time limit rule in Florida

2017“Among those circumstances ... is compliance with the time limit of rule 1.540(b)(3), which, like other jurisdictional time limits such as the time for filing a notice of appeal or a motion for new trial, may not be extended for any reason.” Batronie, 884 So.2d at 349 (citing Fla. R.

2015Florida law requires strict “compliance with the time limit of rule 1.540(b)(3), which, like other jurisdictional time limits such as the time for filing a notice of appeal or a motion for a new trial, may not be extended for any reason.” Batronie, 884 So.2d at 349 (citing Fla. R.

2007NOTES [1] Although it did not directly address section 95.11(5)(f), this court noted in Johnson v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 841 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), that unlike challenges to the outcome of an inmate disciplinary proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court has not by rule adopted a similar time limit to challenge orders of the parole commission in revocation or PPRD proceedings, and that the question of timeliness must therefore be raised, if at all, by the affirmative defense of laches.

2007In Johnson v. Florida Parole Commission, 841 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), we held “that unlike the 30 day limit imposed by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(4), to file a petition challenging an order of the Department of Corrections entered in prisoner disciplinary proceedings, the Florida Supreme Court has not by rule adopted a similar time limit to challenge orders of FPC in parole revocation or PPRD proceedings.” See also Spaziano v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 31 Fla. L.

2023See Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509 , 517–18 (Fla. 1999) (holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s rule 3.850 amended motion for postconviction relief on the ground that the new claims raised in the amended motion were procedurally barred, when the motion was filed within the time limit under the rule and before the trial court had ruled on the original motion), receded from in part on other grounds, Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579 , 582–83 (Fla. 2004); Padro-Guerrero v. State, 123 So. 3d 670, 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“As long as the two-year limitation period [of rule 3.8

2023See Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509 , 517–18 (Fla. 1999) (holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s rule 3.850 amended motion for postconviction relief on the ground that the new claims raised in the amended motion were procedurally barred, when the motion was filed within the time limit under the rule and before the trial court had ruled on the original motion), receded from in part on other grounds, Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579 , 582–83 (Fla. 2004); Padro-Guerrero v. State, 123 So. 3d 670, 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“As long as the two-year limitation period [of rule 3.8

2023See Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509 , 517–18 (Fla. 1999) (holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s rule 3.850 amended motion for postconviction relief on the ground that the new claims raised in the amended motion were procedurally barred, when the motion was filed within the time limit under the rule and before the trial court had ruled on the original motion), receded from in part on other grounds, Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579 , 582–83 (Fla. 2004); Padro-Guerrero v. State, 123 So. 3d 670, 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“As long as the two-year limitation period [of rule 3.8

2019State, 951 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (interpreting Strayer to authorize consideration of an argument that trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a restitution order under rule 3.800(a)).

2019See, e.g., Blake v. State, 152 So. 3d 66, 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (requiring that one opportunity to amend be given when a postconviction motion is insufficiently pleaded in regard to its timeliness on a claim of newly discovered evidence); Schultheis v. State, 125 So. 3d 932, 934 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (noting that the postconviction motion had attempted to invoke the time-limit exception by referencing rule 3.850(b)(1)).

2019See, e.g., Blake v. State, 152 So. 3d 66, 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (requiring that one opportunity to amend be given when a postconviction motion is insufficiently pleaded in regard to its timeliness on a claim of newly discovered evidence); Schultheis v. State, 125 So. 3d 932, 934 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (noting that the postconviction motion had attempted to invoke the time-limit exception by referencing rule 3.850(b)(1)).

2010See Wood, 750 So.2d at 594 (limiting claims cognizable under coram nobis to the time limit in rule 3.850).

2009See Gafford v. State, 783 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (noting that the time limit under rule 3.170(0 is jurisdictional).

2006Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So.2d 1386, 1388-89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (footnotes and citations omitted); Bank One, N.A. v. Batronie, 884 So.2d 346, 348-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“After rendition of a final judgment, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except to enforce the judgment and except as provided by rule 1.540. “[T]he one exception to the rule of absolute finality is rule 1.540, ‘which gives the court jurisdiction to relieve a party from the act of finality in a narrow range of circumstances.’ ” Among those circumstances ... is compliance with the time limit

2004Co., 821 So.2d 1189, 1191-92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend a six-year-old final judgment because, among other reasons, the time limit of rule 1.540 had expired, even though both parties believed the trial court had such jurisdiction when they each sought to amend the judgment); Wright v. Scott, 658 So.2d 1215, 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that the failure to comply with the jurisdictional time limit of rule 1.540(b) was "fundamental error which can be raised for the first time on appeal").

2004Co., 821 So.2d 1189, 1191-92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend a six-year-old final judgment because, among other reasons, the time limit of rule 1.540 had expired, even though both parties believed the trial court had such jurisdiction when they each sought to amend the judgment); Wright v. Scott, 658 So.2d 1215, 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that the failure to comply with the jurisdictional time limit of rule 1.540(b) was "fundamental error which can be raised for the first time on appeal").