considers factors in Illinois

2024People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305 , 329- 30 (2000).

2023People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305 , 329- 30 (2000).

2025People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 47 . ¶ 129 In determining an appropriate sentence, the trial court considers factors such as “defendant’s history, character, and rehabilitative potential, along with the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect society, and the need for deterrence and punishment.” People v. Hernandez, 319 Ill.

2023We now address defendant’s contention that his sentence was excessive given his young age at the time of the offense, his difficult childhood, and his potential for rehabilitation. ¶ 58 In determining an appropriate sentence, the trial court considers factors such as “defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative potential, along with the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect society, and the need for deterrence and punishment.” People v. Hernandez, 319 Ill.

2023See In re T.A., 359 Ill.

2022In doing so, the court considers the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West Supp. 2021)) in the context of the child’s age and developmental needs. - 13 - See In re T.A., 359 Ill.

2026App. 3d 200, 205 (2005) (we apply the manifest-weight standard to the factual findings for each factor upon which the court based its property disposition, but we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing the court’s “final property disposition (and how the trial court considers those factors”)); (2) maintenance (In re Marriage of Micheli, 2014 IL App (2d) 121245, ¶¶ 20-21 (we apply manifest-weight standard to the factual findings regarding a maintenance determination, but we apply abuse-of-discretion standard to a maintenance award, as the “court has wide latitude in considering w

2025“A reviewing court applies the manifest weight of the evidence standard to the factual findings for each factor on which a trial court may base its property disposition, but it applies the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court’s final property disposition (and how the trial court considers those factors).” In re Marriage of Vancura, 356 Ill.

2010People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 150, 178 (2004).

2010People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 150, 178 (2004).

2025Additionally, the Jones Court made clear that “[t]he key assumption of both Miller and Montgomery was that discretionary sentencing allows the sentencer to consider the defendant’s youth, and thereby helps ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s age.” Jones, 593 U.S. at 111-12 .

2023Since defendant’s resentencing, the evolving law of juvenile sentencing has been clarified to permit the imposition of sentences greater than 40 years “as long as the trial court considers the factors set forth in section 5-4.5-105(a) in exercising its discretion.” Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) - 26 - 210498, ¶ 32 (citing Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ---, ---, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1314-15 (2021)).

2009However, even though the supreme court has indicated that a reviewing court has virtually no oversight over a trial court's weighing of the sentencing factors, it has also indicated that the trial court's discretion in sentencing "is not without limitation." People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000).

2008However, even though the supreme court has indicated that a reviewing court has virtually no oversight over a trial court’s weighing of the sentencing factors, it has also indicated that the trial court’s discretion in sentencing “is not without limitation.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000).

2005See In re Marriage of Phillips , 229 Ill.

2005See In re Marriage of Phillips, 229 Ill.

2025See People v. Anderson, 2024 IL App (1st) 220864, ¶ 12 ; People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 32 (“Under Jones and Illinois law, as long as the trial court considers the factors set forth in section 5-4.5-105(a) in exercising its discretion, it may sentence a juvenile offender to a prison term greater than 40 years and not violate the eighth amendment.”). ¶ 41 We find unpersuasive defendant’s contention that the fact that the trial court observed that “most defendants probably do have the potential for rehabilitation” means that Wilson and Jones are “not controlling” and that de

2025Furthermore, “[u]nder Jones and Illinois law, as long as the trial court considers the factors set forth in section 5-4.5-105(a) in exercising its discretion, it may sentence a juvenile offender to a prison term greater than 40 years and not violate the eighth amendment.” People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 32 . ¶ 102 In this case, the circuit court addressed factors in aggravation and mitigation and specifically addressed the additional mitigation factors applicable to juvenile offenders as required under section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.

2020See Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 35-36 (2009) (holding that the trial court is required to consider the factors in sections 504(a) and 510(a-5) in determining whether to modify maintenance); Anderson, 409 Ill.

2012Instead, the trial court considers the factors set forth in sections 504(a) and 510(a-5) of the Act and determines whether “to continue maintenance without modification, to modify or terminate maintenance, or to change the maintenance payment terms.” Id. at 36 . ¶ 25 The MSA at issue here provided that unallocated maintenance and child support payments “shall be reviewable after five (5) years.” The July 19, 2007, order in which the trial court decreased the support payments from $20,000 per month to $14,500 per month also provided that the payments “shall be reviewable provided [petitioner] f

2008People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 242 , 307 Ill.Dec. 524 , 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006).

2008People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 242 , 307 Ill.Dec. 524 , 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006).

2026App. 3d at 204 (whether dissipation occurred in a given case is a factual one, thus manifest-weight review applies)); (4) contribution to attorney fees (In re Marriage of Buonincontro, 2022 IL App (2d) 210380 , ¶ 41 (ruling on a petition for contribution to attorney fees reviewed for an abuse of discretion)); and (5) sanctions (Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 120 (1997) (“only a clear abuse of discretion justifies reversal” of sanctions imposed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (eff.

2026Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971); see Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 520 , - 21 - No. 1-24-2294 526-27 (1995) (quoting Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 59 Ill. 2d 522, 528 (1975), for the proposition that “[a]bsent an express choice of law, insurance policy provisions are generally ‘governed by the location of the subject matter, the place of delivery of the contract, the domicile of the insured or of the insurer, the place of the last act to give rise to a valid contract, the place of performance, or other place bearing a

2026Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971); see Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 520 , - 21 - No. 1-24-2294 526-27 (1995) (quoting Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 59 Ill. 2d 522, 528 (1975), for the proposition that “[a]bsent an express choice of law, insurance policy provisions are generally ‘governed by the location of the subject matter, the place of delivery of the contract, the domicile of the insured or of the insurer, the place of the last act to give rise to a valid contract, the place of performance, or other place bearing a

2026Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971); see Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 520 , - 21 - No. 1-24-2294 526-27 (1995) (quoting Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 59 Ill. 2d 522, 528 (1975), for the proposition that “[a]bsent an express choice of law, insurance policy provisions are generally ‘governed by the location of the subject matter, the place of delivery of the contract, the domicile of the insured or of the insurer, the place of the last act to give rise to a valid contract, the place of performance, or other place bearing a

2026App. 3d 200, 205 (2005) (we apply the manifest-weight standard to the factual findings for each factor upon which the court based its property disposition, but we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing the court’s “final property disposition (and how the trial court considers those factors”)); (2) maintenance (In re Marriage of Micheli, 2014 IL App (2d) 121245, ¶¶ 20-21 (we apply manifest-weight standard to the factual findings regarding a maintenance determination, but we apply abuse-of-discretion standard to a maintenance award, as the “court has wide latitude in considering w

2025“These factors are: (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is timely; and (4) whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified.” Id.

2025In deciding whether to grant leave to amend a pleading under this subsection, a court considers the factors adopted by our supreme court in Loyola Academy v. S & S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 273 (1992).

2025See People v. Anderson, 2024 IL App (1st) 220864, ¶ 12 ; People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 32 (“Under Jones and Illinois law, as long as the trial court considers the factors set forth in section 5-4.5-105(a) in exercising its discretion, it may sentence a juvenile offender to a prison term greater than 40 years and not violate the eighth amendment.”). ¶ 41 We find unpersuasive defendant’s contention that the fact that the trial court observed that “most defendants probably do have the potential for rehabilitation” means that Wilson and Jones are “not controlling” and that de

2023See S.D., - 13 - No. 1-21-1466 2012 IL App (1st) 101876, ¶ 24 .

2022Id. at 253-54 ; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill.