14 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1873–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Estate of Piriegreen2 sentences2009App. 3d 759, 763 (1988) (the court applied the prudent-person standard to a corporate guardian but not with regard to statutory investments); see also In re Estate of Pirie, 141 Ill. 2009In re Guardianship of Connor, 170 Ill.App.3d 759, 763 , 121 Ill.Dec. 408 , 525 N.E.2d 214 (1988) (the court applied the prudent-person standard to a corporate guardian but not with regard to statutory investments); see also In re Estate of Pirie, 141 Ill.App.3d 750, 766 , 97 Ill.Dec. 225 , 492 N.E.2d 884 (1986) (the court interpreted a portion of the Probate Act to apply the prudent-person standard to investments by corporate executors; it also agreed that if the prudent-investor standard is to be applied, it should be applied by the legislature and not the court). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Application of Cook County Collectorgreen2 sentences2009Elsie Bee, 228 Ill. 2009Elsie Bee, 228 Ill.App.3d at 734 , 170 Ill.Dec. 649 , 593 N.E.2d 538 . | 1 | 3 |
In Re Guardianship of Connorgreen2 sentences2009In re Guardianship of Connor, 170 Ill.App.3d 759, 763 , 121 Ill.Dec. 408 , 525 N.E.2d 214 (1988) (the court applied the prudent-person standard to a corporate guardian but not with regard to statutory investments); see also In re Estate of Pirie, 141 Ill.App.3d 750, 766 , 97 Ill.Dec. 225 , 492 N.E.2d 884 (1986) (the court interpreted a portion of the Probate Act to apply the prudent-person standard to investments by corporate executors; it also agreed that if the prudent-investor standard is to be applied, it should be applied by the legislature and not the court). 2009In re Guardianship of Connor, 170 Ill.App.3d 759, 763 , 121 Ill.Dec. 408 , 525 N.E.2d 214 (1988) (the court applied the prudent-person standard to a corporate guardian but not with regard to statutory investments); see also In re Estate of Pirie, 141 Ill.App.3d 750, 766 , 97 Ill.Dec. 225 , 492 N.E.2d 884 (1986) (the court interpreted a portion of the Probate Act to apply the prudent-person standard to investments by corporate executors; it also agreed that if the prudent-investor standard is to be applied, it should be applied by the legislature and not the court). | 1 | 2 |
Advincula v. United Blood Servicesgreen2 sentences2009In Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (1996), the court stated that, generally, the basic standard of care in a negligence case is that of the “ordinarily careful person” or the “reasonably prudent person.” The Advincula court further stated: “To be complete, however, a standard of care must also be subjective, in that it makes proper allowance for the actor’s capacity to meet the risk apparent to him, and the circumstances under which he must act. [Citation.] Accordingly, the basic reasonable person standard allows for and incorporates the physical characteristics of the de 2009In Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (1996), the court stated that, generally, the basic standard of care in a negligence case is that of the “ordinarily careful person” or the “reasonably prudent person.” The Advincula court further stated: “To be complete, however, a standard of care must also be subjective, in that it makes proper allowance for the actor’s capacity to meet the risk apparent to him, and the circumstances under which he must act. [Citation.] Accordingly, the basic reasonable person standard allows for and incorporates the physical characteristics of the de | 1 | 2 |
Estate of Beachgreen2 sentences1986The statute governing trustee conduct in California which was construed in Beach is referred to by that court as the “prudent investor rule.” (Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal. 3d 623 , 637 n.13, 542 P.2d 994 , 1002 n.13, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 , 578 n.13.) The language in the California statute is very similar to the language of the Illinois statute governing trustee conduct which has been denominated by our legislature as the prudent person rule. 1986The statute governing trustee conduct in California which was construed in Beach is referred to by that court as the “prudent investor rule.” (Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal. 3d 623 , 637 n.13, 542 P.2d 994 , 1002 n.13, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 , 578 n.13.) The language in the California statute is very similar to the language of the Illinois statute governing trustee conduct which has been denominated by our legislature as the prudent person rule. | 1 | 2 |
Cabot v. Northern Trust Co.green2 sentences2009In re Guardianship of Connor, 170 Ill.App.3d 759, 763 , 121 Ill.Dec. 408 , 525 N.E.2d 214 (1988) (the court applied the prudent-person standard to a corporate guardian but not with regard to statutory investments); see also In re Estate of Pirie, 141 Ill.App.3d 750, 766 , 97 Ill.Dec. 225 , 492 N.E.2d 884 (1986) (the court interpreted a portion of the Probate Act to apply the prudent-person standard to investments by corporate executors; it also agreed that if the prudent-investor standard is to be applied, it should be applied by the legislature and not the court). 2009In re Guardianship of Connor, 170 Ill.App.3d 759, 763 , 121 Ill.Dec. 408 , 525 N.E.2d 214 (1988) (the court applied the prudent-person standard to a corporate guardian but not with regard to statutory investments); see also In re Estate of Pirie, 141 Ill.App.3d 750, 766 , 97 Ill.Dec. 225 , 492 N.E.2d 884 (1986) (the court interpreted a portion of the Probate Act to apply the prudent-person standard to investments by corporate executors; it also agreed that if the prudent-investor standard is to be applied, it should be applied by the legislature and not the court). | 1 | 1 |
United Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commissiongreen1 sentence1986See Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623 , 542 P.2d 994 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 , cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1046 , 54 L.Ed.2d 797 , 98 S.Ct. 891 . [2] The statute governing trustee conduct in California which was construed in Beach is referred to by that court as the "prudent investor rule." ( Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623 , 637 n. 13, 542 P.2d 994 , 1002 n. 13, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 , 578 n. 13.) The language in the California statute is very similar to the language of the Illinois statute governing trustee conduct which has been denominated by our legislature as the prudent person rul | 1 | 1 |
Richter v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of Californiagreen1 sentence1986See Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623 , 542 P.2d 994 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 , cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1046 , 54 L.Ed.2d 797 , 98 S.Ct. 891 . [2] The statute governing trustee conduct in California which was construed in Beach is referred to by that court as the "prudent investor rule." ( Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623 , 637 n. 13, 542 P.2d 994 , 1002 n. 13, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 , 578 n. 13.) The language in the California statute is very similar to the language of the Illinois statute governing trustee conduct which has been denominated by our legislature as the prudent person rul | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Superior Court of Californiagreen1 sentence1986See Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623 , 542 P.2d 994 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 , cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1046 , 54 L.Ed.2d 797 , 98 S.Ct. 891 . [2] The statute governing trustee conduct in California which was construed in Beach is referred to by that court as the "prudent investor rule." ( Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal.3d 623 , 637 n. 13, 542 P.2d 994 , 1002 n. 13, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 , 578 n. 13.) The language in the California statute is very similar to the language of the Illinois statute governing trustee conduct which has been denominated by our legislature as the prudent person rul | 1 | 1 |
Renn v. Renngreen2 sentences1983Fraudulent Conveyances sec. 127 (1943); see Renn v. Renn (1944), 207 Ark. 147 , 179 S.W.2d 657 .) The evidence shows that the parents knew there were marital difficulties between Roger and Sandra in 1976 when the contract for the sale of the farm, including the forfeiture provision, was prepared. 1983Fraudulent Conveyances sec. 127 (1943); see Renn v. Renn (1944), 207 Ark. 147 , 179 S.W.2d 657 .) The evidence shows that the parents knew there were marital difficulties between Roger and Sandra in 1976 when the contract for the sale of the farm, including the forfeiture provision, was prepared. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Corrington
green
2 sentences2009Corrington provides, “[the executor of an estate] must exercise such discretion with fidelity to the interests of the beneficiaries, and in a reasonable and prudent manner.” Corrington, 124 Ill. at 367 . 2009Corrington provides, "[the executor of an estate] must exercise such discretion with fidelity to the interests of the beneficiaries, and in a reasonable and prudent manner." Corrington, 124 Ill. at 367 , 16 N.E. 252 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Christy v. Christy
green
2 sentences2009Christy provides, “[an administrator of an estate] is held to the exercise of only that degree of skill and diligence which an ordinarily prudent man bestows on his own similar private affairs.” Christy, 225 Ill. at 552-53 . 2009Christy provides, "[an administrator of an estate] is held to the exercise of only that degree of skill and diligence which an ordinarily prudent man bestows on his own similar private affairs." Christy, 225 Ill. at 552-53 , 80 N.E. 242 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Donovan v. Mazzola
green
1 sentence1991Cir. 1985), 772 F.2d 951, 955 .) A court’s task in evaluating fiduciary compliance under ERISA is to inquire “whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.” (Donovan v. Mazzola (9th Cir. 1983), 716 F.2d 1226 , 1232.) A fiduciary’s independent investigation of the merits of a particular investment is “at the heart of the prudent person standard.” Fink, 772 F.2d at 957 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Ronald Fink v. National Savings and Trust Company
