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14 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1999–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2018As this court has stated, "while the failure to conduct an adequate Nelson inquiry is subject to an abuse of discretion standard and, presumably, a harmless error analysis, the failure to conduct any inquiry is per se error." Jackson, 33 So. 3d at 836 . 2017“Generally, this court reviews whether a trial court conducted an adequate Nelson hearing under the abuse of discretion standard.” Id. “[Wjhile the failure to conduct an adequate Nelson inquiry is subject to an abuse of discretion standard and, presumably, a harmless' error analysis, the failure to conduct any inquiry is per se'error.” Jackson v. State, 33 So.3d 833, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). | 3 | 5 |
Torres v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Torres v. State, 42 So. 3d 910, 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“This court reviews whether a trial court conducted an adequate Nelson inquiry for an abuse of discretion. 2017See Torres, 42 So.3d at 913 (“[T]he trial court improperly assumed that Torres’ dissatisfaction with counsel was not based on counsel’s incompetency or that a Nelson hearing, if conducted, would have dispelled any notion of counsel’s incompetency.”). | 3 | 4 |
Kearse v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Kearse v. State, 605 So.2d 534, 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to ‘provide the defendant with the opportunity to explain why he or she objects to counsel or fails to conduct the [required] inquiries.’ ” Maderson v. State, 29 So.3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Kearse, 605 So.2d at 536 ). 2014Kearse v. State, 605 So.2d 534, 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to ‘provide the defendant with the opportunity to explain why he or she objects to counsel or fails to conduct the [required] inquiries.’ ” Maderson v. State, 29 So.3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Kearse, 605 So.2d at 536 ). | 2 | 2 |
Maxwell v. Stategreen2 sentences2014We disagree. “[W]hile the failure to conduct an adequate Nelson inquiry is subject to an abuse of discretion standard and, presumably, a harmless error analysis, the failure to conduct any inquiry is per se error.” Jackson v. State, 33 So.3d 833, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (citing Maxwell v. State, 892 So.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); Nesmith v. State, 6 So.3d 93, 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (noting the failure to conduct a “preliminary inquiry into the defendant’s reason for seeking to discharge court-appointed counsel is not harmless error; rather, it is ‘a structural defect in the trial requ 2014We disagree. “[W]hile the failure to conduct an adequate Nelson inquiry is subject to an abuse of discretion standard and, presumably, a harmless error analysis, the failure to conduct any inquiry is per se error.” Jackson v. State, 33 So.3d 833, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (citing Maxwell v. State, 892 So.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); Nesmith v. State, 6 So.3d 93, 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (noting the failure to conduct a “preliminary inquiry into the defendant’s reason for seeking to discharge court-appointed counsel is not harmless error; rather, it is ‘a structural defect in the trial requ | 2 | 2 |
Sweet v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Id. 2015Furthermore, in Sweet v. State, 624 So.2d 1138, 1141 (Fla.1993), the Florida Supreme Court held that even when the defendant had unequivocally requested discharge of appointed counsel and the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Nelson hearing following that request, “the failure was rendered moot by [defendant’s] subsequent acceptance of and satisfaction -with new counsel and by the dissipation of his reason for wanting counsel removed.” When Judge Bass inquired if Thompson was in agreement with everything, he stated that he was. | 1 | 2 |
Kott v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Generally, the trial court's ruling may also be reviewed to determine whether the error was harmless.”); Kott v. State, 518 So. 2d 957, 958-59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (“The most important circumstance militating in favor of affirmance, however, is the fact that the appellant proceeded to trial with his court-appointed counsel, and made no additional attempt to dismiss counsel or request self-representation. | 1 | 1 |
MADERSON v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Kearse v. State, 605 So.2d 534, 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to ‘provide the defendant with the opportunity to explain why he or she objects to counsel or fails to conduct the [required] inquiries.’ ” Maderson v. State, 29 So.3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Kearse, 605 So.2d at 536 ). | 1 | 1 |
Nesmith v. Stategreen1 sentence2014We disagree. “[W]hile the failure to conduct an adequate Nelson inquiry is subject to an abuse of discretion standard and, presumably, a harmless error analysis, the failure to conduct any inquiry is per se error.” Jackson v. State, 33 So.3d 833, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (citing Maxwell v. State, 892 So.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); Nesmith v. State, 6 So.3d 93, 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (noting the failure to conduct a “preliminary inquiry into the defendant’s reason for seeking to discharge court-appointed counsel is not harmless error; rather, it is ‘a structural defect in the trial requ | 1 | 1 |
Foster v. Stategreen1 sentence1999After questioning by the trial court, Comer persisted in his claim and indicated that he would like to hire another lawyer because Comer's relatives "have a little money." The State correctly notes that Comer's request never triggered the requirements of Nelson, which requires trial courts to inquire into pretrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel "solely to determine if the defendant is entitled to other court-appointed counsel." Foster v. State, 704 So.2d 169, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Branch v. State, 685 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Finfrock v. State
green
2 sentences2017“Generally, this court reviews whether a trial court conducted an adequate Nelson hearing under the abuse of discretion standard.” Id. “[Wjhile the failure to conduct an adequate Nelson inquiry is subject to an abuse of discretion standard and, presumably, a harmless' error analysis, the failure to conduct any inquiry is per se'error.” Jackson v. State, 33 So.3d 833, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). 2017“Generally, this court reviews whether a trial court conducted an adequate Nelson hearing under the abuse of discretion standard.” Id. “[Wjhile the failure to conduct an adequate Nelson inquiry is subject to an abuse of discretion standard and, presumably, a harmless' error analysis, the failure to conduct any inquiry is per se'error.” Jackson v. State, 33 So.3d 833, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Milkey v. State
green
1 sentence2010Jackson, 33 So.3d at 836 ; Milkey, 16 So.3d at 174 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Branch v. State
green
1 sentence1999After questioning by the trial court, Comer persisted in his claim and indicated that he would like to hire another lawyer because Comer's relatives "have a little money." The State correctly notes that Comer's request never triggered the requirements of Nelson, which requires trial courts to inquire into pretrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel "solely to determine if the defendant is entitled to other court-appointed counsel." Foster v. State, 704 So.2d 169, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Branch v. State, 685 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 1996). | 1 | 1999–1999 |