considers factors in California

2015A trial court “must grant a motion for change of venue if ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county.’ The phrase ‘reasonable likelihood’ in this context ‘means something less than “more probable than not,”’ and ‘something more than merely “possible.” ’ [Citation.] In ruling on such a motion, as to which defendant bears the burden of proof, the trial court considers as factors the gravity and nature of the crime, the extent and nature of the publicity, the size and nature of the community, the status of the victim, and the status of the accuse

2000Section 1033, subdivision (a), requires a trial court to grant a motion for change of venue if “there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county.” We have explained that “[t]he phrase ‘reasonable likelihood’ in this context ‘means something less than “more probable than not,” ’ and ‘something more than merely “possible.” ’ [Citation.] In ruling on such a motion, as to which defendant bears the burden of proof, the trial court considers as factors the gravity and nature of the crime, the extent and nature of the publicity, the size and nature of the c

2016Law governing de facto parent status A de facto parent is a " 'person who has been found by the court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both the child's physical and psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period.' (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502(10).)" (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 602 (Giovanni F.).) The decision to grant or deny de facto parent status depends on the "particular individual seeking such status and the unique circumstances of the case." (In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App

2012(In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 66-67 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 ]; In re Ashley P. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 23, 27 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 383 ].) “ ‘[T]hose who attain the status of de facto parenthood “are not equated with . . . parents or guardians for purposes of dependency proceedings and standing to participate does not give them all of the rights and preferences accorded [parents or guardians]. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Rita L. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495, 508 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 157 ].) Although a de facto parent may over time gain substantial interests in the care, custody and com

1991Denial of Second Change of Venue (4a) Defendant next contends that the court erred in denying his motion for a second change of venue. (5) A change of venue must be granted when the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. ( People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1125 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 473 , 774 P.2d 146 ].) In passing on an original motion to change venue, the court considers such factors as the nature and gravity of the offense, the size of the community, the status of the defendant, the popularity and prominence of the victim,

1991Denial of Second Change of Venue (4a) Defendant next contends that the court erred in denying his motion for a second change of venue. (5) A change of venue must be granted when the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. ( People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1125 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 473 , 774 P.2d 146 ].) In passing on an original motion to change venue, the court considers such factors as the nature and gravity of the offense, the size of the community, the status of the defendant, the popularity and prominence of the victim,

1992GUILT PHASE ISSUES A. Motion for change of venue. (1a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his repeated motions for change of venue. [3] (2) Pursuant to section 1033, subdivision (a), the court must grant a motion for change of venue if "there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county." The phrase "reasonable likelihood" in this context "means something less than `more probable than not,'" and "something more than merely `possible.'" ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 673 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 687 , 758 P.2d 1217 ].) In ruling on suc

1992GUILT PHASE ISSUES A. Motion for change of venue. (1a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his repeated motions for change of venue. [3] (2) Pursuant to section 1033, subdivision (a), the court must grant a motion for change of venue if "there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county." The phrase "reasonable likelihood" in this context "means something less than `more probable than not,'" and "something more than merely `possible.'" ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 673 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 687 , 758 P.2d 1217 ].) In ruling on suc

1992GUILT PHASE ISSUES A. Motion for change of venue. (1a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his repeated motions for change of venue. [3] (2) Pursuant to section 1033, subdivision (a), the court must grant a motion for change of venue if "there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county." The phrase "reasonable likelihood" in this context "means something less than `more probable than not,'" and "something more than merely `possible.'" ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 673 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 687 , 758 P.2d 1217 ].) In ruling on suc

1992GUILT PHASE ISSUES A. Motion for change of venue. (1a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his repeated motions for change of venue. [3] (2) Pursuant to section 1033, subdivision (a), the court must grant a motion for change of venue if "there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county." The phrase "reasonable likelihood" in this context "means something less than `more probable than not,'" and "something more than merely `possible.'" ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 673 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 687 , 758 P.2d 1217 ].) In ruling on suc

2026Self-Representation A trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if the defendant unequivocally asserts that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial, and makes his request voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693 , 721, abrogated in part on another ground by People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637-638 .) But when, as here, the motion is not made within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial, whether to grant or deny the motion “is ‘addressed to the sound discretion of the court.’ ”

2026(See People v. Lynch, 12 supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722, fn. 10 [“In assessing an untimely self-representation motion, the trial court considers such factors as … ‘the reasons for the request’ ”].) Jamerson-Keosodsay’s suggestion that his self-representation motion should have been denied because it was untimely is unpersuasive because a trial court has discretion to grant such a motion.

