interpreted rule in Florida

1978It is the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one’s judgment of the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law. 346 U.S. at 34 , 73 S.Ct. at 967 . (e.s.) The court continued: [The discretionary functions] also include determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations.

1978It is the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one’s judgment of the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law. 346 U.S. at 34 , 73 S.Ct. at 967 . (e.s.) The court continued: [The discretionary functions] also include determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations.

2019The court noted that rule 1.820(h) did not even require that a pleading be styled "motion for trial." Instead, the court interpreted the rule to "require[] some notice to the opposing party that its adversary is rejecting an arbitration award and renewing its demand for trial." Id.

2019In Steinberg, the appellant's attorney filed a notice setting a pretrial conference a mere four days after the arbitration decision was rendered, and in it, appellant "clearly indicated a desire to proceed to trial in the case." Id.

1999Id. at 344 (citing State v. Stell, 407 So.2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)).

1999Id. at 344 (citing State v. Stell, 407 So.2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)).

1995In State v. James, 402 So.2d 1169 (Fla.1981), the supreme court broadly stated that discovery depositions are not admissible as substantive evidence absent compliance with rule 3.190(j), and based its holding not on any perceived violation of the confrontation clause, but on certain language of rule 3.220(h), providing that discovery depositions “may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness.” Thus, the court interpreted the rule as precluding the use of discovery depositions at criminal trials for any purpose other than for

1993In Douglas v. State, 606 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), this court interpreted rule 3.701(d)(6), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for assessment of points for legal constraint, to include control release.

1991M.P., 453 So.2d 85 .

1985In that case the court interpreted the requirement of Section 731.301(1) and Rule 5.040(a)(1), Florida Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure (as amended 1980, 387 So.2d 949 (Fla. 1980)) — that the opponent of a will file defenses to the petition for admission of the will to probate within twenty days of service of the petition — -as being merely a procedural rule, and “in no sense” a statute of limitations or a mandatory non-claim provision. 390 So.2d 440, n. 2 .

1984The court interpreted this exception quite narrowly, holding that a cause of action against the parents for the tort of their minor child fails where "the negligence charged with relation to parental restraint is not claimed to flow from the commission of an act or course of conduct which the child habitually engaged in and which led to the appellant's injury." [e.s.] 80 So.2d at 705 .

1983This rule requires the State to provide “the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information which may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any defense with respect thereto.” In State v. Johnson, 285 So.2d 53 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1973), cert. dism. 289 So.2d 9 (1974), the court interpreted this rule as requiring revelation only of those having knowledge as to substantial matters involved in the case.

1983This rule requires the State to provide “the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information which may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any defense with respect thereto.” In State v. Johnson, 285 So.2d 53 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1973), cert. dism. 289 So.2d 9 (1974), the court interpreted this rule as requiring revelation only of those having knowledge as to substantial matters involved in the case.

1977In upholding the constitutionality of a traffic speed statute (not driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions), the Florida Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (1970), quoted with approval the following language from People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748 , 92 P.2d 1039 (1939) — “To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.” The Florida court went on to say — “There are many actions of motorists in th

1977In upholding the constitutionality of a traffic speed statute (not driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions), the Florida Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (1970), quoted with approval the following language from People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748 , 92 P.2d 1039 (1939) — “To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.” The Florida court went on to say — “There are many actions of motorists in th

1977In upholding the constitutionality of a traffic speed statute (not driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions), the Florida Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (1970), quoted with approval the following language from People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748 , 92 P.2d 1039 (1939) — “To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.” The Florida court went on to say — “There are many actions of motorists in th

1977In upholding the constitutionality of a traffic speed statute (not driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions), the Florida Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (1970), quoted with approval the following language from People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748 , 92 P.2d 1039 (1939) — “To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.” The Florida court went on to say — “There are many actions of motorists in th

1977In upholding the constitutionality of a traffic speed statute (not driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions), the Florida Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (1970), quoted with approval the following language from People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748 , 92 P.2d 1039 (1939) — “To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.” The Florida court went on to say — “There are many actions of motorists in th

1977In upholding the constitutionality of a traffic speed statute (not driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions), the Florida Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (1970), quoted with approval the following language from People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748 , 92 P.2d 1039 (1939) — “To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.” The Florida court went on to say — “There are many actions of motorists in th

1977In upholding the constitutionality of a traffic speed statute (not driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions), the Florida Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (1970), quoted with approval the following language from People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748 , 92 P.2d 1039 (1939) — “To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.” The Florida court went on to say — “There are many actions of motorists in th

1977In upholding the constitutionality of a traffic speed statute (not driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions), the Florida Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (1970), quoted with approval the following language from People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748 , 92 P.2d 1039 (1939) — “To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.” The Florida court went on to say — “There are many actions of motorists in th