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14 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
B. W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastingsgreen2 sentences1992It cannot be equivocal or ambiguous but must be of a character which would put a prudent person on inquiry. 274 Minn, at 179, 143 N.W.2d at 225 (quoting B.W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastings, 240 Minn. 44, 49 , 59 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1953)). 1992It cannot be equivocal or ambiguous but must be of a character which would put a prudent person on inquiry. 274 Minn, at 179, 143 N.W.2d at 225 (quoting B.W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastings, 240 Minn. 44, 49 , 59 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1953)). | 5 | 7 |
Alderman's Inc. v. Shanksgreen2 sentences2017The difference between negligence and negligence per se is that in the latter theory, “a statutory duty of care is substituted for the ordinary prudent person standard such that a violation of a statute is conclusive evidence of duty and breach.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[B]reach of a statute gives rise to negligence per se if [(1)] the person harmed by [the statutory violation is] within the intended protection of the statute and [(2)] the harm suffered is of the type the legislation was intended to prevent.” Alderman’s Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). 2017Because the statute “imposes a fixed duty of care, . . . its breach constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence.” Id. | 2 | 2 |
Seim Ex Rel. Seim v. Garavaliagreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., Alderman’s, Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 7-10 (Minn.1995) (addressing fire codes specifically); Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Minn.1981) (explaining negligence per se). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. Minneapolis Police Relief Associationgreen2 sentences1996It is well settled that “the law in force when the claim to a pension arises governs the right to the pension.” Butler v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, 283 Minn. 70, 72 , 166 N.W.2d 705, 706 (1969) (quoting State ex rel. 1996It is well settled that “the law in force when the claim to a pension arises governs the right to the pension.” Butler v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, 283 Minn. 70, 72 , 166 N.W.2d 705, 706 (1969) (quoting State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Township of Sterling v. Griffin
green
2 sentences2003But, the court added, possession cannot “fall below that which will put a prudent person on inquiry.” Id. 1984This evidence satisfies the MTA standard because the Township’s possession was “of a character which would put a prudent person on inquiry.” Id. at 236 , 244 N.W.2d at 133 (quoting B.W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastings, 240 Minn. 44, 49 , 59 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1953)). 2. | 4 | 1984–2003 |
Gradjelick v. Hance
green
2 sentences2012The difference between ordinary negligence and negligence per se is that in negligence per se, a statutory duty of care is substituted for the ordinary prudent person standard “such that a violation of a statute ... is conclusive evidence of duty and breach.” Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225 , 231 n. 3 (Minn.2002). 2005"A per se negligence rule substitutes a statutory standard of *190 care for the ordinary prudent person standard of care, such that a violation of a statute * * * is conclusive evidence of duty and breach." Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225 , 231 n. 3 (Minn.2002). | 2 | 2005–2012 |
CAROGA REALTY COMPANY v. Tapper
green
2 sentences2010Caroga Realty Co., 274 Minn. at 178 , 143 N.W.2d at 225 (quoting B.W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastings, 240 Minn. 44, 49 , 59 N.W.2d 813, 816-17 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1992It cannot be equivocal or ambiguous but must be of a character which would put a prudent person on inquiry. 274 Minn, at 179, 143 N.W.2d at 225 (quoting B.W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastings, 240 Minn. 44, 49 , 59 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1953)). | 2 | 1992–2010 |
Wichelman v. Messner
green
2 sentences1966It cannot be equivocal or ambiguous but must be of a character which would put a prudent person on inquiry.” See, also, Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88 , 83 N. W. (2d) 800 , 71 A. L. 1966It cannot be equivocal or ambiguous but must be of a character which would put a prudent person on inquiry.” See, also, Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88 , 83 N. W. (2d) 800 , 71 A. L. | 2 | 1966–1985 |
Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co.
green
1 sentence2017The difference between negligence and negligence per se is that in the latter theory, “a statutory duty of care is substituted for the ordinary prudent person standard such that a violation of a statute is conclusive evidence of duty and breach.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[B]reach of a statute gives rise to negligence per se if [(1)] the person harmed by [the statutory violation is] within the intended protection of the statute and [(2)] the harm suffered is of the type the legislation was intended to prevent.” Alderman’s Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.