voluntary manslaughter instruction in California

2025(Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 827 [“Simple assault, such as [scratching, kicking, and grabbing], also does not rise to the level of provocation necessary to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction”].) In any event, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2025(Moye, at p. 550; People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1225-1226 (Rangel); People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163 , 176.) “A voluntary manslaughter instruction is unwarranted where the alleged provocation was no more than taunting words, a technical battery, a slight touching, or simple assault.” (People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307 , 318; accord, People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676 , 686 [a provocation of slight and trifling character, such as words of reproach, is not sufficient to arouse heat of passion in a reasonable person]; People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th

2024Our Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that, although provocative conduct may be verbal, “such provocation ‘must be such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment.’ ” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547 , 585–586; People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60 .) In Manriquez, the court found this standard was not met where the victim “called defendant a ‘mother fucker’ ” and “taunted [the] defendant, repeatedly asserting that if defendant had a weapon, he should take it out and use it.” (Manriquez, at pp. 585−586.) Likewise, the court

2021(People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 [voluntary manslaughter instruction not warranted where the act that allegedly provoked the killing was no more than taunting words, a technical battery, or slight touching].) Even a simple assault, such as a tussle, does “not rise to the level of provocation necessary to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction.” (People v. Gutierrez, at p. 827; see People v. Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 586 [calling defendant a “ ‘mother fucker,’ ” and daring him to use his weapon if he had one, “plainly were insufficient to cause an average person to

2025(Moye, at p. 550; People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1225-1226 (Rangel); People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163 , 176.) “A voluntary manslaughter instruction is unwarranted where the alleged provocation was no more than taunting words, a technical battery, a slight touching, or simple assault.” (People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307 , 318; accord, People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676 , 686 [a provocation of slight and trifling character, such as words of reproach, is not sufficient to arouse heat of passion in a reasonable person]; People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th

2024Our Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that, although provocative conduct may be verbal, “such provocation ‘must be such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment.’ ” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547 , 585–586; People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60 .) In Manriquez, the court found this standard was not met where the victim “called defendant a ‘mother fucker’ ” and “taunted [the] defendant, repeatedly asserting that if defendant had a weapon, he should take it out and use it.” (Manriquez, at pp. 585−586.) Likewise, the court

2024Specifically, the jury asked a question about the objective component of provocation and whether it should be decided based on “the end result of action, or everything that leads up to the event[.]” The jury also asked whether “the reaction” to the provocation meant “emotional” or “logical.” The court responded—with the parties’ agreement— by repeating portions of the original voluntary manslaughter instruction (CALCRIM No. 570), along with the following language from Beltran: “In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition would have been

2021It is true, as Cruz asserts, that the “provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter need not occur instantaneously, but may occur over a period of time.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 569 ; accord, People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245, 256 [“provocation ‘may comprise a single incident or numerous 13 incidents over a period of time’”].) However, if “ ‘sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter.’ ” (People v. Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 951 .) To wa

2021In such situations, our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that insults “would induce sufficient provocation in an ordinary person to merit an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.” (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 759 ; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 (Gutierrez) [“a voluntary manslaughter instruction is not warranted where the act that allegedly provoked the killing was no more than taunting words”]; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 706 [gang challenge insufficient provocation]; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 586 [name calling and taunting 9 The

2020Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction, because that instruction was not supported by the evidence.” (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 826–827.) Similarly, in Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th 680 , the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s argument with the victim did not warrant instruction on heat of passion: “The record indicates that the victims and their friends, who were not armed, were socializing in a parking lot, and that two of the friends, Pereira and Casas, were talking with three young women [they h

2016(People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 194-195 .) There was no evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction because there was no evidence that Matthew was provoked, that his passions were aroused, or that he could have perceived any threat from a man who was bent over when 11 Matthew shot him in the buttocks.