2022(See In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952 [“To determine the significance of the sibling relationship, the court considers the factors set forth in section 366.26, subdivision [(c)(1)(B)(v)].”].) The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pricilla and Johnny a contested hearing on the sibling-relationship exception.

2022(See In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952 [“To determine the significance of the sibling relationship, the court considers the factors set forth in section 366.26, subdivision [(c)(1)(B)(v)].”].) The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pricilla and Johnny a contested hearing on the sibling-relationship exception.

2018If the court finds that the factual allegations are true, the court holds a dispositional hearing on the need to remove the children from their current level of placement. ( In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453 , 460, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 .) Bifurcating the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings under section 387 is discretionary. ( In re Miguel E . (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 521 , 542, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 ( Miguel E . ).) In the case of removal from a relative caregiver, the court considers the factors listed in section 361.3, subdivision (a).

2018If the court finds that the factual allegations are true, the court holds a dispositional hearing on the need to remove the children from their current level of placement. ( In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453 , 460, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 .) Bifurcating the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings under section 387 is discretionary. ( In re Miguel E . (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 521 , 542, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 ( Miguel E . ).) In the case of removal from a relative caregiver, the court considers the factors listed in section 361.3, subdivision (a).

1992GUILT PHASE ISSUES A. Motion for change of venue. (1a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his repeated motions for change of venue. [3] (2) Pursuant to section 1033, subdivision (a), the court must grant a motion for change of venue if "there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county." The phrase "reasonable likelihood" in this context "means something less than `more probable than not,'" and "something more than merely `possible.'" ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 673 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 687 , 758 P.2d 1217 ].) In ruling on suc

1992GUILT PHASE ISSUES A. Motion for change of venue. (1a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his repeated motions for change of venue. [3] (2) Pursuant to section 1033, subdivision (a), the court must grant a motion for change of venue if "there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county." The phrase "reasonable likelihood" in this context "means something less than `more probable than not,'" and "something more than merely `possible.'" ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 673 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 687 , 758 P.2d 1217 ].) In ruling on suc

2000Further, “[w]ith regard to the second part of the showing, in order to determine whether pretrial publicity had a prejudicial effect on the jury, we also examine the voir dire of the jurors.” (Id. at p. 524.) The crime was of the gravest order, involving the murder of a police officer, and although this circumstance weighs in favor of a change of venue (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 852 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 802 P.2d 906 ]), it does not by itself require a change of venue.

2000Further, “[w]ith regard to the second part of the showing, in order to determine whether pretrial publicity had a prejudicial effect on the jury, we also examine the voir dire of the jurors.” (Id. at p. 524.) The crime was of the gravest order, involving the murder of a police officer, and although this circumstance weighs in favor of a change of venue (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 852 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 802 P.2d 906 ]), it does not by itself require a change of venue.

2026(People v. Weber (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1053 (Weber).) While states “ ‘ “are free to adopt for mentally ill or mentally incapacitated defendants who wish to represent themselves at trial a competency standard that differs from the standard for determining whether such a defendant is competent to stand trial,” ’ ” they are not required to do so.

2023In determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee award under section 2030, a court also considers the factors set forth in section 4320, which include a party’s “earning capacity.” (§ 2032, subd. (b); § 4320, subd. (a); see also In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 37 Cal.3d 762, 769 (Sullivan) [“ ‘[T]he cases have frequently and uniformly held that the court may base its decision on the [paying spouse’s] ability to earn, rather than his [or her] current earnings . . .’ for the simple reason that in cases such as this, current earnings give a grossly distorted view of the paying spouse’s fina

2019(See People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 816 [aggravating circumstances “serve as a consideration in the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in selecting the appropriate term from among those authorized for the defendant’s offense”].) The information sheet factors essentially duplicate these considerations, none of which directly addresses a defendant’s disposition for “benefiting 20 from the treatment and services provided under the diversion program.” (§ 1001.80, subd. (c).) The fact that the information sheet factors reflect considerations more pertinent to felony sentencing than to