death knell doctrine in California

2025Under the one final judgment rule, an appeal may generally be taken “‘“only from the final judgment in an entire action.”’” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756 .) “The death knell doctrine is a ‘“tightly defined and narrow”’ exception to the one final judgment rule in the class action context.” (Chavez Reyes v. Hi-Grade Materials Co. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1089 , 1096 (Chavez).) “Under the death knell doctrine, . . . an order ‘is appealable if it effectively terminates the entire action as to the class, in legal effect being “tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to all

2025The death knell doctrine requires the order be “a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs.” (In re Baycol (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 759 .) Here, the arbitration agreement’s class action waiver provision prohibits an employee from arbitrating class claims, requiring instead that such actions be litigated in civil court.

2025(Cortez, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 9 [concluding “the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule does not apply when a PAGA claim remains pending in the trial court following termination of the class claims”]; Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232 , 243–244 [same]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 (Young) [same]; Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291 , 310–311 (Munoz) [“Denial of class certification where the PAGA claims remain in the trial court would not have the ‘legal effect’ of a final judgment . . . .”].

2025Equipment Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Cortez).) Therefore, to be appealable under the death knell doctrine, an order must “amount[ ] to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where . . . the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered.” (Ibid.) “‘[O]rders that only limit the scope of a class or the number of claims available to it are not similarly tantamount to dismissal and do not qualify for immediate appeal under the death knell 5 doctrine; only an order that entirely

2025Jurado opposed the motion, pointing out the “sole remaining predicate violation [regarding failure to timely produce her payroll records and personnel file] . . . was asserted only on behalf of Plaintiff, not other aggrieved current or former employees.” She argued the death knell doctrine applied because “the minimal recovery available for Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for failure to produce her employment records creates a substantial risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered.”8 In its reply, Neotech insisted a PAGA claim “is inherently representative in nature,” and Jurado

2024Citing Franco, the court in Miranda v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 196, 199, 201 , held the death knell doctrine applied to render appealable a trial court order compelling arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim and dismissing a non-individual PAGA claim.

2025(Cortez, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 9 [concluding “the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule does not apply when a PAGA claim remains pending in the trial court following termination of the class claims”]; Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232 , 243–244 [same]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 (Young) [same]; Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291 , 310–311 (Munoz) [“Denial of class certification where the PAGA claims remain in the trial court would not have the ‘legal effect’ of a final judgment . . . .”].

2024Equipment Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1 , 8–9 (Cortez); Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630 , 634–635.) The “fundamental underpinnings of the death knell doctrine [identified in Baycol] are lacking when a plaintiff’s representative PAGA claim remains pending in the trial court following the termination of the class claims. . . [T]he PAGA plaintiff remains incentivized by the statutory scheme to proceed to judgment. . . ‘[g]iven the potential for recovery of significant 4 civil penalties if the PAGA claims are successful, as well as attorney fees and costs.’ ” (Cortez, at p. 8, citing Mu

2024(Baycol, at p. 759.) In Franco, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at page 1288 , the Court of Appeal held the death knell doctrine rendered appealable a superior court order that enforced a class arbitration waiver and required the named plaintiff to arbitrate his claims on an individual basis.

2022Ramirez filed an opposition, contending the order striking the class allegations was immediately appealable under the death knell doctrine and the simultaneously issued and closely related order compelling arbitration was, as a consequence, appealable as well, citing several cases for that proposition, including Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1288 (an order to arbitrate individual claims is appealable if it constitutes the “death knell” for class litigation).

2025Equipment Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Cortez), citing Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 758 .) For an order to be appealable under the death knell doctrine, therefore, it must “ ‘amount[] to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where . . . the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered.’ ” (Cortez, at p. 8, quoting Baycol, at p. 759.) An appeal is permitted under California law in this situation because the order would essentially “r[i]ng the death knell for the class cl

2025Equipment Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Cortez).) Therefore, to be appealable under the death knell doctrine, an order must “amount[ ] to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where . . . the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered.” (Ibid.) “‘[O]rders that only limit the scope of a class or the number of claims available to it are not similarly tantamount to dismissal and do not qualify for immediate appeal under the death knell 5 doctrine; only an order that entirely

2024(Baycol, at p. 757; Aleman, at pp. 585–586 [concluding the death knell doctrine is not applicable if the remaining class plaintiffs retain their ability to pursue class certification].) Other orders “excluded from the death knell doctrine are orders certifying a class, orders partially certifying a class, orders compelling the representative of a class to arbitrate, and orders directing service of notice to class members.” ( Farwell, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1547–1548.) Ultimately, “[w]hat matter[s is] not the form of the order or judgment but its impact.” (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p.

2024Applied in the class action context, it permits an appeal from an order which effectively terminates class claims but permits individual claims to continue. ( Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th 754 ; accord, Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695 .) It derives from the principle that an order terminating class claims “effectively [rings] the death knell for the class claims” and, “in the absence of [an appellate court] treating the order as a de facto final judgment, any appeal likely would be foreclosed.” (Baycol, at p. 757.) Thus, application of the death knell doctrine requires “an order that (

2024(Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 1121–1122.) But an exception to this rule is found in the death knell doctrine.

2023(Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1121 .) Nor is such an order appealable under the death knell exception, because a motion compelling arbitration is not a de facto final judgment and does not create a risk that there will never be a final judgment.

2025(Cortez, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 9 [concluding “the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule does not apply when a PAGA claim remains pending in the trial court following termination of the class claims”]; Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232 , 243–244 [same]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 635 (Young) [same]; Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291 , 310–311 (Munoz) [“Denial of class certification where the PAGA claims remain in the trial court would not have the ‘legal effect’ of a final judgment . . . .”].

2022Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232 , 243–244 [rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Munoz was “ ‘wrongly decided’ ” and deeming order compelling arbitration nonappealable].)9 We agree the death knell doctrine does not permit Plaintiffs to appeal the trial court’s order denying class certification.

2025(Stephen v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 806, 811 (Stephen).) Under the death knell doctrine, however, an order “is appealable if it 5 effectively terminates the entire action as to the class, in legal effect being ‘tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to all members of the class other than plaintiff.’ ” (Ibid.) “The doctrine is animated by two basic considerations: (1) The order terminating class claims is the practical equivalent of a final judgment for absent class members; and (2) without the possibility of a group recovery, the plaintiff will lack incentive to pursue

2025(Baycol, at p. 757; see also Stephen, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 811 .) 3 Chavez contends the death knell doctrine applies here because the trial court’s August 2023 order denying class certification stated that the action would proceed only as to his individual claims.

2018(See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay (1978) 437 U.S. 463 , 476-477, 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 .) In contrast, in California state court, the death knell doctrine allows an immediate appeal of the trial court's denial of class certification (or the trial court's dismissal of class claims).

2018(See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay (1978) 437 U.S. 463 , 476-477, 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 .) In contrast, in California state court, the death knell doctrine allows an immediate appeal of the trial court's denial of class certification (or the trial court's dismissal of class claims).

2021“The death knell doctrine is a ‘ “tightly defined and narrow” ’ exception to the one-final-judgment rule, which generally precludes piecemeal litigation through appeals from orders that dispose of less than an entire action. [Citation.]” (Williams v. Impax Laboratories., Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1060 , 1066.) The doctrine applies when an order “ ‘effectively terminates the entire action as to [a] class.’ ” (Ibid.) “The death knell doctrine permits the appellate court to review an order denying a motion to certify a class when it is unlikely the case will proceed as an individual action.” (Sz

2017Appealability A trial court order compelling arbitration ordinarily is reviewable only after the arbitration is complete and a party *232 appeals from the resulting judgment. ( Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 1121-1122, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 ; Muao v. Grosvenor Properties (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085 , 1088-1089, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 .) The Aanderuds, however, contend the order compelling arbitration is appealable under the death knell doctrine, which permits the appellate court to review an order denying a motion to certify a class when it is unlikely the

2022Proc., § 1294.) Siguenza does not dispute that the order is not appealable, but argues that this court should nevertheless entertain jurisdiction over it pursuant to the death knell doctrine, which “provides that an order which allows a plaintiff to pursue individual claims, but prevents the plaintiff from maintaining the claims as a class 3 action . . . is immediately appealable because it ‘effectively r[ings] the death knell for the class claims.’” (Aleman v. Airtouch Cellular (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 556, 585-586 .) To be appealable under the death knell doctrine (1) the order must be a de fa

2019BACKGROUND A. The Death Knell Doctrine The one final judgment rule is a fundamental rule of appellate practice: " ' "an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an entire action." ' " ( In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751 , 756, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 248 P.3d 681 ; § 904.1.) An exception to the one final judgment rule is the death knell doctrine, which is unique to class actions. ( Baycol Cases , at p. 757, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 248 P.3d 681 .) "This doctrine provides that an order which allows a plaintiff to pursue individual claims but prevents the plaintiff from maint

2024(Cf. Kight v. CashCall, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1386, fn. 2 .) 16 same time forbidden by law. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (Progressive West Ins.

2022(In re Baycol Cases I & II, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 761-762; Kight v. CashCall, Inc. supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1386, fn. 2 [order granting defendant’s motion for summary adjudication immediately appealable under the death knell doctrine “because the order terminated all class claims and left the named plaintiffs’ individual claims for further adjudication in the lawsuit”].) b.

2014(Szetela, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098 .) As part of its general discussion of the death knell doctrine, Szetela cited Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (Richmond) for the proposition that “the death knell doctrine permits the appellate court to review an order denying a motion to certify a class when it is unlikely the case will proceed as an individual action.” (Szetela, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098 .) 8 However, Richmond says no such thing.

2014Instead, citing Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 698-699 , the Richmond court said that a trial court order “denying certification to an entire class is an appealable order.” (Richmond, supra, 29 Cal.3d at 470 .) Szetela’s citation to Richmond’s true holding makes sense in the context of Szetela – where the death knell doctrine was found inapplicable because the case would still proceed as a class action, albeit one limited to persons not bound by the arbitration provision.

2025(Id. at p. 757.) In order for the death knell doctrine to apply, there must be an order that “(1) amounts to a de facto final judgment for 2 absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where (2) the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered . . . .” (Id. at p. 759, italics omitted.) “[T]he gist of the death knell doctrine is that the denial of class action certification is the death knell of the action itself, i.e., that without a class, there will not be an action or actions, as is true of cases when the in

2024(Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 754 .) “Notwithstanding its colorful title, the ‘death knell’ doctrine is a tightly defined and narrow concept.” 6 (Farwell v. Sunset Mesa Property Owners Assn., Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1547 (Farwell).) Under the death knell doctrine, “an order that (1) amounts to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where (2) the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered” are appealable.

2026“The death knell doctrine is applied to orders in class actions that effectively terminate class claims, such as orders denying class certification or decertifying a class, while allowing individual claims to persist. [Citations.] The doctrine is animated by the concern ‘that an individual plaintiff may lack incentive to pursue his individual claims to judgment, thereby foreclosing any possible appellate review of class issues.’ [Citation.] To preserve appellate review of class issues, the death knell doctrine permits appeal from ‘an order that … amounts to a de facto final judgment for absent

2021“The death knell doctrine is a ‘ “tightly defined and narrow” ’ exception to the one-final-judgment rule, which generally precludes piecemeal litigation through appeals from orders that dispose of less than an entire action. [Citation.]” (Williams v. Impax Laboratories., Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1060 , 1066.) The doctrine applies when an order “ ‘effectively terminates the entire action as to [a] class.’ ” (Ibid.) “The death knell doctrine permits the appellate court to review an order denying a motion to certify a class when it is unlikely the case will proceed as an individual action.” (Sz

2016If the employer had prevailed, however, the nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 987 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 209 P.3d 923 ].) Plaintiffs final concern is that the “putative class members must appeal now or forever lose the right to appeal.” But Baycol rejected such an argument and held the death knell doctrine did not apply where there was no risk that “an individual plaintiff may lack incentive to