2010(See People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 140 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212 , 91 P.3d 164 ] [no evidence of consensual sexual encounter on which claim of provocation was predicated]; cf. People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 191, 202 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ] [victim nearly collided with, and spat on, the defendant's daughter's car during traffic incident; an argument ensued between the defendant and the victim; voluntary manslaughter instruction was appropriate].) For the first time in his reply brief in this court, and relying on dictum in a Court of Appeal case, defendant summarily

2026He thus argues that despite the absence of provoking conduct immediately before the murder, there was still evidence of provocation warranting a voluntary manslaughter instruction. “[P]rovocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter need not occur instantaneously, but may occur over a period of time.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 569 ; accord, People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245, 256 [“provocation ‘may comprise a single incident or numerous incidents over a period of time’ ”].) Still, “ ‘ “if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for

2026This evidence was insufficient for the jury to find Rodriguez’s reason “ ‘ “was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 550 .) The trial court properly rejected a voluntary manslaughter instruction.

2025And we “see no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have construed this language in a voluntary manslaughter instruction to alter the requirement—plainly stated in CALCRIM No. 521—that first degree murder must be 26. deliberate and premedi[t]ated.” (People v. Ocegueda, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 559; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 880 [“In the absence of instructional errors such as were present in [People v. ]Valentine [(1946) 28 Cal.2d 121 ], the standard manslaughter instruction is not misleading, because the jury is told that premeditation and deliberation is the factor

2024And we “see no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have construed this language in a voluntary manslaughter instruction to alter the requirement—plainly stated in CALCRIM No. 521—that first degree murder must be deliberate and premedi[t]ated.” (People v. Ocegueda, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 559; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 880 [“In the absence of instructional errors such as were present in [People v. ]Valentine [(1946) 28 Cal.2d 121 ], the standard manslaughter instruction is not misleading, because the jury is told that premeditation and deliberation is the factor dist

2024(See People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306-1307, 1308 [holding voluntary manslaughter instruction was not warranted based on the defendant’s “long- simmering resentment” of former girlfriend who obtained child custody and support orders, which she was “legally entitled to do,” and who maintained a relationship with the defendant’s mother]; People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1144 [“If anything, [the] defendant appears to have acted out of a passion for revenge, which will not serve to reduce murder to manslaughter”]; People v. Hudgins (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 174, 181 [holding th

2015(People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144 .) Here, Hume sawed off a shotgun and told others about his plans to assault the victim, enlisting their help because he expected resistance.

2026(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218 [the independent standard of review applies to the failure of the trial court to instruct on a lesser included offense].) Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder.

2024Our Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that, although provocative conduct may be verbal, “such provocation ‘must be such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment.’ ” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547 , 585–586; People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60 .) In Manriquez, the court found this standard was not met where the victim “called defendant a ‘mother fucker’ ” and “taunted [the] defendant, repeatedly asserting that if defendant had a weapon, he should take it out and use it.” (Manriquez, at pp. 585−586.) Likewise, the court

2026He thus argues that despite the absence of provoking conduct immediately before the murder, there was still evidence of provocation warranting a voluntary manslaughter instruction. “[P]rovocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter need not occur instantaneously, but may occur over a period of time.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 569 ; accord, People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245, 256 [“provocation ‘may comprise a single incident or numerous incidents over a period of time’ ”].) Still, “ ‘ “if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for

2021It is true, as Cruz asserts, that the “provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter need not occur instantaneously, but may occur over a period of time.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 569 ; accord, People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245, 256 [“provocation ‘may comprise a single incident or numerous 13 incidents over a period of time’”].) However, if “ ‘sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter.’ ” (People v. Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 951 .) To wa

2014(Id. at p. 294.) The court expressly rejected the view, expressed in People v. Spurlin (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 119 , that a voluntary manslaughter instruction may be appropriate when a victim “‘“was present aiding and abetting the person causing the provocation.”’” (Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 294 .) 13 (3) Butler In Butler defendant had been convicted of two counts each of murder, robbery, and carjacking.

2010(See People v. Spurlin (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 119, 126 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 663 ] [voluntary manslaughter instruction may be appropriate when "`deceased was present aiding and abetting the person causing the provocation'"].) We have rejected this view: "`The provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of passion must be caused by the victim [citation], or be conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim.' [Citation.]" ( Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 705.) Defendant cites no persuasive basis for us to revisit this settled principle.

2026He thus argues that despite the absence of provoking conduct immediately before the murder, there was still evidence of provocation warranting a voluntary manslaughter instruction. “[P]rovocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter need not occur instantaneously, but may occur over a period of time.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 569 ; accord, People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245, 256 [“provocation ‘may comprise a single incident or numerous incidents over a period of time’ ”].) Still, “ ‘ “if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for

2021It is true, as Cruz asserts, that the “provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter need not occur instantaneously, but may occur over a period of time.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 569 ; accord, People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245, 256 [“provocation ‘may comprise a single incident or numerous 13 incidents over a period of time’”].) However, if “ ‘sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter.’ ” (People v. Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 951 .) To wa

2025And we “see no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have construed this language in a voluntary manslaughter instruction to alter the requirement—plainly stated in CALCRIM No. 521—that first degree murder must be 26. deliberate and premedi[t]ated.” (People v. Ocegueda, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 559; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 880 [“In the absence of instructional errors such as were present in [People v. ]Valentine [(1946) 28 Cal.2d 121 ], the standard manslaughter instruction is not misleading, because the jury is told that premeditation and deliberation is the factor

2024And we “see no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have construed this language in a voluntary manslaughter instruction to alter the requirement—plainly stated in CALCRIM No. 521—that first degree murder must be deliberate and premedi[t]ated.” (People v. Ocegueda, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 559; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 880 [“In the absence of instructional errors such as were present in [People v. ]Valentine [(1946) 28 Cal.2d 121 ], the standard manslaughter instruction is not misleading, because the jury is told that premeditation and deliberation is the factor dist

2025(Moye, at p. 550; People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1225-1226 (Rangel); People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163 , 176.) “A voluntary manslaughter instruction is unwarranted where the alleged provocation was no more than taunting words, a technical battery, a slight touching, or simple assault.” (People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307 , 318; accord, People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676 , 686 [a provocation of slight and trifling character, such as words of reproach, is not sufficient to arouse heat of passion in a reasonable person]; People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th

2015(People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 848 [evidence that defendant’s wife/victim said, “ ‘Why, George?’ ” shortly before the 27 defendant shot her and that defendant was concerned his wife was planning to leave him did not warrant a heat of passion instruction].) In People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1158 , for example, evidence that the defendant was intoxicated and jealous and his statement he went “berserk” after his wife/victim said she would put a “ ‘butcher knife in your ass’ ” might satisfy “the subjective element of heat of passion.” (Id. at p. 1216.) But it “did not satisfy the ob

2026(See Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1253 .) To the extent Torrez contends a voluntary manslaughter instruction was required because the court gave a provocation instruction distinguishing between first and second degree murder, he is incorrect. “ ‘ “[T]he existence of provocation which is not ‘adequate’ to reduce the class of the offense [from murder to manslaughter] may nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the intent to kill upon, and carried it out after, deliberation and premeditation.” ’ ” (People v. Robbins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 660, 673 .) That is because part

2024To warrant an instruction on heat of passion, the defendant must actually have killed in the heat of passion, 18 and the circumstances that gave rise to the passion must be such that they would arouse such passion in the mind of a reasonable person. ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1252–1253.) Ample case law and our independent review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Sanchez’s single use of a racial slur was insufficiently objectively provocative to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction.

2024In People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321 (Borchers), the California Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s reduction of a verdict from second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter where the evidence showed provocation over a period of time.

2024(People v. Berry 18 (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 513 ; People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, 328-329 .) Nonetheless, the Attorney General argues this court “should urge the California Supreme Court to reconsider those antiquated precedents.” Respectfully, we decline to urge the 3 Supreme Court to reconsider its precedential holdings.

2024(Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 759 .) 23 Accordingly, we conclude Welch has not shown there was substantial evidence in the record justifying a voluntary manslaughter instruction on a theory of heat of passion.

