10 California opinions name it 1 courts 2001–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 903 , 909 [the ‘front entrance was as open to the law enforcement officers as to any delivery person, guest, or other member of the public’]; see also United States v. Dunn 6 (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 300 [in identifying the curtilage, the ‘central’ inquiry is ‘whether the area harbors the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” [Citation.]’].)” (People v. Robinson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 253, fn. 23 .) Laster also claims that the trial court erred in finding he did not have standing to join 2014(See, e.g., U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 903 , 909 [the ‘front entrance was as open to the law enforcement officers as to any delivery person, guest, or other member of the public’]; see also United States v. Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 300 [in identifying the curtilage, the ‘central’ inquiry is ‘whether the area harbors the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” [Citation.]’].)” (People v. Robinson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 253, fn. 23 .) Laster also claims that the trial court erred in finding he did not have standing to join R | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Dunngreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 903 , 909 [the ‘front entrance was as open to the law enforcement officers as to any delivery person, guest, or other member of the public’]; see also United States v. Dunn 6 (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 300 [in identifying the curtilage, the ‘central’ inquiry is ‘whether the area harbors the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” [Citation.]’].)” (People v. Robinson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 253, fn. 23 .) Laster also claims that the trial court erred in finding he did not have standing to join 2014(See, e.g., U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 903 , 909 [the ‘front entrance was as open to the law enforcement officers as to any delivery person, guest, or other member of the public’]; see also United States v. Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 300 [in identifying the curtilage, the ‘central’ inquiry is ‘whether the area harbors the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” [Citation.]’].)” (People v. Robinson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 253, fn. 23 .) Laster also claims that the trial court erred in finding he did not have standing to join R | 2 | 2 |
In Re Zeth S.green1 sentence2016Analysis Pack contends the trial court erred in considering the fence construction in denying a restraining order, because there was no sworn testimony on that issue.5 He relies on the 5 Notably, we reject Pack’s apparent suggestion that we must assume the trial court relied entirely upon the fence construction in denying a restraining order, because at the previous hearing date the court had rejected Richardson’s motion to dismiss Pack’s 8 proposition that “It is axiomatic that the unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence.” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 414, fn. 11 .) In the pre | 1 | 1 |
People v. Arceogreen1 sentence2015In consequence, the “Bruton /Richardson framework” (People v. Arceo (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 556, 574 (Arceo)) no longer stretches as far as before, and does not reach the facts of the present case. | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. City of Hermosa Beachgreen2 sentences2013(See Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1169 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 223 ] [when challenging fairness of administrative proceeding, trial court findings on matters of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by substantial evidence].) As referenced above, in opposition to Richardson’s motion for administrative writ of mandamus, where she presented the same conflict of interest argument, Deputy City Attorney Blits submitted a declaration in which she testified as follows: “2. 2013(See Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1169 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 223 ] [when challenging fairness of administrative proceeding, trial court findings on matters of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by substantial evidence].) As referenced above, in opposition to Richardson’s motion for administrative writ of mandamus, where she presented the same conflict of interest argument, Deputy City Attorney Blits submitted a declaration in which she testified as follows: “2. | 1 | 1 |
Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteriagreen2 sentences2003(See, e.g., Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of Montclair, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 795 ; see also, e.g., Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542, 550 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 623 ] [California courts have upheld vacancy control as legitimate economic regulation].) As a procedural matter, the court also observed that defendants failed to raise their Richardson claim in this proceeding, although it was raised in the bifurcated cross-complaint. 2003(See, e.g., Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of Montclair, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 795 ; see also, e.g., Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542, 550 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 623 ] [California courts have upheld vacancy control as legitimate economic regulation].) As a procedural matter, the court also observed that defendants failed to raise their Richardson claim in this proceeding, although it was raised in the bifurcated cross-complaint. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Russogreen2 sentences2001Accordingly, the Richardson requirement of jury unanimity does not apply to them. ( Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 818-819 [119 S.Ct. at pp. 1710-1711].) Recently, in People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1128 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 , 25 P.3d 641 ], the California Supreme Court settled the *561 question of “whether the jury must unanimously agree on a specific overt act,” by holding that “the jury need not agree on a specific overt act as long as it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that some conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” We conclude the t 2001Accordingly, the Richardson requirement of jury unanimity does not apply to them. ( Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 818-819 [119 S.Ct. at pp. 1710-1711].) Recently, in People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1128 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 , 25 P.3d 641 ], the California Supreme Court settled the *561 question of “whether the jury must unanimously agree on a specific overt act,” by holding that “the jury need not agree on a specific overt act as long as it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that some conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” We conclude the t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