2016If the employer had prevailed, however, the nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 987 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 209 P.3d 923 ].) Plaintiffs final concern is that the “putative class members must appeal now or forever lose the right to appeal.” But Baycol rejected such an argument and held the death knell doctrine did not apply where there was no risk that “an individual plaintiff may lack incentive to

2014(See In re Baycol Cases I&II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 757-758 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 248 P.3d 681 ] [“orders that only limit the scope of a class or the number of claims available to it are not similarly tantamount to dismissal and do not qualify for immediate appeal under the death knell doctrine; only an order that entirely terminates class claims is appealable”]; Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.Sd 126,149, fn. 18 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 ] [class action interim orders are not appealable unless “ ‘tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to all members of the class’ ”]; General Moto

2014(See In re Baycol Cases I&II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 757-758 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 248 P.3d 681 ] [“orders that only limit the scope of a class or the number of claims available to it are not similarly tantamount to dismissal and do not qualify for immediate appeal under the death knell doctrine; only an order that entirely terminates class claims is appealable”]; Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.Sd 126,149, fn. 18 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 ] [class action interim orders are not appealable unless “ ‘tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to all members of the class’ ”]; General Moto

2017Proc., § 1294 ; Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc . (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 638 , 648, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 [order compelling arbitration not appealable; may be reviewed only after entry of judgment confirming award]; Muao v. Grosvenor Properties, Ltd. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085 , 1089, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 .) Thus, even if appellate jurisdiction exists under the death knell doctrine, is the September 2014 order compelling arbitration subject to review?

2017Proc., § 1294 ; Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc . (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 638 , 648, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 [order compelling arbitration not appealable; may be reviewed only after entry of judgment confirming award]; Muao v. Grosvenor Properties, Ltd. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085 , 1089, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 .) Thus, even if appellate jurisdiction exists under the death knell doctrine, is the September 2014 order compelling arbitration subject to review?

2024(Estate of Lock (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 892, 896 [a memorandum of decision is an appealable order when its “substance or effect” is a final determination on the merits].) The order is therefore appealable under the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule.

2024(Estate of Lock (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 892, 896 [a memorandum of decision is an appealable order when its “substance or effect” is a final determination on the merits].) The order is therefore appealable under the death knell exception to the one final judgment rule.

2017Appealability A trial court order compelling arbitration ordinarily is reviewable only after the arbitration is complete and a party *232 appeals from the resulting judgment. ( Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 1121-1122, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 ; Muao v. Grosvenor Properties (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085 , 1088-1089, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 .) The Aanderuds, however, contend the order compelling arbitration is appealable under the death knell doctrine, which permits the appellate court to review an order denying a motion to certify a class when it is unlikely the

2017Appealability A trial court order compelling arbitration ordinarily is reviewable only after the arbitration is complete and a party *232 appeals from the resulting judgment. ( Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 1121-1122, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 ; Muao v. Grosvenor Properties (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085 , 1088-1089, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 .) The Aanderuds, however, contend the order compelling arbitration is appealable under the death knell doctrine, which permits the appellate court to review an order denying a motion to certify a class when it is unlikely the

2023In support of its argument against applying the death knell doctrine, respondent cites Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630 , Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291 , and Haro v. City of Rosemead (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1067 , all of which are distinguishable.

2023In support of its argument against applying the death knell doctrine, respondent cites Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630 , Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291 , and Haro v. City of Rosemead (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1067 , all of which are distinguishable.

2015Finally, relying on Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 843 , *310 673 P.2d 720 ], plaintiffs request that we treat their appeal as a writ if we conclude that the trial court’s order denying certification was not an appeal-able order. 14 We have not found any reported case, and the parties have not cited any, that addresses the precise issue before us: Whether the presence of PAGA claims following a trial court’s denial of class certification precludes application of the death knell doctrine.

2015Finally, relying on Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 843 , *310 673 P.2d 720 ], plaintiffs request that we treat their appeal as a writ if we conclude that the trial court’s order denying certification was not an appeal-able order. 14 We have not found any reported case, and the parties have not cited any, that addresses the precise issue before us: Whether the presence of PAGA claims following a trial court’s denial of class certification precludes application of the death knell doctrine.

2016II DISCUSSION A. Appealability “An order compelling arbitration is not appealable.” (Garcia v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1149 [ 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 312 ].) Although “[r]eview of [such] an order . . . ordinarily must await appeal from a final judgment entered after arbitration^] [citation] [¶] . . . when warranted by the circumstances, immediate review of an order granting a motion to compel arbitration may be obtained by a petition for writ of mandate.” (Ibid.) Where appropriate, it is also attainable under the death knell doctrine, which “ ‘provides that an order which allows a

2016II DISCUSSION A. Appealability “An order compelling arbitration is not appealable.” (Garcia v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1149 [ 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 312 ].) Although “[r]eview of [such] an order . . . ordinarily must await appeal from a final judgment entered after arbitration^] [citation] [¶] . . . when warranted by the circumstances, immediate review of an order granting a motion to compel arbitration may be obtained by a petition for writ of mandate.” (Ibid.) Where appropriate, it is also attainable under the death knell doctrine, which “ ‘provides that an order which allows a

2021Equipment Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Cortez).) We conclude the death knell doctrine does not apply because of the remaining representative PAGA claim. 7 Under the death knell doctrine, an order is immediately appealable “when ‘it effectively terminates the entire action as to [a] class, in legal effect being “tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to all members of the class other than plaintiff.”’ [Citations.]” (Williams v. Impax Laboratories, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1060 , 1066 (Williams).) In Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 291 (Munoz), the court exp

2015It allows immediate appeals from “orders that effectively terminate class claims but permit individual claims to continue.” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 754 ; Baycol.) This includes a scenario such as the one here where the court ordered plaintiff to individually arbitrate his claims, which order “was the ‘death knell’ of class litigation through arbitration.” (Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1288 , abrogated on another ground in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 366 (Iskanian).) Defendant argues the dea

2020In General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 247 , the Court of Appeal rejected the application of the death knell doctrine in a product liability lawsuit.

2014Second, Nelsen and Szetela are flatly at odds with Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d at pages 698 and 699 and our Supreme Court’s 4 The Nelsen court was actually citing a quote from Daar that was set forth in General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 247, 251 . 9 most recent explanation of the death knell doctrine, which holds that the death knell doctrine applies to rulings that “effectively terminate class claims but permit individual claims to continue.” (In re Baycol Cases I and II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 754 .) Nelsen never mentioned Baycol, and we therefore choos

2024(Id. at pp. 1395–1396.) On appeal from the order striking the class allegations, Wallace’s sole argument was that the trial court erred in finding that she lost standing to proceed as the representative plaintiff when GEICO sent her the check. ( Wallace, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1396–1397.) Before addressing the merits of that contention, we observed in a footnote that an order striking class allegations was immediately appealable under the death knell doctrine.

2013Proc., § 906.) Thus, the ruling that [the plaintiff] lacks standing to serve as a class representative is also within the scope of our review, as that ruling impacted the trial court’s decision to strike the class allegations.” ( 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396, fn. 5 , italics added.) The sustaining of the demurrers to the section 1983 claims here did not directly “impact” the class certification issue, as did the adverse ruling on the putative class representative’s standing to pursue the class claims in Wallace, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th 1390 .

2023(See ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 184-185 [PAGA “empowers employees to sue on behalf of themselves and other aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties”].) Woodworth’s individual rest period claim survived, but the persistence of that “‘de minimis individual’” claim “‘creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered.’” (Miranda, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 202 .) And although the court had terminated Woodworth’s class claims by denying class certification several months earlier, the death knell doctrine did not 11 render that order appealable.

2022Plaintiffs claim the California Supreme Court’s opinion in ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175 (ZB, N.A.) renders “[t]he underlying rationale in Munoz [] null and void” and warrants application of the death knell doctrine here.