statutory best-interests factors in Michigan

2025Furthermore, while trial courts have “the duty to apply all the statutory best interests factors to each individual child,” Foskett, 247 Mich App at 11 , this Court has determined, although in the termination-of- parental-rights context, trial courts are only required to do so when “the best interests of the individual children significantly differ,” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 715 ; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

2021Wiechmann v Wiechmann, 212 Mich App 436, 440 ; 538 NW2d 57 (1995); Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 11 ; 634 NW2d 363 (2001).5 4 See Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 501 “[I]n determining if a change of circumstances had occurred, the trial court was limited to basing its decision on events occurring after entry of the most recent custody order.”). 5 See Foskett, 247 Mich App at 11–12: Incumbent on the trial court therefore, is the duty to apply all the statutory best interests factors to each individual child.

2021Wiechmann v Wiechmann, 212 Mich App 436, 440 ; 538 NW2d 57 (1995); Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 11 ; 634 NW2d 363 (2001).5 4 See Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 501 “[I]n determining if a change of circumstances had occurred, the trial court was limited to basing its decision on events occurring after entry of the most recent custody order.”). 5 See Foskett, 247 Mich App at 11–12: Incumbent on the trial court therefore, is the duty to apply all the statutory best interests factors to each individual child.

2021Wiechmann v Wiechmann, 212 Mich App 436, 440 ; 538 NW2d 57 (1995); Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 11 ; 634 NW2d 363 (2001).5 4 See Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 501 “[I]n determining if a change of circumstances had occurred, the trial court was limited to basing its decision on events occurring after entry of the most recent custody order.”). 5 See Foskett, 247 Mich App at 11–12: Incumbent on the trial court therefore, is the duty to apply all the statutory best interests factors to each individual child.

2021Wiechmann v Wiechmann, 212 Mich App 436, 440 ; 538 NW2d 57 (1995); Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 11 ; 634 NW2d 363 (2001).5 4 See Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 501 “[I]n determining if a change of circumstances had occurred, the trial court was limited to basing its decision on events occurring after entry of the most recent custody order.”). 5 See Foskett, 247 Mich App at 11–12: Incumbent on the trial court therefore, is the duty to apply all the statutory best interests factors to each individual child.

2018Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 508-509 .

2001The trial court should be able to obtain this information from such minor children without subjecting them to the "additional distress resulting from cross-examination and testifying before the parents." Lesauskis, supra, p. 815 , 314 N.W.2d 767 .

2001The trial court should be able to obtain this information from such minor children without subjecting them to the “additional distress resulting from cross-examination and testifying before the parents.” Lesauskis, supra, p 815 .

2026Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 665 ; 811 NW2d 501 (2011).

2026Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 665 ; 811 NW2d 501 (2011).

2025Furthermore, while trial courts have “the duty to apply all the statutory best interests factors to each individual child,” Foskett, 247 Mich App at 11 , this Court has determined, although in the termination-of- parental-rights context, trial courts are only required to do so when “the best interests of the individual children significantly differ,” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 715 ; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

2025Furthermore, while trial courts have “the duty to apply all the statutory best interests factors to each individual child,” Foskett, 247 Mich App at 11 , this Court has determined, although in the termination-of- parental-rights context, trial courts are only required to do so when “the best interests of the individual children significantly differ,” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 715 ; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

2021Pierron, 486 Mich at 91;9 Lombardo, 202 Mich App at 160 .

2015“Rather, the statute’s sole limitation is that the award be in the child’s best interests, after weighing the parental presumption, applicable burdens of proof, and the statutory best interests factors.” Id. at 63 .

2009We note that “the statutory best interests factors need not be given equal weight.” McCain v McCain, 229 Mich App 123, 131 ; 580 NW2d 485 (1998) (emphasis in original).

2009We note that “the statutory best interests factors need not be given equal weight.” McCain v McCain, 229 Mich App 123, 131 ; 580 NW2d 485 (1998) (emphasis in original).

2001Although we are sympathetic with the statement in Hilliard, supra, p. 320 , 586 N.W.2d 263 , that the "children of the parties to a custody dispute will often be among the best sources of information for a trial court regarding many of the statutory best interests factors," we believe that using the in camera interview for anything more than the preference of the child could place the child in such a compromising and stressful situation that it far outweighs the need for additional information, even if the best source, from the child.

2001Although we are sympathetic with the statement in Hilliard, supra, p 320 , that the “children of the parties to a custody dispute will often be among the best sources of information for a trial court regarding many of the statutory best interests factors,” we believe that using the in camera interview for anything more than the preference of the child could place the child in such a compromising and stressful situation that it far outweighs the need for additional information, even if the child is the best source.

2001Where a trial court fails to consider custody issues in accordance with the mandates set forth in MCL 722.23 “and make reviewable findings of fact, the proper remedy is to remand for a new child custody hearing.” Bowers, supra at 56 .

2001Accordingly, were it not for the precedential effect of Hilliard , we would follow the rule of Burghdoff, supra, pp. 612-613 , 239 N.W.2d 679 : We now hold that sound policy requires that [an in camera] conference be confined to those matters reasonably necessary to enable the circuit judge to determine and understand the preference *593 of the child.

2001Accordingly, were it not for the precedential effect of Hilliard , we would follow the rule of Burghdoff, supra, pp 612-613: We now hold that sound policy requires that [an in camera] conference be confined to those matters reasonably necessary to enable the circuit judge to determine and understand the preference of the child.

1998On the contrary, “the Child Custody Act ... is not applicable to proceedings in the juvenile division of the probate court.” In re Schejbal, supra at 835 .