thirteenth instruction in Illinois

1953(Easton v. Hall, 323 Ill. 397 .) In Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, at 649 , this court quoted with approval from Gray on Perpetuities, sec. 607, where it was said: “ ‘But if the court can see an intention to make an unconditional gift to charity (and the court is very keen-sighted to discover this intention,) then the gift will be regarded as immediate, not subject to any condition precedent, and, therefore, not within the scope of the rule against perpetuities.’ ” By the thirteenth clause of his will testator appoints the two persons named “my trustees and executors to carry out and execut

1953(Easton v. Hall, 323 Ill. 397 .) In Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, at 649 , this court quoted with approval from Gray on Perpetuities, sec. 607, where it was said: “ ‘But if the court can see an intention to make an unconditional gift to charity (and the court is very keen-sighted to discover this intention,) then the gift will be regarded as immediate, not subject to any condition precedent, and, therefore, not within the scope of the rule against perpetuities.’ ” By the thirteenth clause of his will testator appoints the two persons named “my trustees and executors to carry out and execut

1948Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598 . ' Appellants cite Baulos v. Ash, 19 Ill. 187 , Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57 , Duffield v. Duffield, 268 Ill. 29 , and Albers v. Donovan, 371 Ill. 458 , in support of their contention that the words “the heirs of my body then living” as used in the thirteenth clause of the will should be construed as limiting a remainder to the heirs generally of the testator.

1948(Riddle v. Killian, 366 Ill. 294 ; Friedman v. Friedman, 283 Ill. 383 .) After the creation of the life estate and the alternative contingent remainders, there still remained undisposed of by the thirteenth clause of the will the reversion in fee created by operation of law.

1948Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598 . ' Appellants cite Baulos v. Ash, 19 Ill. 187 , Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57 , Duffield v. Duffield, 268 Ill. 29 , and Albers v. Donovan, 371 Ill. 458 , in support of their contention that the words “the heirs of my body then living” as used in the thirteenth clause of the will should be construed as limiting a remainder to the heirs generally of the testator.

1948(Carter v. Lewis, 364 Ill. 434 .) The fact that Mary Gridley Bell was devised an equitable life estate, in the form of a spendthrift trust, or the fact that the testator created other spendthrift trusts for his other children does not indicate that when, by the twentieth clause of his will, he devised and bequeathed “all the rest and remainder of my estate not herein disposed of,” he intended to exclude therefrom the undisposed of reversion in fee of the property described in the thirteenth clause of his will.

1948Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598 . ' Appellants cite Baulos v. Ash, 19 Ill. 187 , Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57 , Duffield v. Duffield, 268 Ill. 29 , and Albers v. Donovan, 371 Ill. 458 , in support of their contention that the words “the heirs of my body then living” as used in the thirteenth clause of the will should be construed as limiting a remainder to the heirs generally of the testator.

1948Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598 . ' Appellants cite Baulos v. Ash, 19 Ill. 187 , Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57 , Duffield v. Duffield, 268 Ill. 29 , and Albers v. Donovan, 371 Ill. 458 , in support of their contention that the words “the heirs of my body then living” as used in the thirteenth clause of the will should be construed as limiting a remainder to the heirs generally of the testator.

1948Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598 . ' Appellants cite Baulos v. Ash, 19 Ill. 187 , Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57 , Duffield v. Duffield, 268 Ill. 29 , and Albers v. Donovan, 371 Ill. 458 , in support of their contention that the words “the heirs of my body then living” as used in the thirteenth clause of the will should be construed as limiting a remainder to the heirs generally of the testator.

1948(Riddle v. Killian, 366 Ill. 294 ; Friedman v. Friedman, 283 Ill. 383 .) After the creation of the life estate and the alternative contingent remainders, there still remained undisposed of by the thirteenth clause of the will the reversion in fee created by operation of law.

1948(Fisher v. Easton, 299 Ill. 293 .) Until the vesting of the contingent remainder, or the determination of the impossibility of its vesting, the reversion in fee must rest either in the testator’s heirs by descent, or in his devisees under the terms of his will.

1936This contention has likewise been adversely disposed of in Golden v. Cervenka, supra, Sanders v. Merchants State Bank, supra, and Heine v. Degen, supra. Every contention made by appellants relative to constitutional provisions has been decided against them in a number of cases, and it is well settled that the mere assertion that a constitutional question is involved is not sufficient, but the question must exist and it must be fairly debatable before this court can take appellate jurisdiction on that ground.

1932(Richardson v. Nelson, 221 Ill. 254 ; Keokuk Bridge Co. v. Wetzel, 228 id. 253.) We do not think that the instruction would be understood by the jury as authorizing- them to estimate and allow damages capable of pecuniary measurement without any evidence upon which to base such estimate. ’ ’ This thirteenth instruction in the case at bar, while it permits the jury to take into consideration loss of time, wages or employment, also limits their consideration to only such damages as were shown by the evidence.

1925Larabee v. Larabee, 240 Ill. 576 ; Chaney v. Baker, supra. The thirteenth instruction informed the jury that it was to try the case upon the law, the evidence and the presumption of sanity of the decedent.

1925Larabee v. Larabee, 240 Ill. 576 ; Chaney v. Baker, supra. The thirteenth instruction informed the jury that it was to try the case upon the law, the evidence and the presumption of sanity of the decedent.

1924App. 634 , where there was a similar but broader bequest of all his, “personal estate of money, goods and chattels of whatsoever nature, ’ ’ and the court held it, in that case, a specific request, but Cox v. Johnson, 242 Ill. 159 , quoted in that case, as an authority that the debts should be prorated upon all the devises in a case, where the will only affected devises of real estate, and made no provision as to the payment of debts.

1922The proponents having shown the execution of the will and the sanity of the testator by the proof required by the statute were entitled to the benefit of the legal presumption of sanity, (Craig v. Southard, 162 Ill. 209 ,) and if the evidence on that question were only sufficient to raise a doubt or were equally balanced, such presumption would require a determination of the question in favor of sanity.

1922The court gave the following instruction at the request of the defendants in error: “The court instructs the jury that to justify a finding that the testator is not of sound mind and memory in the making of a will, the evidence must preponderate in favor of unsoundness of mind, and the presumption of sanity must prevail, if the evidence is only sufficient to raise a doubt as to such sanity.” This is substantially the same as the thirteenth instruction which was approved in Grace v. Grace, 270 Ill. 558 .

1919The twelfth instruction reads as follows: “The court instructs the jury that while it is true that under the laws of this State defendants in criminal cases are competent witnesses in their own cases, yet you are instructed that their credibility is left by statute to the consideration of the jury, and in considering the amount of credit or value you will give to the testimony of the defendant in this case you may take into consideration his interest in the result of the case and his desire to avoid punishment for the crime with which he is charged.” The thirteenth instruction contained the fo

1919The twelfth instruction reads as follows: “The court instructs the jury that while it is true that under the laws of this State defendants in criminal cases are competent witnesses in their own cases, yet you are instructed that their credibility is left by statute to the consideration of the jury, and in considering the amount of credit or value you will give to the testimony of the defendant in this case you may take into consideration his interest in the result of the case and his desire to avoid punishment for the crime with which he is charged.” The thirteenth instruction contained the fo

1909“A party cannot complain of an instruction given on behalf of his adversary like one given at his request.” Springer v. City of Chicago, 135 Ill. 552 ; Woods v. Dailey, 211 Ill. 495 ; Purtel v. Bell, 225 Ill. 523 .

1909“A party cannot complain of an instruction given on behalf of his adversary like one given at his request.” Springer v. City of Chicago, 135 Ill. 552 ; Woods v. Dailey, 211 Ill. 495 ; Purtel v. Bell, 225 Ill. 523 .

1909“A party cannot complain of an instruction given on behalf of his adversary like one given at his request.” Springer v. City of Chicago, 135 Ill. 552 ; Woods v. Dailey, 211 Ill. 495 ; Purtel v. Bell, 225 Ill. 523 .

1907(Anderson’s Dictionary of Law, p. 1057.) In Eldred v. Meek, 183 Ill. 26 , on page 35, it was said: “Appellants seem to overlook the thirteenth clause of the will, which directs that the executor (trustee) shall keep the lands rented; * * * that he shall pay legal taxes and assessments, repair buildings, etc., and re-build when for the best interest of the estate, and keep the buildings insured, and that he apply the balance of the proceeds equally in the ‘necessary care, maintenance and education of those entitled to the actual benefit of the respective trusts under the terms and provisions of

1904The thirteenth instruction given at the request of the People is objected to as placing the plaintiff in error in a different class from other witnesses and not requiring the jury to treat his testimony the same as that of others, and the decision in Hellyer v. People, 186 Ill. 550 , is relied upon.

1902It does not, as counsel contend, authorize the jury to fix the compensation from their own view of the premises without regard to the testimony in the case, but that part of the instruction relating to their own view is based upon the condition that “they believe, from the whole evidence, that they have, from personal -examination of the premises, arrived at a more accurate judgment and determination ■ as to the value of the premises sought to be taken and of the amount of damages, if any, than is shown by the evidence in open, court.” The instruction conforms to the law on this point as decla

1902It does not, as counsel contend, authorize the jury to fix the compensation from their own view of the premises without regard to the testimony in the case, but that part of the instruction relating to their own view is based upon the condition that “they believe, from the whole evidence, that they have, from personal -examination of the premises, arrived at a more accurate judgment and determination ■ as to the value of the premises sought to be taken and of the amount of damages, if any, than is shown by the evidence in open, court.” The instruction conforms to the law on this point as decla

1897(Bartelott v. International Bank, 119 Ill. 259 ; Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquist, 152 id. 581; Swift & Co. v. Fue, 167 id. 443.) The thirteenth instruction which was refused directed a verdict for the defendant, and was one of a series presented by defendant on the submission of the cause to the jury.

1866In the case of Rigg v. Wilton, 13 Ill. 15 , this court adopted the construction given to the Kentucky statute from which ours was copied, as given bv the Court of Appeals in that State.