8 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ojedagreen2 sentences2015In People v. Ojeda, 110 Ill. 2015In People v. Ojeda, 110 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences2015Brown, 236 Ill. 2d at 189 (quoting People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998)). 2015Brown, 236 Ill. 2d at 189 (quoting People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998)). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Childressgreen2 sentences2023See People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 175 , 730 N.E.2d 32 (2000) (explaining “[c]laims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are measured against the same standard as those dealing with ineffective assistance of trial counsel,” and “[u]nless the underlying issue is meritorious, petitioner suffered no prejudice from counsel’s failure to raise it on direct appeal”). 2023See People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 175 , 730 N.E.2d 32 (2000) (explaining “[c]laims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are measured against the same standard as those dealing with ineffective assistance of trial counsel,” and “[u]nless the underlying issue is meritorious, petitioner suffered no prejudice from counsel’s failure to raise it on direct appeal”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coopergreen2 sentences2023As there was no evidence defendant’s confession was involuntary under the Richardson factors, “defense counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress [on this basis] does not establish incompetent representation.” Id.; see People v. Cooper, 2013 IL App (1st) 113030, ¶¶ 66-68 , 991 N.E.2d 789 (holding the defendant could not “establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to focus on his mental deficiencies” in that there was no “reasonable probability [the] defendant’s motion to suppress would have been granted”). ¶ 33 As trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to base the pretria 2023As there was no evidence defendant’s confession was involuntary under the Richardson factors, “defense counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress [on this basis] does not establish incompetent representation.” Id.; see People v. Cooper, 2013 IL App (1st) 113030, ¶¶ 66-68 , 991 N.E.2d 789 (holding the defendant could not “establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to focus on his mental deficiencies” in that there was no “reasonable probability [the] defendant’s motion to suppress would have been granted”). ¶ 33 As trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to base the pretria | 1 | 1 |
People v. Beangreen2 sentences1991App. 3d 863, 865 , 496 N.E.2d 295, 296-97 (applying the above Richardson analysis in context of the Act). 1991App. 3d 863, 865 , 496 N.E.2d 295, 296-97 (applying the above Richardson analysis in context of the Act). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. DiVincenzo
green
2 sentences2015In - 48 - No. 1-11-3075 DiVincenzo the supreme court found that the involuntary manslaughter instruction should have been given in part because "[s]ome of this evidence could have suggested to the jury that defendant acted recklessly but without knowledge of a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. *** Determination of defendant's mental state may be inferred from the circumstantial evidence [citation], and this task is particularly suited to the jury." (Emphasis added.) DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 251-52 . ¶ 173 The instruction on involuntary manslaughter was critical to Richardson' 2015In DiVincenzo the supreme court found that the involuntary manslaughter instruction should have been given in part because “[s]ome of this evidence could have suggested to the jury that defendant acted recklessly but without knowledge of a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. *** Determination of defendant’s mental state may be inferred from the circumstantial evidence [citation], and this task is particularly suited to the jury.” (Emphasis added.) DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 251-52 . ¶ 173 The instruction on involuntary manslaughter was critical to Richardson’s defense case, yet t | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 46 . 2015Id. at 46 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences2015Brown, 236 Ill. 2d at 189 (quoting People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998)). 2015Brown, 236 Ill. 2d at 189 (quoting People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998)). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Dowding
green
1 sentence2020Viewing the whole of the trial court’s statements, it is apparent that this harsh sentence was not improperly lengthened based on the fact that Mr. Richardson’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm. ¶ 43 Mr. Richardson compares his case to People v. Abdelhadi, 2012 IL App (2d) 111053 , and Dowding, 388 Ill. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Zelaya v. Frost
green
2 sentences2018The court adopted the Richardson analysis "because it encourages settlement of visitation issues and because it offers protection when the promise to return the child is breached either because it was falsely made at the outset or because the parent decides at a later time not to return the child." Id. ¶ 33 We follow Richardson . 2018The court adopted the Richardson analysis "because it encourages settlement of visitation issues and because it offers protection when the promise to return the child is breached either because it was falsely made at the outset or because the parent decides at a later time not to return the child." Id. ¶ 33 We follow Richardson . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
The People v. Romero
green
2 sentences1977(People v. Romero, 36 Ill. 2d 315 , 223 N.E.2d 121 .) The statements of the prosecutor so prejudiced and inflamed the jury against Richardson’s defense that he was deprived of a fair trial. 1977(People v. Romero, 36 Ill. 2d 315 , 223 N.E.2d 121 .) The statements of the prosecutor so prejudiced and inflamed the jury against Richardson’s defense that he was deprived of a fair trial. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
The PEOPLE v. Heard
green
2 sentences1973It is not intended as a linguistic exercise whereby the prosecutor must eliminate all possibility of misconstruction.” By applying the Richardson standard and construing the indictment in the light most favorable to the State, we might overlook the substitution in the indictment of the word “and” for the proper word “or.” However, even if the indictment had properly listed each offense in the alternative People v. Heard (1970), 47 Ill.2d 501 , 266 N.E.2d 340 , would compel our reversing the convictions. 1973It is not intended as a linguistic exercise whereby the prosecutor must eliminate all possibility of misconstruction.” By applying the Richardson standard and construing the indictment in the light most favorable to the State, we might overlook the substitution in the indictment of the word “and” for the proper word “or.” However, even if the indictment had properly listed each offense in the alternative People v. Heard (1970), 47 Ill.2d 501 , 266 N.E.2d 340 , would compel our reversing the convictions. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.