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14 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Witt v. Stategreen2 sentences2020In order to determine whether a new rule of law is of “sufficient magnitude” to merit retroactive application, this Court considers the following three factors of the Stovall/Linkletter test adopted in Witt: “(a) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent of reliance on the old rule; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule.” Witt, 387 So. 2d at 926 . 2005Under the third prong of the Witt test, the Court will consider a decision of fundamental significance if it places beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties or if it meets the three so-called Stovall/Linkletter factors. [29] Witt, 387 So.2d at 926 . | 3 | 9 |
Hughes v. Stategreen2 sentences2025We reached the same result in Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 846 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting argument that Apprendi applied retroactively based on analysis of the Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)/Linkletter factors). - 15 - Guided by our analysis in Johnson and Hughes, we conclude Linkletter’s first factor weighs against retroactive application of Erlinger. 2025Johnson, 122 So. 3d at 865 (citing Hughes and concluding second prong of Linkletter test weighed against retroactivity because Florida had relied on trial courts in sentencing for a significant period); Hughes, 901 So. 2d at 845 (repeating district court’s observation that retroactive application of Apprendi would have a far-reaching adverse impact on the administration of justice and concluding third prong of Linkletter test did not warrant retroactive application). | 2 | 3 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-35 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) (holding that under the Linkletter standard Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), applied only to trials commencing after that decision had been announced). 2004See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-35 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) (holding that under the Linkletter standard Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), applied only to trials commencing after that decision had been announced). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Whitfieldgreen2 sentences2005See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo.2003) (concluding that Ring should apply retroactively under the Stovall/Linkletter test and rejecting the applicability of Teague ). 2005See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo.2003) (concluding that Ring should apply retroactively under the Stovall/Linkletter test). [32] Some published accounts have indicated that there are only a small number of individuals in this position. | 2 | 2 |
Ferguson v. Stategreen2 sentences2016As the Court stated in Ferguson v. State, 789 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2001), “This final consideration in the retroactivity equation requires a balancing of the justice system’s goals of fairness and finality.” Id. at 312 . 2016As the Court stated in Ferguson v. State, 789 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2001), “This final consideration in the retroactivity equation requires a balancing of the justice system’s goals of fairness and finality.” Id. at 312 . | 1 | 2 |
Linkletter v. Walkerred2 sentences2016Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965). - 24 - Again, like Ring, this last prong turns on the Stovall/Linkletter test, which we address below. 1. 2001As set forth in Regan, Heggs does not meet the standard of a change of law which is of sufficient magnitude to require retroactive application as ascertained by the three-part test of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). *260 The first prong of the Stovall/Linkletter test, the purpose to be served by the new rule, does not support retroactivity. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Towerygreen2 sentences2005That significant reliance has been placed on the old rule is an important factor supporting [exclusively] prospective application of the new rule."); State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386 , 64 P.3d 828, 835 (2003) (concluding under the Linkletter test that "the [Arizona] justice system's good faith reliance on Walton v. Arizona weighs against retroactivity"). 3. 2005That significant reliance has been placed on the old rule is an important factor supporting [exclusively] prospective application of the new rule."); State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386 , 64 P.3d 828, 835 (2003) (concluding under the Linkletter test that "the [Arizona] justice system's good faith reliance on Walton v. Arizona weighs against retroactivity"). 3. | 1 | 2 |
DeStefano v. Woodsgreen2 sentences2005Using the Linkletter standard we adopted in Witt , the Court cited the above-quoted language in Duncan and determined that "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial." Id. at 634, 88 S.Ct. 2093 . 2005Using the Linkletter standard we adopted in Witt , the Court cited the above-quoted language in Duncan and determined that "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial." Id. at 634, 88 S.Ct. 2093 . | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-35 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) (holding that under the Linkletter standard Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), applied only to trials commencing after that decision had been announced). 2004See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-35 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) (holding that under the Linkletter standard Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), applied only to trials commencing after that decision had been announced). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2025Indeed, in State v. Johnson, 122 So. 3d 856 (Fla. 2013), we concluded application of the Linkletter test to a materially identical precedent failed to justify retroactive application. 2025Indeed, in State v. Johnson, 122 So. 3d 856 (Fla. 2013), we concluded application of the Linkletter test to a materially identical precedent failed to justify retroactive application. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barnumgreen1 sentence2024As Witt says, and as our cases have repeated over and over, “evolutionary refinements in the criminal law” do not justify “an abridgement of the finality of judgments.” Phillips, 299 So. 3d at 1021 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929 ); see, e.g., State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 519 (Fla. 2005); Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 844 (Fla. 2005); McCuiston v. State, 534 So. 2d 1144 , 1146 - 22 - (Fla. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Frank A. Walls v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2020Walls, 213 So. 3d at 351 (Canady, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Id. at 926 ; Johnson, 904 So. 2d at 408 . 2016Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 409 (Fla. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Mortimer v. Stategreen1 sentence2013In the instant case, at least two of the three Witt factors weigh against retroactive application and, in contrast to Castano , Perez filed his postconviction motion after the Supreme Court had issued its Padilla opinion. “[T]he interest in finality for criminal convictions, and the potential effects on the administration of justice, strongly weigh against applying Padilla retroactively.” Mortimer v. State, 96 So.3d 1060, 1063 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Callawaygreen1 sentence2002See State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983, 987 (Fla.1995). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stovall v. Denno
green
2 sentences2025We reached the same result in Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 846 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting argument that Apprendi applied retroactively based on analysis of the Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)/Linkletter factors). - 15 - Guided by our analysis in Johnson and Hughes, we conclude Linkletter’s first factor weighs against retroactive application of Erlinger. 2005Two years later, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), the Court again applied the three Linkletter factors, cementing their status as the controlling federal test. | 4 | 2001–2025 |
Teague v. Lane
green
2 sentences2005In Teague v. Lane , a plurality of the Court recognized *414 that "[t]he Linkletter retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results," 489 U.S. at 302 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , and that "commentators have `had a veritable field day' with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being `more than mildly negative.'" Id. at 303, 109 S.Ct. 1060 . 2005In Teague v. Lane , a plurality of the Court recognized *414 that "[t]he Linkletter retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results," 489 U.S. at 302 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , and that "commentators have `had a veritable field day' with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being `more than mildly negative.'" Id. at 303, 109 S.Ct. 1060 . | 3 | 1996–2005 |
McCuiston v. State
green
1 sentence2024As Witt says, and as our cases have repeated over and over, “evolutionary refinements in the criminal law” do not justify “an abridgement of the finality of judgments.” Phillips, 299 So. 3d at 1021 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929 ); see, e.g., State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 519 (Fla. 2005); Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 844 (Fla. 2005); McCuiston v. State, 534 So. 2d 1144 , 1146 - 22 - (Fla. 1988). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Penry v. Lynaugh
red
2 sentences2004Therefore, in the remainder of this opinion I refer to them as the Linkletter factors. [25] The plurality attributed the disparity in results under the Linkletter standard to its own "failure to treat retroactivity as a threshold question and the Linkletter standard's inability to account for the nature and function of collateral review." 489 U.S. at 305 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 . [26] Although Teague garnered only a plurality, a majority of the Court soon adopted the plurality's approach in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 2004Therefore, in the remainder of this opinion I refer to them as the Linkletter factors. [25] The plurality attributed the disparity in results under the Linkletter standard to its own "failure to treat retroactivity as a threshold question and the Linkletter standard's inability to account for the nature and function of collateral review." 489 U.S. at 305 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 . [26] Although Teague garnered only a plurality, a majority of the Court soon adopted the plurality's approach in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Duncan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2004Finally, in yet another case, the Supreme Court held, under the less-stringent Linkletter standard, that its holding in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), that the basic Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to the States through the *950 Fourteenth Amendment, did not apply retroactively. 2004Finally, in yet another case, the Supreme Court held, under the less-stringent Linkletter standard, that its holding in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), that the basic Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to the States through the *950 Fourteenth Amendment, did not apply retroactively. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Addonizio
green
2 sentences2004We noted that "[t]he reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments are well known and basic to our adversary system of justice." 387 So.2d at 925 (quoting Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184 , 99 S.Ct. 2235 ). 2004We noted that "[t]he reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments are well known and basic to our adversary system of justice." 387 So.2d at 925 (quoting Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184 , 99 S.Ct. 2235 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.