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14 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Guestgreen2 sentences2025App. 3d at 600. “[A] defendant must still meet the Strickland test unless the case involves a complete failure to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 500 (2000). ¶ 86 “The choice of defense theory is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy, and counsel has the ultimate authority to decide this trial strategy.” People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995). 2023The record shows the trial court barring counsel from using a photo of Lawson (proposed Defense Exhibit 2), which, in the court’s view, would have required counsel to have litigated the Lynch motion he withdrew before trial. ¶ 66 While “the choice of defense theory is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy” and counsel “has the ultimate authority to decide” strategy (People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995)), counsel still must observe “prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 687 -89. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Rameygreen2 sentences2007See People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 53-55 (1992). 2007See People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 53-55 (1992). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2025Defense counsel is “not required to manufacture a defense where none exists.” People v. Lopez, 242 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nievesgreen1 sentence2025App. 3d at 600. “[A] defendant must still meet the Strickland test unless the case involves a complete failure to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 500 (2000). ¶ 86 “The choice of defense theory is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy, and counsel has the ultimate authority to decide this trial strategy.” People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Upshawgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., People v. Upshaw, 2017 IL App (1st) 151405, ¶ 39 . ¶ 57 A key point of the Krankel procedure is to generate a record of counsel’s reasons for trying the case in a particular way, so that we can determine whether the defense presented was the result of an actual, reasonable, and informed strategic decision, or the result of incompetence or literal neglect, often in the form of a failure to investigate and thus develop a potential line of defense. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jamesgreen1 sentence2019People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶ 154 (defendant could not state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance based on claimed errors in defense counsel’s closing argument). | 1 | 1 |
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.green2 sentences1990We note from the outset that our analysis and decision in this matter, to a great extent, begins with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 , and concerns the inquiry of "what degree of fault a private person bringing a defamation action against a media defendant must prove in *137 order to recover actual damages [3] under (Illinois) State constitutional and (common) law, given the fact that the Supreme Court left to the States the choice of which standard of fault was to be imposed in defamation actions 1990We note from the outset that our analysis and decision in this matter, to a great extent, begins with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 , and concerns the inquiry of "what degree of fault a private person bringing a defamation action against a media defendant must prove in *137 order to recover actual damages [3] under (Illinois) State constitutional and (common) law, given the fact that the Supreme Court left to the States the choice of which standard of fault was to be imposed in defamation actions | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Massey
green
1 sentence2024People v. Massey, 2019 IL App (1st) 162407, ¶ 33 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bhutani v. Barrington Bank and Trust Company, N.A.
green
1 sentence2015Here, the complete lack of identity of the claims makes clear that the choice of test would have no effect on the outcome. - 10 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140972 ¶ 28 The bank argues that Bhutani’s appeal is moot as to the replevin action because the equipment has been removed from the property. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence1995Ed. 2d at 694-95 , 104 S. Ct. at 2065 .) We also note that the choice of defense theory is ordinarily a matter of trial , strategy, and counsel has the ultimate authority to decide this trial strategy. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Housby
green
2 sentences1989Second, the jurors were told, ‘The law presumes,’ instead of ‘You may presume ***.’ The court concluded that these elements of the instruction made it mandatory, not permissive, in the eyes of the reasonable juror.” 84 Ill. 2d at 432 . 1989Second, the jurors were told, `The law presumes,' instead of `You may presume * * *.' The court concluded that these elements of the instruction made it mandatory, not permissive, in the eyes of the reasonable juror." 84 Ill.2d at 432 . • 11 It is clear from Housby that the factual premise upon which a statutory presumption is predicated must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Hicks
green
1 sentence1987(People v. Hicks (1981), 101 Ill. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1981Second, the jurors were told, “The law presumes,” instead of “You may presume.” ( 442 U.S. 510, 515 , 61 L. 1981Second, the jurors were told, “The law presumes,” instead of “You may presume.” ( 442 U.S. 510, 515 , 61 L. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.