compartmental analysis in Maryland

2011This Court has explained that in remedying a discovery violation, the court should weigh [“](1) the reasons why the disclosure was not made; (2) the existence and amount of any prejudice to the opposing party; (3) the feasability of curing any prejudice ...; and (4) any other relevant circumstances.” [Thomas ] at 570-71, 919 A.2d at 57-58 ; see also Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 390-91 , 456 A.2d 29, 37 (1983) (enumerating similar factors and stating that the factors “do not lend themselves to a compartmental analysis”).

2011This Court has explained that in remedying a discovery violation, the court should weigh [“](1) the reasons why the disclosure was not made; (2) the existence and amount of any prejudice to the opposing party; (3) the feasability of curing any prejudice ...; and (4) any other relevant circumstances.” [Thomas ] at 570-71, 919 A.2d at 57-58 ; see also Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 390-91 , 456 A.2d 29, 37 (1983) (enumerating similar factors and stating that the factors “do not lend themselves to a compartmental analysis”).

2022Accordingly, “[w]e do not look at each incident in isolation, but rather at the entire history and context of the case in reviewing the trial court’s decision[.]” Valentine-Bowers v. Retina Grp. of Wash., P.C., 217 Md.

2020And, for that reason, “[w]e do not look at each incident in isolation, but rather at the entire history and context 33 of the case[.]” Valentine-Bowers v. Retina Grp. of Washington, P.C., 217 Md.

2020They do not lend themselves to a compartmental analysis.” Id. at 577 (internal citations omitted).

2011Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670, 698-99 , 7 A.3d 1038, 1054 (2010).

2011Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670, 698-99 , 7 A.3d 1038, 1054 (2010).

1998See also Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md.App. 10, 28-34 , 578 A.2d 228 (1990), rev’d in part on other grounds, 326 Md. 179 , 604 A.2d 445 (1992), making it clear that the Taliaferro guidelines apply in civil cases as surely as they do in criminal cases. *332 In the present case, the failure of the appellant either to seek an inspection of the premises or to name a lead-based paint expert within the required discovery schedule was substantial and not merely technical.

1998See also Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md.App. 10, 28-34 , 578 A.2d 228 (1990), rev’d in part on other grounds, 326 Md. 179 , 604 A.2d 445 (1992), making it clear that the Taliaferro guidelines apply in civil cases as surely as they do in criminal cases. *332 In the present case, the failure of the appellant either to seek an inspection of the premises or to name a lead-based paint expert within the required discovery schedule was substantial and not merely technical.

1998See also Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md.App. 10, 28-34 , 578 A.2d 228 (1990), rev’d in part on other grounds, 326 Md. 179 , 604 A.2d 445 (1992), making it clear that the Taliaferro guidelines apply in civil cases as surely as they do in criminal cases. *332 In the present case, the failure of the appellant either to seek an inspection of the premises or to name a lead-based paint expert within the required discovery schedule was substantial and not merely technical.

1998See also Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md.App. 10, 28-34 , 578 A.2d 228 (1990), rev’d in part on other grounds, 326 Md. 179 , 604 A.2d 445 (1992), making it clear that the Taliaferro guidelines apply in civil cases as surely as they do in criminal cases. *332 In the present case, the failure of the appellant either to seek an inspection of the premises or to name a lead-based paint expert within the required discovery schedule was substantial and not merely technical.