affirmative showing error in Georgia

2025See Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 873 ( 742 SE2d 707 ) (2013) (for plain-error review, the burden is on the 39 defendant to make “an affirmative showing that the error probably did not affect the outcome below”).

2025See Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 873 ( 742 SE2d 707 ) (2013) (for plain-error review, the burden is on the 39 defendant to make “an affirmative showing that the error probably did not affect the outcome below”).

2026See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 781 SE2d 772 ) (2016) (“[B]eyond showing a clear or obvious error, plain-error analysis requires the appellant to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.”) (quotation marks omitted). 3.

2026See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 781 SE2d 772 ) (2016) (“[B]eyond showing a clear or obvious error, plain-error analysis requires the appellant to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.”) (quotation marks omitted). 3.

2019See State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29 , 33 (2) (a), 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011) ; see also Shaw v. State , 292 Ga. 871 , 873 (2), 742 S.E.2d 707 (2013).

2015However, because Howell denied making such a seemingly innocuous gesture, a reasonable inference could be drawn that he had an ulterior motive for making it — i.e., that he had intended to influence her testimony. 5 As Justice Hunstein similarly pointed out in her dissent in Slackman, supra at 673, it was (the Defendant’s) own behavior in uttering the statement in (the court reporter’s) presence which caused her to be a witness. 6 “Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requi

2015However, because Howell denied making such a seemingly innocuous gesture, a reasonable inference could be drawn that he had an ulterior motive for making it — i.e., that he had intended to influence her testimony. 5 As Justice Hunstein similarly pointed out in her dissent in Slackman, supra at 673, it was (the Defendant’s) own behavior in uttering the statement in (the court reporter’s) presence which caused her to be a witness. 6 “Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requi

2015However, because Howell denied making such a seemingly innocuous gesture, a reasonable inference could be drawn that he had an ulterior motive for making it — i.e., that he had intended to influence her testimony. 5 As Justice Hunstein similarly pointed out in her dissent in Slackman, supra at 673, it was (the Defendant’s) own behavior in uttering the statement in (the court reporter’s) presence which caused her to be a witness. 6 “Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requi

2024Proving that admission of the evidence affected Miller’s substantial rights requires him “to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 243 (4) (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (citation omitted).

2024Proving that admission of the evidence affected Miller’s substantial rights requires him “to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 243 (4) (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (citation omitted).

2014See also Wagner v. State, 311 Ga. App. 589, 594, n. 3 ( 716 SE2d 633 ) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring specially) (“Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requires the appellant to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.”) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 734 (II) (A) ( 113 SCt 1770 , 123 LE2d 508) (1993)).

2014See also Wagner v. State, 311 Ga. App. 589, 594, n. 3 ( 716 SE2d 633 ) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring specially) (“Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requires the appellant to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.”) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 734 (II) (A) ( 113 SCt 1770 , 123 LE2d 508) (1993)).

2024Given Appellant’s cursory treatment of the claim of error and the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, including his own statements, we conclude that he has failed to meet his burden of making “an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga. 704, 708 (808 SE2d 671) (2017) (cleaned up).

2024Given Appellant’s cursory treatment of the claim of error and the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, including his own statements, we conclude that he has failed to meet his burden of making “an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga. 704, 708 (808 SE2d 671) (2017) (cleaned up).

2017“Beyond showing a clear or obvious error, plain-error analysis requires the appellant to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 40, 42-43 (2) ( 785 SE2d 886 ) (2016).

2017“Beyond showing a clear or obvious error, plain-error analysis requires the appellant to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 40, 42-43 (2) ( 785 SE2d 886 ) (2016).

2023“To show that an error affected his substantial rights, [the appellant] must make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” McKinney v. State, 307 Ga. 129, 135 (2) (b) (834 SE2d 741) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023“To show that an error affected his substantial rights, [the appellant] must make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” McKinney v. State, 307 Ga. 129, 135 (2) (b) ( 834 SE2d 741 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024See Hampton, 302 Ga. at 168 (2) (To prevail on the third step of the plain error analysis, an “appellant has the burden to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2019"To prevail on this step, appellant has the burden to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hampton v. State , 302 Ga. 166 , 168 (2), 805 S.E.2d 902 (2017).

2026See State v. Williams, 308 Ga. 228 , 232 n.8 (2020) (“When plain error analysis is applied on appeal, the appellant has to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” (quotation marks omitted)).

2026See State v. Williams, 308 Ga. 228 , 232 n.8 (2020) (“When plain error analysis is applied on appeal, the appellant has to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” (quotation marks omitted)).

2024(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 362 (3) ( 882 SE2d 289 ) (2022).1 Thomas contends that there was slight evidence to support a jury charge regarding the victim’s ability to perceive the events due to her drinking and medication use.

2024(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 362 (3) ( 882 SE2d 289 ) (2022).1 Thomas contends that there was slight evidence to support a jury charge regarding the victim’s ability to perceive the events due to her drinking and medication use.

2018Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 317 (2) ( 800 SE2d 333 ) (2017).

2018Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 317 (2) ( 800 SE2d 333 ) (2017).

2017Further, “[j]ury instructions are read and considered as a whole in determining whether there is error [Cit.],” White v. State, 281 Ga. 276, 280 (4) ( 637 SE2d 645 ) (2006), and the jury was instructed on reasonable doubt, participation in a crime, “mere presence” at the scene of a crime, and that “grave suspicion” does not authorize a conviction.

2017Further, “[j]ury instructions are read and considered as a whole in determining whether there is error [Cit.],” White v. State, 281 Ga. 276, 280 (4) ( 637 SE2d 645 ) (2006), and the jury was instructed on reasonable doubt, participation in a crime, “mere presence” at the scene of a crime, and that “grave suspicion” does not authorize a conviction.

2014Crapps cannot meet this burden. “[E] vidence which is relevant to an issue in a case is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it incidentally puts the defendant’s character in issue.” Ferguson v. State, 307 Ga. App. 232, 237 (2) ( 704 SE2d 470 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014Crapps cannot meet this burden. “[E] vidence which is relevant to an issue in a case is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it incidentally puts the defendant’s character in issue.” Ferguson v. State, 307 Ga. App. 232, 237 (2) ( 704 SE2d 470 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023See Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 823 (2) (809 SE2d 727) (2018) (“The appellant has the burden of showing a clear or obvious error and further making an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.”).

2023See Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 823 (2) (809 SE2d 727) (2018) (“The appellant has the burden of showing a clear or obvious error and further making an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.”).

2024However, even assuming that the trial court clearly erred in not instructing the jury that the State had the burden to disprove Appellant’s justification defense, we conclude 4 In contrast to nonconstitutional harmless error, where the State has the burden to show that it was highly probable that an error did not contribute to the verdict, under the plain-error test, “a defendant has the burden of making an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 418 n.6 (851 SE2d 541) (2020) (cleaned up). 20 that Appellant has failed to carry his

2024Thus, even assuming that it was clear error to admit the footage showing the injured Zambrano, we conclude that Madera “cannot establish that the error affected his substantial rights because he has not made an affirmative showing that the error probably affected the outcome of his trial.” Allen, 310 Ga. at 416 (3) (rejecting plain error claim where evidence at issue “was cumulative of other unchallenged evidence” and evidence of defendant’s guilt was strong).

2020(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State, 301 Ga. 83, 88 (2) ( 799 SE2d 757 ) (2017).

2020(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State, 301 Ga. 83, 88 (2) ( 799 SE2d 757 ) (2017).

2025“The appellant has the burden of showing a clear or obvious error and further making an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” DeMuro v. State, 317 Ga. 155, 163 (2) ( 892 SE2d 31 ) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025“The appellant has the burden of showing a clear or obvious error and further making an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” DeMuro v. State, 317 Ga. 155, 163 (2) ( 892 SE2d 31 ) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025See also Campbell v. State, 320 Ga. 333 , 366 n.35 ( 907 SE2d 871 ) (2024) (“Although we reviewed one of the errors as to [the co-defendants] for only plain error, we need not decide how that could affect our evaluation of the cumulative harm because these claims fail even under the stricter harmless- error standard for preserved non-constitutional errors.”) (emphasis supplied).

2025See also Campbell v. State, 320 Ga. 333 , 366 n.35 ( 907 SE2d 871 ) (2024) (“Although we reviewed one of the errors as to [the co-defendants] for only plain error, we need not decide how that could affect our evaluation of the cumulative harm because these claims fail even under the stricter harmless- error standard for preserved non-constitutional errors.”) (emphasis supplied).

2024See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 557 (II) ( 124 SCt 1284 , 157 LE2d 1068) (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment[,] by its terms[,] requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents.”); United States v. Barajas, 710 F3d 1102, 1109 (B) (1) (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting argument “that [the] probable cause determination [for seizure of cell phone GPS data] hinges on the government’s failure to specifically request GPS data” in the supporting affidavit). 27 to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2024See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 557 (II) ( 124 SCt 1284 , 157 LE2d 1068) (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment[,] by its terms[,] requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents.”); United States v. Barajas, 710 F3d 1102, 1109 (B) (1) (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting argument “that [the] probable cause determination [for seizure of cell phone GPS data] hinges on the government’s failure to specifically request GPS data” in the supporting affidavit). 27 to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2024See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 557 (II) ( 124 SCt 1284 , 157 LE2d 1068) (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment[,] by its terms[,] requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents.”); United States v. Barajas, 710 F3d 1102, 1109 (B) (1) (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting argument “that [the] probable cause determination [for seizure of cell phone GPS data] hinges on the government’s failure to specifically request GPS data” in the supporting affidavit). 27 to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2024See also Jones, 317 Ga. at 473 (2) (appellant failed to show how alleged erroneous admission of evidence affected his substantial rights where the evidence “was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence at trial” and there was “substantial evidence of [appellant’s] guilt”); Perryman-Henderson v. State, 316 Ga. 626, 632-633 (3) (889 SE2d 814) (2023) (appellant failed to show 8 how alleged error affected his substantial rights in light of the evidence against him, including eyewitness testimony that was not consistent with his version of events).

2024See also Jones, 317 Ga. at 473 (2) (appellant failed to show how alleged erroneous admission of evidence affected his substantial rights where the evidence “was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence at trial” and there was “substantial evidence of [appellant’s] guilt”); Perryman-Henderson v. State, 316 Ga. 626, 632-633 (3) (889 SE2d 814) (2023) (appellant failed to show 8 how alleged error affected his substantial rights in light of the evidence against him, including eyewitness testimony that was not consistent with his version of events).

2024See also Jones, 317 Ga. at 473 (2) (appellant failed to show how alleged erroneous admission of evidence affected his substantial rights where the evidence “was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence at trial” and there was “substantial evidence of [appellant’s] guilt”); Perryman-Henderson v. State, 316 Ga. 626, 632-633 (3) ( 889 SE2d 814 ) (2023) (appellant failed to show how alleged error affected his substantial rights in light of the evidence against him, including eyewitness testimony that was not consistent with his version of events).

2024See also Jones, 317 Ga. at 473 (2) (appellant failed to show how alleged erroneous admission of evidence affected his substantial rights where the evidence “was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence at trial” and there was “substantial evidence of [appellant’s] guilt”); Perryman-Henderson v. State, 316 Ga. 626, 632-633 (3) (889 SE2d 814) (2023) (appellant failed to show 8 how alleged error affected his substantial rights in light of the evidence against him, including eyewitness testimony that was not consistent with his version of events).

2024Pretermitting whether the trial court erred in admitting the Facebook records, we conclude that Jennings has failed to satisfy the third prong of the plain-error analysis, requiring her “to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” Ruthenberg v. State, 317 Ga. 227, 231 (2) (892 SE2d 728) (2023).

2024Pretermitting whether the trial court erred in admitting the Facebook records, we conclude that Jennings has failed to satisfy the third prong of the plain-error analysis, requiring her “to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” Ruthenberg v. State, 317 Ga. 227, 231 (2) (892 SE2d 728) (2023).