Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 37 (D.C.1989). 2013Under the plain-error standard of review, “we will reverse [appellant’s] conviction only if the misconduct so clearly prejudiced his substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of his trial.” Id. at 32 . “[R]eversal for plain error in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct should be confined to ‘particularly egregious’ situations.” Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). | 5 | 5 |
Watts v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000See Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc) (defining plain error). 2000See Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc) (defining plain error). | 2 | 2 |
Harris v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C.1992) (en banc); McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991); Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989). | 1 | 1 |
McGrier v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C.1992) (en banc); McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991); Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Coreas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001As to statements by the prosecutor to which no timely objection was made, we must decide whether the judge committed plain error, see Coreas, supra, 565 A.2d at 600, by failing to intervene, sua sponte, in order to correct or strike any erroneous or improper argument. 2001As to statements by the prosecutor to which no timely objection was made, we must decide whether the judge committed plain error, see Coreas, supra, 565 A.2d at 600, by failing to intervene, sua sponte, in order to correct or strike any erroneous or improper argument. | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2001E.g., Parker v. United States, 757 A.2d 1280, 1289 (D.C.2000). (3) Misstatement of the law. | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995Assuming, without deciding, that the discovery provided by the prosecution was inadequate, cf. Thomas v. United States, 444 A.2d 952, 953 (D.C.1982), the lack of a defense objection narrows our review to a determination whether the trial judge committed plain error. | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1990See generally Ford v. United States, 396 A.2d 191, 193-94 (D.C.1978) (evi *781 dence admissible to explain circumstances of arrest). | 1 | 1 |
Lofty v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1972Appellant relies upon this court’s statement in Lofty v. United States, D.C.App., 277 A.2d 99, 101 (1971), which was taken from the Circuit Court’s decision in United States v. McClain, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 213 , 218, 440 F.2d 241, 246 (1971), that “whenever evidence is brought in which is admissible only for a limited purpose, it is plain error, in the absence of manifest waiver, to omit an immediate cautioning instruction.” 22 (Emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Earnest McClaingreen1 sentence1972Appellant relies upon this court’s statement in Lofty v. United States, D.C.App., 277 A.2d 99, 101 (1971), which was taken from the Circuit Court’s decision in United States v. McClain, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 213 , 218, 440 F.2d 241, 246 (1971), that “whenever evidence is brought in which is admissible only for a limited purpose, it is plain error, in the absence of manifest waiver, to omit an immediate cautioning instruction.” 22 (Emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2000Much of the prosecutor’s questioning related to the period that predated Roberts' receipt of advice or rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2000Much of the prosecutor’s questioning related to the period that predated Roberts' receipt of advice or rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Doyle v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2000Relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), however, Roberts now asserts that the trial judge committed plain error by not intervening, sua sponte, and by failing to prohibit the cross-examination and closing argument of which Roberts now complains. 2000Relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), however, Roberts now asserts that the trial judge committed plain error by not intervening, sua sponte, and by failing to prohibit the cross-examination and closing argument of which Roberts now complains. | 2 | 1999–2000 |
United States v. Young
green
2 sentences2013Under the plain-error standard of review, “we will reverse [appellant’s] conviction only if the misconduct so clearly prejudiced his substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of his trial.” Id. at 32 . “[R]eversal for plain error in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct should be confined to ‘particularly egregious’ situations.” Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). 2013Under the plain-error standard of review, “we will reverse [appellant’s] conviction only if the misconduct so clearly prejudiced his substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of his trial.” Id. at 32 . “[R]eversal for plain error in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct should be confined to ‘particularly egregious’ situations.” Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2003Contrary to Thomas’ position, "errors adversely affecting the exercise of peremptory challenges [are] not structural errors” (within the meaning of Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). 2003Contrary to Thomas’ position, "errors adversely affecting the exercise of peremptory challenges [are] not structural errors” (within the meaning of Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Landgraf v. USI Film Products
green
2 sentences1994Given the deeply rooted presumption against retroactivity, which was recently invoked by the Supreme Court in interpreting a remedial federal civil rights statute, see Landgraf v. USI Film Products, — U.S.-,-& n. 17, 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 1497 & n. 17, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), we cannot say that the trial judge committed plain error in failing to set aside a decision of the Board which predated the promulgation of the Guideline, where neither he nor the Board had been asked to apply the Guideline retroactively. 1994Given the deeply rooted presumption against retroactivity, which was recently invoked by the Supreme Court in interpreting a remedial federal civil rights statute, see Landgraf v. USI Film Products, — U.S.-,-& n. 17, 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 1497 & n. 17, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), we cannot say that the trial judge committed plain error in failing to set aside a decision of the Board which predated the promulgation of the Guideline, where neither he nor the Board had been asked to apply the Guideline retroactively. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.