2021In such situations, our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that insults “would induce sufficient provocation in an ordinary person to merit an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.” (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 759 ; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 (Gutierrez) [“a voluntary manslaughter instruction is not warranted where the act that allegedly provoked the killing was no more than taunting words”]; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 706 [gang challenge insufficient provocation]; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 586 [name calling and taunting 9 The

2021In such situations, our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that insults “would induce sufficient provocation in an ordinary person to merit an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.” (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 759 ; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 (Gutierrez) [“a voluntary manslaughter instruction is not warranted where the act that allegedly provoked the killing was no more than taunting words”]; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 706 [gang challenge insufficient provocation]; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 586 [name calling and taunting 9 The

2019In such situations, our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that insults “would induce sufficient provocation in an ordinary person to merit an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.” (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 759 ; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 (Gutierrez) [“a voluntary manslaughter instruction is not warranted where the act that allegedly provoked the killing was no more than taunting words”]; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 706 [gang challenge insufficient provocation]; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 586 [name calling and taunting defen

2024Our Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that, although provocative conduct may be verbal, “such provocation ‘must be such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment.’ ” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547 , 585–586; People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60 .) In Manriquez, the court found this standard was not met where the victim “called defendant a ‘mother fucker’ ” and “taunted [the] defendant, repeatedly asserting that if defendant had a weapon, he should take it out and use it.” (Manriquez, at pp. 585−586.) Likewise, the court

2016Adequate provocation and heat of passion must be affirmatively demonstrated.” (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60 , citing People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 719 ; People v. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614, 624 .) “‘“[N]o specific type of provocation [is] required . . . .”’ [Citations.] Moreover, the passion aroused need not be anger or rage, but can be any ‘“‘[v]iolent, intense, high- wrought or enthusiastic emotion’”’ [citations] other than revenge [citation].” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163 .) 13 Armstrong argues that “the combination of Lister’s size and the physical alterca

2016Adequate provocation and heat of passion must be affirmatively demonstrated.” (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60 , citing People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 719 ; People v. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614, 624 .) “‘“[N]o specific type of provocation [is] required . . . .”’ [Citations.] Moreover, the passion aroused need not be anger or rage, but can be any ‘“‘[v]iolent, intense, high- wrought or enthusiastic emotion’”’ [citations] other than revenge [citation].” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163 .) 13 Armstrong argues that “the combination of Lister’s size and the physical alterca

2007Disapproving People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 329 (because unreasonable self-defense is a defense and not a lesser included offense, trial court has no obligation to instruct sua sponte on imperfect self-defense), and reaffirming its earlier pronouncements in People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ], 16 the court held that, so long as there is evidence, whether in the People’s case or in the defense case or both, from which a jury could infer the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, whether based on heat of passion or imperfect self-d

2014(People v. Breverman, supra, at p. 178 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) Defense counsel asked for a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on “heat of passion.” The trial court cited the substantial evidence test for giving lesser-included offense instructions.

2014(People v. Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 549-550; People v. Trinh (June 5, 2014, S115284) 59 Cal.4th 216 [ 2014 WL 2535253, *8 ].) In addition, given the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, any error in omitting the voluntary manslaughter instruction was harmless under either the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ), or the reasonable probability of a more favorable result standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ).

2026(People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 678 .) On the other hand, “[t]he test of whether provocation or heat of passion can negate deliberation and premeditation so as to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder … is subjective”; it considers whether the provocation actually drove the defendant to kill even if a person of average disposition would not have done so under the circumstances (Ibid.) As one court commented, the subjective test “inquires whether the defendant in fact committed the act because he was provoked,” which “may negate the elements of premeditation, deliber

2023The facts and circumstances 13. provoking the defendant must therefore be “ ‘sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable [person.]’ ” (People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 678 (Padilla); People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1114 .) Accordingly, a defendant who experienced hallucinations or delusions which prompted them to kill is not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on heat of passion or provocation aroused by the hallucination or delusion.

2025(See People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 260, fn.7 [the Chapman harmless error standard3 applies in reviewing failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory].) Here, the guilty verdict and the jury’s finding that Hernandez committed willful, deliberate, and premeditated first degree murder precluded any possibility of also finding that Hernandez acted under heat of passion because “voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion is ‘manifestly inconsistent’ with premeditation and deliberation.” (Schuller, supra, at p. 265 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); see People

2014(People v. Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 549-550; People v. Trinh (June 5, 2014, S115284) 59 Cal.4th 216 [ 2014 WL 2535253, *8 ].) In addition, given the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, any error in omitting the voluntary manslaughter instruction was harmless under either the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ), or the reasonable probability of a more favorable result standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ).