death knell exception in Maine

2026For the death knell exception to apply, the rights at stake must be “substantial.” Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71, ¶ 14 , 974 A.2d 918 (quotation marks omitted).

2026For the death knell exception to apply, the rights at stake must be “substantial.” Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71, ¶ 14 , 974 A.2d 918 (quotation marks omitted).

2007The Death Knell Exception [¶ 8] The death knell exception allows for an appeal of an interlocutory order “where substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 5 , 728 A.2d 1261, 1264 (quoting Cook v. Cook, 574 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me.1990.)) The death knell exception applies only to orders that, without an interlocutory appeal, result in a substantial loss or sacrifice of the rights, property, or claim at issue.

2002THE DEATH KNELL EXCEPTION [¶ 12] The death knell exception to the final judgment rule allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order immediately if “substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 5 , 728 A.2d 1261, 1264 (quoting Cook v. Cook, 574 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me.1990)).

2025At issue here is the “death knell” exception, which “permits an appeal from an interlocutory order where substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 5 , 728 A.2d 1261 (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted). [¶11] We have applied the death knell exception when the appellant’s “substantial rights” were textually linked to the United States and Maine Constitutions.

2025At issue here is the “death knell” exception, which “permits an appeal from an interlocutory order where substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 5 , 728 A.2d 1261 (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted). [¶11] We have applied the death knell exception when the appellant’s “substantial rights” were textually linked to the United States and Maine Constitutions.

2014Because there was no constitutional violation, we determined that there was “no authorized appeal from an order issued from a summary preliminary hearing” and concluded that “[ajppeal to this Court [was] barred by [section 4006], and appeal [was] not available by law under any other exception to the normal prudential judicial rule barring interlocutory appeals.” Id. [¶ 8] In In re Bailey M., we accepted a mother’s argument that the death-knell exception applied to her appeal from an order denying her motion to open her termination-of-parental-rights proceedings to the public after one of her c

2014Because there was no constitutional violation, we determined that there was “no authorized appeal from an order issued from a summary preliminary hearing” and concluded that “[ajppeal to this Court [was] barred by [section 4006], and appeal [was] not available by law under any other exception to the normal prudential judicial rule barring interlocutory appeals.” Id. [¶ 8] In In re Bailey M., we accepted a mother’s argument that the death-knell exception applied to her appeal from an order denying her motion to open her termination-of-parental-rights proceedings to the public after one of her c

2024Ass’n, 482 A.2d at 464-65 (declining to review a remand order when it could be challenged after entry of a final judgment). [¶23] Even when ballot printing deadlines are at issue, we have not always applied the death knell exception.

2008State Employees Ass’n, 482 A.2d 461, 464-65 (Me.1984). [¶ 10] “The death knell exception allows an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order when substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123, ¶ 9 , 908 A.2d at 1217 (quotation marks omitted).

2018Even if the trial court's mandate remains an interlocutory order, as the Court holds it is, an exception to the final judgment rule requires that we consider this appeal. [¶ 28] Under the "death knell" exception to the final judgment rule, an interlocutory appeal is permitted when "substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment." Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 ME 13 , ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1255 ; see also U.S. Dep't of Agric., Rural Housing Serv. v. Carter, 2002 ME 103 , ¶ 12, 799 A.2d 1232 (stating that the death knell exception is available when the injur

2018Even if the trial court's mandate remains an interlocutory order, as the Court holds it is, an exception to the final judgment rule requires that we consider this appeal. [¶ 28] Under the "death knell" exception to the final judgment rule, an interlocutory appeal is permitted when "substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment." Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 ME 13 , ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1255 ; see also U.S. Dep't of Agric., Rural Housing Serv. v. Carter, 2002 ME 103 , ¶ 12, 799 A.2d 1232 (stating that the death knell exception is available when the injur

2002See Andrews, ¶ 4, 716 A.2d at 215 (interlocutory review of denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment stage proper because reversal after judgment would not vindicate defendant’s right to avoid having to defend suit).

1999We have determined, however, that “ ‘the denial of a motion for a summary judgment based on a claim of immunity is immediately reviewable pursuant to’ the death knell exception to the final judgment rule.” Id. (quoting J.R.M., Inc. v. City of Portland, 669 A.2d 159 , 160 & n. 1 (Me.1995)).

2020See Harris Mgmt., Inc. v. Coulombe, 2016 ME 166 , ¶ 11 n.3, 151 A.3d 7 ; see also M.R.

2020See Harris Mgmt., Inc. v. Coulombe, 2016 ME 166 , ¶ 11 n.3, 151 A.3d 7 ; see also M.R.

2018One is the death knell exception, which allows an appeal from an interlocutory order "when substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment." Kingsbury , 2008 ME 79 , ¶ 5, 946 A.2d 389 (quotation marks omitted).

2018One is the death knell exception, which allows an appeal from an interlocutory order "when substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment." Kingsbury , 2008 ME 79 , ¶ 5, 946 A.2d 389 (quotation marks omitted).

2019DISCUSSION [¶6] An appeal from an interlocutory order, such as an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel, is “eligible for immediate review only if [it falls] within a judicially-created exception to the final judgment rule, including one of the three, well-established exceptions: the death knell exception, the judicial economy exception, or the collateral order exception.” Estate of Markheim v. Markheim, 2008 ME 138, ¶ 12 , 957 A.2d 56 (quotation marks omitted).

2019DISCUSSION [¶6] An appeal from an interlocutory order, such as an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel, is “eligible for immediate review only if [it falls] within a judicially-created exception to the final judgment rule, including one of the three, well-established exceptions: the death knell exception, the judicial economy exception, or the collateral order exception.” Estate of Markheim v. Markheim, 2008 ME 138, ¶ 12 , 957 A.2d 56 (quotation marks omitted).

2019Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51 , ¶ 12 n.9, 66 A.3d 571 (stating the correct standard of review for a special motion to dismiss); Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 , 343 n.8 (Me. 1979) (the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the disclosure of confidential records is immediately appealable). [¶9] The determination of whether the death knell exception is applicable to a particular case rests on a fact-specific analysis.

1986The death knell doctrine allows an appeal to be taken from an interlocutory order where “substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 , 343 n. 8 (Me.1979).

2018Otherwise, we held, "the confidences and privileged information revealed in the course of the proceedings would become part of the record." Id. ¶ 20 ; see Butler v. Romanova , 2008 ME 99 , ¶¶ 5-10, 953 A.2d 748 (considering the merits of the court's denial of a motion to disqualify in a divorce matter after concluding, without elaborating, that the moving party otherwise "[stood] to irreparably lose substantial rights"). [¶ 8] Even if we were to apply Markheim 's analysis to Carrillo's appeal, we would have to conclude that Carrillo has not met her burden of establishing the application of the

2018Otherwise, we held, "the confidences and privileged information revealed in the course of the proceedings would become part of the record." Id. ¶ 20 ; see Butler v. Romanova , 2008 ME 99 , ¶¶ 5-10, 953 A.2d 748 (considering the merits of the court's denial of a motion to disqualify in a divorce matter after concluding, without elaborating, that the moving party otherwise "[stood] to irreparably lose substantial rights"). [¶ 8] Even if we were to apply Markheim 's analysis to Carrillo's appeal, we would have to conclude that Carrillo has not met her burden of establishing the application of the

2019See Tornesello v. Tisdale , 2008 ME 84 , ¶ 12, 948 A.2d 1244 .

2019See Tornesello v. Tisdale , 2008 ME 84 , ¶ 12, 948 A.2d 1244 .

2018See Taylor, 2017 ME 218 , ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539 ; In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 14 , 169 A.3d 914 (stating that the death knell exception “allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order immediately if substantial rights of that party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment” (quotation marks omitted)); Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 105, ¶ 11 , 30 A.3d 816 (stating that the collateral order exception applies when a court’s decision “would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review” (quotation marks omitted)).

2018See Taylor , 2017 ME 218 , ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539 ; In re Evelyn A. , 2017 ME 182 , ¶ 14, 169 A.3d 914 (stating that the death knell exception "allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order immediately if substantial rights of that party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment" (quotation marks omitted) ); Bond v. Bond , 2011 ME 105 , ¶ 11, 30 A.3d 816 (stating that the collateral order exception applies when a court's decision "would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review" (quotation marks omitted) ).

2018See Fiber Materials, 2009 ME 71, ¶¶ 15-16, 24 , 974 A.2d 918 (concluding that the death knell exception did not apply because materials the appellant sought to strike had “already been widely disclosed” and were a “matter of public record for seven days until the memo was sealed by the court”); see also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that, although the confidential information became publicly available as a result of the trial court’s own error, “[w]e simply do not have the power, even if we were of the mind to use it if we had, to make what has thus bec

2018See Fiber Materials , 2009 ME 71 , ¶¶ 15-16, 24, 974 A.2d 918 (concluding that the death knell exception did not apply because materials the appellant sought to strike had "already been widely disclosed" and were a "matter of public record for seven days until the memo was sealed by the court"); see also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG , 377 F.3d 133 , 144 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that, although the confidential information became publicly available as a result of the trial court's own error, "[w]e simply do not have the power, even if we were of the mind to use it if we had, to make what has thus

2018Even if the trial court's mandate remains an interlocutory order, as the Court holds it is, an exception to the final judgment rule requires that we consider this appeal. [¶ 28] Under the "death knell" exception to the final judgment rule, an interlocutory appeal is permitted when "substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment." Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 ME 13 , ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1255 ; see also U.S. Dep't of Agric., Rural Housing Serv. v. Carter, 2002 ME 103 , ¶ 12, 799 A.2d 1232 (stating that the death knell exception is available when the injur

2018Even if the trial court's mandate remains an interlocutory order, as the Court holds it is, an exception to the final judgment rule requires that we consider this appeal. [¶ 28] Under the "death knell" exception to the final judgment rule, an interlocutory appeal is permitted when "substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment." Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 ME 13 , ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1255 ; see also U.S. Dep't of Agric., Rural Housing Serv. v. Carter, 2002 ME 103 , ¶ 12, 799 A.2d 1232 (stating that the death knell exception is available when the injur

2009The exception is only available, however, when the injury to the plaintiffs claimed right would otherwise be “imminent, concrete, and irreparable.” In re Bailey M., 2002 ME 12, ¶ 7 , 788 A.2d 590, 594 (quoting Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 2001 ME 70, ¶ 14 , 772 A.2d 842, 847 ). [¶ 6] Contrary to OAI’S contention, the death knell exception does not apply to this interlocutory appeal because failure to undertake appellate review neither precludes effective review nor results in irreparable injury to OAI.

2009The exception is only available, however, when the injury to the plaintiffs claimed right would otherwise be “imminent, concrete, and irreparable.” In re Bailey M., 2002 ME 12, ¶ 7 , 788 A.2d 590, 594 (quoting Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 2001 ME 70, ¶ 14 , 772 A.2d 842, 847 ). [¶ 6] Contrary to OAI’S contention, the death knell exception does not apply to this interlocutory appeal because failure to undertake appellate review neither precludes effective review nor results in irreparable injury to OAI.

2018See Taylor , 2017 ME 218 , ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539 ; In re Evelyn A. , 2017 ME 182 , ¶ 14, 169 A.3d 914 (stating that the death knell exception "allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order immediately if substantial rights of that party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment" (quotation marks omitted) ); Bond v. Bond , 2011 ME 105 , ¶ 11, 30 A.3d 816 (stating that the collateral order exception applies when a court's decision "would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review" (quotation marks omitted) ).

2018See Taylor , 2017 ME 218 , ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539 ; In re Evelyn A. , 2017 ME 182 , ¶ 14, 169 A.3d 914 (stating that the death knell exception "allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order immediately if substantial rights of that party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment" (quotation marks omitted) ); Bond v. Bond , 2011 ME 105 , ¶ 11, 30 A.3d 816 (stating that the collateral order exception applies when a court's decision "would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review" (quotation marks omitted) ).

2006One of the few narrow exceptions to the final judgment rule, see id., is the death knell exception, which permits immediate review when a party’s substantial rights will be irreparably lost if we delay review until the entry of a final judgment, see Fitch v. Doe, 2005 ME 39, ¶ 9 , 869 A.2d 722, 725 .

