14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richardson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Richardson, 311 Ga. App. at 370 . 2012See Richardson, 311 Ga. App. at 370 . | 2 | 2 |
Sawyer v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Sawyer v. State, 308 Ga. 375, 386 (2020) (failing to object to testimony was reasonable trial strat- egy where the statement was used to support defendant’s overall defense strategy). | 1 | 1 |
Hinkle v. Hinklegreen1 sentence2026See id. (c) The trial court granted summary judgment to the Hohmanns on Richardson’s remaining claims for punitive damages, attorney fees, constructive trust and disgorgement of funds, and injunctive relief because it granted summary judgment as to Richardson’s underlying claims. | 1 | 1 |
The Coastal Bank v. Larry Rawlins, Jr.green2 sentences2022Id. at 848, 851 (1). 2022Id. at 848, 851 (1). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Patanegreen2 sentences2020Id. at 83-84 (2) (affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress a statement made before a Miranda warning); Troutman, 300 Ga. at 618-619 (2) (reversing a trial court’s finding that a 2-hour 45-minute interrogation without Miranda warnings, during a 9-hour detention from which defendant was not free to leave, rendered a confession involuntary); see also United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 (IV) ( 124 SCt 2620 , 159 LE2d 667) (2004) (plurality opinion) (“fruits” doctrine should not apply to physical evidence, such as a firearm, because “the exclusion of unwarned [but vol 2020Id. at 83-84 (2) (affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress a statement made before a Miranda warning); Troutman, 300 Ga. at 618-619 (2) (reversing a trial court’s finding that a 2-hour 45-minute interrogation without Miranda warnings, during a 9-hour detention from which defendant was not free to leave, rendered a confession involuntary); see also United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 (IV) ( 124 SCt 2620 , 159 LE2d 667) (2004) (plurality opinion) (“fruits” doctrine should not apply to physical evidence, such as a firearm, because “the exclusion of unwarned [but vol | 1 | 1 |
Jordan v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Jordan v. State, 307 Ga. 450 (2) ( 836 SE2d 86 ) (2019). 4. | 1 | 1 |
Norwood v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Id. at 83-84 (2) (affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress a statement made before a Miranda warning); Troutman, 300 Ga. at 618-619 (2) (reversing a trial court’s finding that a 2-hour 45-minute interrogation without Miranda warnings, during a 9-hour detention from which defendant was not free to leave, rendered a confession involuntary); see also United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 (IV) ( 124 SCt 2620 , 159 LE2d 667) (2004) (plurality opinion) (“fruits” doctrine should not apply to physical evidence, such as a firearm, because “the exclusion of unwarned [but vol | 1 | 1 |
State v. Troutmangreen1 sentence2020Id. at 83-84 (2) (affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress a statement made before a Miranda warning); Troutman, 300 Ga. at 618-619 (2) (reversing a trial court’s finding that a 2-hour 45-minute interrogation without Miranda warnings, during a 9-hour detention from which defendant was not free to leave, rendered a confession involuntary); see also United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 (IV) ( 124 SCt 2620 , 159 LE2d 667) (2004) (plurality opinion) (“fruits” doctrine should not apply to physical evidence, such as a firearm, because “the exclusion of unwarned [but vol | 1 | 1 |
Goddard v. Stategreen1 sentence2012“Notably, in determining whether the government or the defendant is more to blame for the pretrial delay, the government includes all state actors, even trial and appellate court judges.” Goddard, 315 Ga. App. at 874 (2) (b). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shirleygreen1 sentence2012Accordingly, the court found no evidence of prejudice and weighed the fourth Barker-Doggett factor heavily against Richardson. 2 In considering the State’s failure to timely provide certain discovery, the trial court ultimately may find that the failure should not serve as a mitigating factor under the particular facts of this case, as we recognized in Shirley, 311 Ga. App. at 146 (3) (c). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 895, 897, n. 7 ( 723 SE2d 100 ) (2012). entry of a proper order. 2012See Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 895, 897, n. 7 ( 723 SE2d 100 ) (2012). entry of a proper order. | 1 | 1 |
Glenn v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Glenn v. State, 251 Ga. App. 336, 337-338 (1) ( 553 SE2d 323 ) (2001) (evidence of constructive possession was sufficient where officers saw drug paraphernalia and residue in plain view after defendant opened door to apartment). 2006See Glenn v. State, 251 Ga. App. 336, 337-338 (1) ( 553 SE2d 323 ) (2001) (evidence of constructive possession was sufficient where officers saw drug paraphernalia and residue in plain view after defendant opened door to apartment). | 1 | 1 |
Hightower v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See Hightower v. State, 224 Ga. App. 703, 704-705 (2) ( 481 SE2d 867 ) (1997); OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (a) (2); 16-11-102; 16-11-127 (a). 1998See Hightower v. State, 224 Ga. App. 703, 704-705 (2) ( 481 SE2d 867 ) (1997); OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (a) (2); 16-11-102; 16-11-127 (a). | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. Stategreen2 sentences1990The Supreme Court, finding no basis for jurisdiction, transferred the appeal to this court. “ The bench mark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ [Cit.] In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) ‘that counsel’s performance was deficient,’ i.e., that counsel’s performance was not reasona *359 ble under all the circumstances, and (2) that this .‘deficient performance prejudiced the de 1990The Supreme Court, finding no basis for jurisdiction, transferred the appeal to this court. “ The bench mark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ [Cit.] In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) ‘that counsel’s performance was deficient,’ i.e., that counsel’s performance was not reasona *359 ble under all the circumstances, and (2) that this .‘deficient performance prejudiced the de | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doggett v. United States
green
2 sentences2012In the prior appeal, we vacated the trial court’s order denying Richardson’s motion because it did not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 651 (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992), and we remanded for entry of a proper order. 2012In the prior appeal, we vacated the trial court’s order denying Richardson’s motion because it did not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992), and we remanded for 1 A defendant is entitled to directly appeal the pretrial denial of a constitutional speedy trial claim. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2012In the prior appeal, we vacated the trial court’s order denying Richardson’s motion because it did not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 651 (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992), and we remanded for entry of a proper order. 2012In the prior appeal, we vacated the trial court’s order denying Richardson’s motion because it did not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992), and we remanded for 1 A defendant is entitled to directly appeal the pretrial denial of a constitutional speedy trial claim. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Richardson v. the State
green
2 sentences2016Richardson v. State, 334 Ga. App. 344 ( 779 SE2d 406 ) (2015). 2016Richardson v. State, 334 Ga. App. 344 ( 779 SE2d 406 ) (2015). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Porter v. State
green
2 sentences2002Porter v. State, 271 Ga. 498 ( 521 SE2d 566 ) (1999). 2002Porter v. State, 271 Ga. 498 ( 521 SE2d 566 ) (1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Logue v. Wright
green
2 sentences1994With regard to Richardson’s defense of official immunity, the trial court relied on Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 ( 392 SE2d 235 ) (1990), and concluded that her allegedly negligent acts were discretionary acts performed in her official capacity. 1994With regard to Richardson’s defense of official immunity, the trial court relied on Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 ( 392 SE2d 235 ) (1990), and concluded that her allegedly negligent acts were discretionary acts performed in her official capacity. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1987Following the procedure announced in Smith v. State, 255 Ga. 654 (341 8E2d 5) (1986), this case is remanded to the trial court for a hearing and appropriate findings with respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and for a reconsideration of the general grounds only of Richardson’s motion for new trial. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.