voluntary manslaughter instruction in North Carolina

2010To the contrary, Defendant himself testified that he put his hands on Inna’s throat because he “simply wanted her to shut up, not to aggravate [him], not to make [him] mad.” Although Defendant acknowledges that he did not find Inna “in the very act of intercourse, or under circumstances clearly indicating that the act had just been completed, or was ‘severely proximate,’ ” Id., he “requests that [this Court] extend existing case law to consider the evidence of on-going adulterous behavior of a spouse, along with the promise to continue the adulterous intercourse, to be adequate provocation and

2004In the instant case, there are three reasons why there was not sufficient evidence of provocation to support submission of a voluntary manslaughter instruction: (1) defendant merely had a suspicion that Harris had taken his money, see Ward, 286 N.C. at 313 , 210 S.E. 2d at 414 ; (2) the act, if it in fact occurred at all, had occurred hours before, see Id. at 312-13 , 210 S.E. 2d at 413 -14 , and (3) a misdemeanor larceny is simply not sufficient provocation to warrant a reduction from attempted first-degree murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter, see State v. Rogers, 323 N.C. 658 , 667, 3

2020The State argues this issue is only reviewable for plain error because Defendant did not object to the voluntary manslaughter instruction before the trial court. [T]he plain error rule . . . is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a “fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,” or “where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,” or the error has “‘resulted in a misca

2020The State argues this issue is only reviewable for plain error because Defendant did not object to the voluntary manslaughter instruction before the trial court. [T]he plain error rule . . . is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a “fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,” or “where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,” or the error has “‘resulted in a misca

2020The State argues this issue is only reviewable for plain error because Defendant did not object to the voluntary manslaughter instruction before the trial court. [T]he plain error rule . . . is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a “fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,” or “where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,” or the error has “‘resulted in a misca

2020The State argues this issue is only reviewable for plain error because Defendant did not object to the voluntary manslaughter instruction before the trial court. [T]he plain error rule . . . is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a “fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,” or “where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,” or the error has “‘resulted in a misca

2006We disagree. "[A] trial court does not commit prejudicial error in failing to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction when a jury rejects a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder and instead finds defendant guilty of first-degree murder." State v. Lyons, 340 N.C. 646, 663 , 459 S.E.2d 770, 779 (1995).

2006We disagree. "[A] trial court does not commit prejudicial error in failing to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction when a jury rejects a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder and instead finds defendant guilty of first-degree murder." State v. Lyons, 340 N.C. 646, 663 , 459 S.E.2d 770, 779 (1995).

2006See State v. Walker, 22 N.C.

2006See State v. Walker, 22 N.C.

2006Defendant argues the submission of a voluntary manslaughter instruction to the jury had a probable impact on the jury's finding of guilt because "the submission of a lesser included offense in the absence of substantial evidence to support the lesser verdict, invites jurors to disregard their oaths and to reach verdicts by compromise." State v. Arnold, 98 N.C.

2006Defendant argues the submission of a voluntary manslaughter instruction to the jury had a probable impact on the jury’s finding of guilt because “the submission of a lesser included offense in the absence of substantial evidence to support the lesser verdict, invites jurors to disregard their oaths and to reach verdicts by compromise.” State v. Arnold, 98 N.C.

2024See McHone, 174 N.C.

2017See State v. Long , 87 N.C.

2010See Camacho, 337 N.C. at 2333-4 , 446 S.E.2d at 13 (holding that "legal provocation" existed to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction were defendant beat victim to death with a hammer after victim assaulted defendant with a knife); State v. McConnaughey, 66 N.C.

2010See Camacho, 337 N.C. at 2333-4 , 446 S.E.2d at 13 (holding that "legal provocation" existed to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction were defendant beat victim to death with a hammer after victim assaulted defendant with a knife); State v. McConnaughey, 66 N.C.

1994Again assuming error arguendo, defendant has not carried his burden of establishing that the error amounted to “plain error.” The “plain error” rule, to which defendant must resort because he failed to object at trial to the absence of a voluntary manslaughter instruction, “applies only in truly exceptional cases.” State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39 , 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986).

1994Again assuming error arguendo, defendant has not carried his burden of establishing that the error amounted to “plain error.” The “plain error” rule, to which defendant must resort because he failed to object at trial to the absence of a voluntary manslaughter instruction, “applies only in truly exceptional cases.” State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39 , 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986).

1994Rose, 335 N.C. at 331, 439 S.E.2d at 534 .

1994Rose, 335 N.C. at 331, 439 S.E.2d at 534 .

1992It is, of course, “an elementary rule of law that a trial judge is required to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence and to instruct according to the evidence.” State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 284 , 298 S.E.2d 645, 652 (1983).

1992It is, of course, “an elementary rule of law that a trial judge is required to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence and to instruct according to the evidence.” State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 284 , 298 S.E.2d 645, 652 (1983).