2006One of the few narrow exceptions to the final judgment rule, see id., is the death knell exception, which permits immediate review when a party’s substantial rights will be irreparably lost if we delay review until the entry of a final judgment, see Fitch v. Doe, 2005 ME 39, ¶ 9 , 869 A.2d 722, 725 .

2014Although N.B. asserts that we should reach the merits of her appeal pursuant to the death-knell exception, that exception is only available "when substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Liberty v. Bennett, 2012 ME 81, ¶ 18 , 46 A.3d 1141 (quotation marks omitted).

2013Guided by stare decisis, we will apply rules articulated in our precedents “unless the passage of time and changes in conditions justify reexamining the law stated in our prior opinion and reaching a different result.” State v. Bromiley, 2009 ME 110, ¶ 5 , 983 A.2d 1068 . [¶ 7] Quirion also argues that the cost he would incur in litigating this case to its conclusion, without any prospect of a significant damages award if Maine law does not apply, is cause for us to accept this appeal pursuant to either the death knell or judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule. [¶ 8] Pursuant to

2014Although N.B. asserts that we should reach the merits of her appeal pursuant to the death-knell exception, that exception is only available "when substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Liberty v. Bennett, 2012 ME 81, ¶ 18 , 46 A.3d 1141 (quotation marks omitted).

2013Guided by stare decisis, we will apply rules articulated in our precedents “unless the passage of time and changes in conditions justify reexamining the law stated in our prior opinion and reaching a different result.” State v. Bromiley, 2009 ME 110, ¶ 5 , 983 A.2d 1068 . [¶ 7] Quirion also argues that the cost he would incur in litigating this case to its conclusion, without any prospect of a significant damages award if Maine law does not apply, is cause for us to accept this appeal pursuant to either the death knell or judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule. [¶ 8] Pursuant to

1999We have determined, however, that “ ‘the denial of a motion for a summary judgment based on a claim of immunity is immediately reviewable pursuant to’ the death knell exception to the final judgment rule.” Id. (quoting J.R.M., Inc. v. City of Portland, 669 A.2d 159 , 160 & n. 1 (Me.1995)).

1999The death knell exception “permits an appeal from an interlocutory order where substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Id. (quoting Cook v. Cook, 574 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me.1990)).

2026See Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26 , ¶ 17, 202 A.3d 1189 .

2026See Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26 , ¶ 17, 202 A.3d 1189 (holding that a “statute of limitation defense can be reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment, [so] no irreparable loss of right exists if the case proceeds to trial”); see also United States v. Weiss, 7 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that appeal of a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds does not involve a right that will be “irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal”) (quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he statute of limitations is an ordinary defense an

2023Ass’n, 2022 ME 26, ¶ 16 , 273 A.3d 6 358 (quotation marks omitted) (“The exceptions include (1) the death knell exception, (2) the collateral order exception, and (3) the judicial economy exception.”).

2023See Maples, 2022 ME 26, ¶ 16 , 273 A.3d 358 . [¶17] We have stated that “[a] party urging that we reach the merits of an otherwise interlocutory appeal has the burden of demonstrating” that one of the exceptions to the final judgment rule “justifies our reaching the merits of the appeal.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (“The exceptions include (1) the death knell exception, (2) the collateral order exception, and (3) the judicial economy exception.”).

2018We have not the means to put the genie back [in the bottle]"); Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Limelight Networks, Inc. , 611 F.Supp.2d 572 , 584-85 (E.D.Va. 2009) (where a motion to impound was filed after the records at issue had been admitted in evidence at a trial and three weeks after the jury's verdict, concluding that the party had waived the right to seek any such relief). [¶ 13] The death knell exception to the final judgment rule serves to preserve and protect rights from being irreparably lost.

2018We have not the means to put the genie back [in the bottle]"); Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Limelight Networks, Inc. , 611 F.Supp.2d 572 , 584-85 (E.D.Va. 2009) (where a motion to impound was filed after the records at issue had been admitted in evidence at a trial and three weeks after the jury's verdict, concluding that the party had waived the right to seek any such relief). [¶ 13] The death knell exception to the final judgment rule serves to preserve and protect rights from being irreparably lost.