green
2 sentences1991Cir. 1985), 772 F.2d 951, 955 .) A court’s task in evaluating fiduciary compliance under ERISA is to inquire “whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.” (Donovan v. Mazzola (9th Cir. 1983), 716 F.2d 1226 , 1232.) A fiduciary’s independent investigation of the merits of a particular investment is “at the heart of the prudent person standard.” Fink, 772 F.2d at 957 . 1991Cir. 1985), 772 F.2d 951, 955 .) A court’s task in evaluating fiduciary compliance under ERISA is to inquire “whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.” (Donovan v. Mazzola (9th Cir. 1983), 716 F.2d 1226 , 1232.) A fiduciary’s independent investigation of the merits of a particular investment is “at the heart of the prudent person standard.” Fink, 772 F.2d at 957 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Smith v. Grubb
green
1 sentence1983(Smith v. Grubb (1949), 402 Ill. 451, 464-65 .) Where real estate is in the possession of someone other than the record owner, such possession is generally regarded as notice of the interest represented thereby and is legally equivalent to the recording of such interest; a purchaser is bound to inquire of the person in possession by what tenure he holds and what interest he claims in the premises. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Hofmann v. Hofmann
green
2 sentences1983(See Ray v. Winter (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 296 , 367 N.E.2d 678 .) It has been held that “a transferee is chargeable with acquiescence in a fraudulently intended transfer where he is in possession of facts and circumstances which are not reconcilable with ordinary business integrity or would otherwise put a prudent person on inquiry.” (Hofmann v. Hofmann (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 205, 225 , 446 N.E.2d 499, 507 .) We find that under the unusual circumstances of this case, where the third party and the husband may have acted in collusion to deprive the wife and children of the marital home and violated the 1983(See Ray v. Winter (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 296 , 367 N.E.2d 678 .) It has been held that “a transferee is chargeable with acquiescence in a fraudulently intended transfer where he is in possession of facts and circumstances which are not reconcilable with ordinary business integrity or would otherwise put a prudent person on inquiry.” (Hofmann v. Hofmann (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 205, 225 , 446 N.E.2d 499, 507 .) We find that under the unusual circumstances of this case, where the third party and the husband may have acted in collusion to deprive the wife and children of the marital home and violated the | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Ray v. Winter
green
2 sentences1983(See Ray v. Winter (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 296 , 367 N.E.2d 678 .) It has been held that “a transferee is chargeable with acquiescence in a fraudulently intended transfer where he is in possession of facts and circumstances which are not reconcilable with ordinary business integrity or would otherwise put a prudent person on inquiry.” (Hofmann v. Hofmann (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 205, 225 , 446 N.E.2d 499, 507 .) We find that under the unusual circumstances of this case, where the third party and the husband may have acted in collusion to deprive the wife and children of the marital home and violated the 1983(See Ray v. Winter (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 296 , 367 N.E.2d 678 .) It has been held that “a transferee is chargeable with acquiescence in a fraudulently intended transfer where he is in possession of facts and circumstances which are not reconcilable with ordinary business integrity or would otherwise put a prudent person on inquiry.” (Hofmann v. Hofmann (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 205, 225 , 446 N.E.2d 499, 507 .) We find that under the unusual circumstances of this case, where the third party and the husband may have acted in collusion to deprive the wife and children of the marital home and violated the | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Mason v. Mullahy
neutral
1 sentence1941Mason v. Mullahy, 145 Ill. 383 ; German-American Nat. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Merrick v. Wallace
green
1 sentence1878It was said in Merrick v. Wallace, 19 Ill. 486 , that the record of a deed describing premises by an impossible sectional number, was sufficient to put a party purchasing the same quarter upon' inquiry, and might amount to notice of a prior grant. | 1 | 1878–1878 |
Erickson v. Rafferty
green
1 sentence1878From Doyle et al. v. Teas et al. 4 Scam. 202 , to Erickson v. Rafferty, 79 Ill. 209 , the .doctrine has not been essentially departed from, a party having notice of such facts as would put a prudent person on inquiry, is chargeable with a knowledge of other facts to which by diligent inquiry and investigation he would have been led. | 1 | 1878–1878 |
Henneberry v. Morse
neutral
1 sentence1873Henneberry v. Morse, 56 Ill. 394 . | 1 | 1873–1873 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.