No. 95-1961
green
2 sentences2014(See, e.g., U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 903 , 909 [the ‘front entrance was as open to the law enforcement officers as to any delivery person, guest, or other member of the public’]; see also United States v. Dunn 6 (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 300 [in identifying the curtilage, the ‘central’ inquiry is ‘whether the area harbors the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” [Citation.]’].)” (People v. Robinson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 253, fn. 23 .) Laster also claims that the trial court erred in finding he did not have standing to join 2014(See, e.g., U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 903 , 909 [the ‘front entrance was as open to the law enforcement officers as to any delivery person, guest, or other member of the public’]; see also United States v. Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 300 [in identifying the curtilage, the ‘central’ inquiry is ‘whether the area harbors the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” [Citation.]’].)” (People v. Robinson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 253, fn. 23 .) Laster also claims that the trial court erred in finding he did not have standing to join R | 2 | 2014–2014 |
California v. Trombetta
green
2 sentences2016Unlike the Richardson defendant, Verducci relies on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, under which “criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. *967 479, 485 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 413 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 ].) Furthermore, Verducci had been tried not once before, but on three prior occasions. 2016Unlike the Richardson defendant, Verducci relies on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, under which “criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. *967 479, 485 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 413 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 ].) Furthermore, Verducci had been tried not once before, but on three prior occasions. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Yaqub v. Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System
green
1 sentence2016(Yaqub v. Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 474, 483 .) Richardson’s claim that any procedural error requires reversal without regard to whether it was prejudicial is simply incorrect. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ohio v. Roberts
red
2 sentences2015Crawford held, based on the common law history and purpose of the confrontation clause, that the clause (1) applies only to out-of-court statements that are “testimonial,” i.e., offering “testimony” against a defendant (whether or not in a court proceeding), but (2) strictly requires the exclusion of such statements, despite any applicable hearsay exception, unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 51-54, 59 [158 L.Ed.2d at pp. 192-194, 197].) The court overruled Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 56 [ 65 2015Crawford held, based on the common law history and purpose of the confrontation clause, that the clause (1) applies only to out-of-court statements that are “testimonial,” i.e., offering “testimony” against a defendant (whether or not in a court proceeding), but (2) strictly requires the exclusion of such statements, despite any applicable hearsay exception, unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 51-54, 59 [158 L.Ed.2d at pp. 192-194, 197].) The court overruled Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 56 [ 65 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Superior Court (Romero)
green
1 sentence2014During the sentencing hearing on the same date, the court struck four strike convictions from 1988 and two of the prior prison term commitments pursuant to People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2014Richardson has not carried his burden of proving prejudice as his argument is "simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel." (People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 937 .) Based on the foregoing record, we conclude Richardson has failed to meet his burden of establishing Samimi's performance was deficient or prejudicial. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco
green
2 sentences2013He noted that Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 14 ] (Breslin) did not support this proposition, nor did Richardson cite any other “case law requiring the investigative entity to provide as detailed of an ‘actual’ investigatory activity as petitioner desired.” In the absence of any evidence showing that the Contra Costa County District Attorney did not conduct an investigation, the December 15, 2008 document evidencing its decision not to prosecute supported the Commission’s conclusion that the statute of limitations was tolled until that 2013He noted that Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 14 ] (Breslin) did not support this proposition, nor did Richardson cite any other “case law requiring the investigative entity to provide as detailed of an ‘actual’ investigatory activity as petitioner desired.” In the absence of any evidence showing that the Contra Costa County District Attorney did not conduct an investigation, the December 15, 2008 document evidencing its decision not to prosecute supported the Commission’s conclusion that the statute of limitations was tolled until that | 1 | 2013–2013 |
PARKOWNERS ASS'N v. City of Montclair
green
1 sentence2003(See, e.g., Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of Montclair, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 795 ; see also, e.g., Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542, 550 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 623 ] [California courts have upheld vacancy control as legitimate economic regulation].) As a procedural matter, the court also observed that defendants failed to raise their Richardson claim in this proceeding, although it was raised in the bifurcated cross-complaint. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.