Chimel exception in Illinois

2014The Court noted that “[t]o read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications [i.e., officer safety and - 32 - preventing the destruction of evidence] underlying the Chimel exception.” Id. at 343 .

2014The Court noted that “[t]o read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications [i.e., officer safety and - 32 - preventing the destruction of evidence] underlying the Chimel exception.” Id. at 343 .

2014The Gant Court itself expressly stated its desire to keep the rule of Belton tethered to ‘the justifications underlying the Chimel exception,’ id., and Chimel did not involve a car search.

2014The Gant Court itself expressly stated its desire to keep the rule of Belton tethered to ‘the justifications underlying the Chimel exception,’ id., and Chimel did not involve a car search.

1990App. 1984), 683 S.W.2d 411 .) In this case, where the defendant was not in the vehicle prior to arrest, the Chimel standard applies: when lawfully arresting a person, the police may search the arrestee and the area within his immediate control. ( Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 ; Ill.

1990App. 1984), 683 S.W.2d 411 .) In this case, where the defendant was not in the vehicle prior to arrest, the Chimel standard applies: when lawfully arresting a person, the police may search the arrestee and the area within his immediate control. ( Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 ; Ill.

1993“PROTECTIVE SWEEP” Finally, the State argues that the police were lawfully on defendant’s premises while conducting a “protective sweep.” In Maryland v. Buie (1990), 494 U.S. 325, 334 , 108 L.

1993“PROTECTIVE SWEEP” Finally, the State argues that the police were lawfully on defendant’s premises while conducting a “protective sweep.” In Maryland v. Buie (1990), 494 U.S. 325, 334 , 108 L.

1990App. 1984), 683 S.W.2d 411 .) In this case, where the defendant was not in the vehicle prior to arrest, the Chimel standard applies: when lawfully arresting a person, the police may search the arrestee and the area within his immediate control.

1990App. 1984), 683 S.W.2d 411 .) In this case, where the defendant was not in the vehicle prior to arrest, the Chimel standard applies: when lawfully arresting a person, the police may search the arrestee and the area within his immediate control.

1990Ed. 2d 768 , 101 S. Ct. 2860 , the Court applied the Chimel doctrine to situations where the arrestee was in full custodial arrest and under close control of the police in holding that the search of the person (Robinson) and the search of the passenger compartment (Belton) were proper.

1990Ed. 2d 768 , 101 S. Ct. 2860 , the Court applied the Chimel doctrine to situations where the arrestee was in full custodial arrest and under close control of the police in holding that the search of the person (Robinson) and the search of the passenger compartment (Belton) were proper.

1982In People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 239, 244 , 311 N.E.2d 681, 684 , the search of a dog food bag 7 to 10 feet from defendant was upheld.

1982In People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 239, 244 , 311 N.E.2d 681, 684 , the search of a dog food bag 7 to 10 feet from defendant was upheld.

1977An analogous situation was presented in United States v. Griffith, 537 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976).

1977An analogous situation was presented in United States v. Griffith, 537 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976).

1973A search may be incident to a lawful arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity thereof. ( Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 , 84 S.Ct. 889 ; People v. Jeffries, 31 Ill.2d 597 . ) However, pre- Chimel searches have been upheld as incident to an arrest, although conducted a considerable length of time after the arrest and conducted out of the presence of the defendant. *409 In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , the defendant was arrested in the living room of his four-room ap

1973A search may be incident to a lawful arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity thereof. ( Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 , 84 S.Ct. 889 ; People v. Jeffries, 31 Ill.2d 597 . ) However, pre- Chimel searches have been upheld as incident to an arrest, although conducted a considerable length of time after the arrest and conducted out of the presence of the defendant. *409 In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , the defendant was arrested in the living room of his four-room ap

1973A search may be incident to a lawful arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity thereof. ( Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 , 84 S.Ct. 889 ; People v. Jeffries, 31 Ill.2d 597 . ) However, pre- Chimel searches have been upheld as incident to an arrest, although conducted a considerable length of time after the arrest and conducted out of the presence of the defendant. *409 In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , the defendant was arrested in the living room of his four-room ap

1973A search may be incident to a lawful arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity thereof. ( Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 , 84 S.Ct. 889 ; People v. Jeffries, 31 Ill.2d 597 . ) However, pre- Chimel searches have been upheld as incident to an arrest, although conducted a considerable length of time after the arrest and conducted out of the presence of the defendant. *409 In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , the defendant was arrested in the living room of his four-room ap

1973Defendant points out, however, that the Illinois courts have consistently limited the scope of a permissible search incident to an arrest to that which “is reasonably necessary to protect the officers from attack, to prevent the escape of the prisoner, or to discover the fruits of the crime * # People v. Alexander, 21 Ill.2d 347 , 172 N.E.2d 785 (1961).

1973Defendant points out, however, that the Illinois courts have consistently limited the scope of a permissible search incident to an arrest to that which “is reasonably necessary to protect the officers from attack, to prevent the escape of the prisoner, or to discover the fruits of the crime * # People v. Alexander, 21 Ill.2d 347 , 172 N.E.2d 785 (1961).

1973A search may be incident to a lawful arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity thereof. ( Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 , 84 S.Ct. 889 ; People v. Jeffries, 31 Ill.2d 597 . ) However, pre- Chimel searches have been upheld as incident to an arrest, although conducted a considerable length of time after the arrest and conducted out of the presence of the defendant. *409 In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , the defendant was arrested in the living room of his four-room ap

1972Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 stated that the right to search (an automobile) and the validity of tire seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest.

1972Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 stated that the right to search (an automobile) and the validity of tire seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest.