47 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2026See People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 241, 260 (1997) (noting, in reviewing the trial court’s sentence in a death penalty case, that the court “is presumed to know the law and apply it properly *** absent an affirmative showing of error”). 2024The sentencing court “is presumed to know the law and apply it properly, and its decision regarding sentencing will be presumed to be proper absent an affirmative showing of error.” People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 260 (1997). | 7 | 7 |
People v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2025The State appealed. ¶ 53 APPLICABLE LAW ¶ 54 “Absent an affirmative showing of error in the record, a trial judge is presumed to know the law and to apply it properly.” People v. Henderson, 336 Ill. 2025This approach does not withstand scrutiny. 21 No. 1-24-0655 ¶ 63 Again, “[a]bsent an affirmative showing of error in the record, a trial judge is presumed to know the law and to apply it properly.” Henderson, 336 Ill. | 4 | 5 |
People v. Askewgreen2 sentences2023App. 3d 915, 922 (2003) (citing People v. Askew, 273 Ill. 2003People v. Askew, 273 Ill. | 3 | 5 |
People v. Lunagreen2 sentences2003People v. Luna, 234 Ill. 1998Luna , 234 Ill. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Spinksgreen2 sentences1985See People v. Spinks (1980), 80 Ill. 1985(People v. Spinks (1980), 80 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gonzalezgreen1 sentence2024Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d at 139 . ¶ 43 The sentencing court “is presumed to know the law and apply it properly, and its decision regarding sentencing will be presumed to be proper absent an affirmative showing of error.” People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 260 (1997). “[A] single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing ‘a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.’ ” People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 13 (quoting People v. 14 Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 84 (1992)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2024The only requirement for admission of evidence in a sentencing hearing, including hearsay evidence, is it “must be reliable and relevant as determined by the trial court within its sound discretion.” People v. Harris, 375 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cartergreen1 sentence2016See Carter, 2015 IL 117709 , ¶¶ 20, 23. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fort
green
2 sentences2001Further, "[a] sentence is presumptively correct, and only where such a presumption has been rebutted by an affirmative showing of error will a reviewing court find that the trial court has abused its discretion." Fort , 229 Ill. 2001Further, “[a] sentence is presumptively correct, and only where such a presumption has been rebutted by an affirmative showing of error will a reviewing court find that the trial court has abused its discretion.” Fort, 229 Ill. | 7 | 1993–2007 |
People v. Choate
green
2 sentences1980Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005-5-4.1.) Only where this presumption is rebutted by an affirmative showing of error will the sentence be reduced by a reviewing court. ( People v. Choate (1979), 71 Ill. 1980People v. Choate (1979), 71 Ill. | 5 | 1980–1980 |
People of v. Plantinga
green
2 sentences1992People v. Plantinga (1985), 132 Ill. 1992People v. Plantinga (1985), 132 Ill. | 4 | 1988–1992 |
People v. Reed
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2014Id. | 2 | 2014–2015 |
People v. Beck
green
2 sentences1998People v. Beck , 295 Ill. 1998People v. Beck, 295 Ill. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Woodard
green
2 sentences1997The court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, and modified the judgment, pursuant to section 110 — 14, to reflect a $500 credit against the $500 fine for the period of defendant’s incarceration prior to sentencing. 276 Ill. 1997The court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence, and modified the judgment, pursuant to section 110-14, to reflect a $500 credit against the $500 fine for the period of defendant's incarceration prior to sentencing. 276 Ill.App.3d at 248 , 212 Ill.Dec. 878 , 658 N.E.2d 55 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2024Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d at 139 . ¶ 43 The sentencing court “is presumed to know the law and apply it properly, and its decision regarding sentencing will be presumed to be proper absent an affirmative showing of error.” People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 260 (1997). “[A] single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing ‘a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.’ ” People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 13 (quoting People v. 14 Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 84 (1992)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Morrow
green
1 sentence2024Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d at 139 . ¶ 43 The sentencing court “is presumed to know the law and apply it properly, and its decision regarding sentencing will be presumed to be proper absent an affirmative showing of error.” People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 260 (1997). “[A] single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing ‘a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.’ ” People v. Morrow, 2014 IL App (2d) 130718 , ¶ 13 (quoting People v. 14 Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 84 (1992)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Sweet
green
1 sentence2023“A trial court commits error when it refuses to exercise discretion based on the erroneous belief that it does not have the power to exercise its discretion.” People v. Sweet, 2017 IL App (3d) 140434, ¶ 44 . ¶ 12 Here, the court’s failure to explicitly rule on defendant’s motion for the appointment of counsel did not show that the court failed to recognize that it had the discretion to do so because “[a]bsent an affirmative showing of error in the record, a trial judge is presumed to know the law and to apply it properly.” People v. Henderson, 336 Ill. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Buchanan
green
1 sentence1995(People v. Buchanan (1991), 211 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Jordan
green
1 sentence1988App. 3d 810 , 474 N.E.2d 1283 .) The sentence imposed is presumed to be proper, and only where such presumption has been rebutted by an affirmative showing of error will a reviewing court find the sentence to be an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Perruquet
green
2 sentences1985(People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153 , 368 N.E.2d 882 .) A sentence appealed from is presumed to be proper, and only where such presumption has been rebutted by an affirmative showing of error will a reviewing court find it to be an abuse of discretion. 1985(People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153 , 368 N.E.2d 882 .) A sentence appealed from is presumed to be proper, and only where such presumption has been rebutted by an affirmative showing of error will a reviewing court find it to be an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Henderson
green
1 sentence1985App. 3d 798 , 359 N.E.2d 909 .) A sentence appealed from is presumed to be proper, and only where such presumption has been rebutted by an affirmative showing of error will a reviewing court find it to be an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Gaston
green
1 sentence1972This court held in People v. Gaston (1971), (Ill.App.2d), 270 N.E.2d 846 and People v. Spates (Ill.App.2d), 270 N.E.2d 848 , that a signed jury waiver in and of itself, in a record otherwise totally silent on the issue of waiver of jury trial, was not sufficient to result in relinquishment of defendant’s constitutional right to trial by jury. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
People v. Spates
neutral
1 sentence1972This court held in People v. Gaston (1971), (Ill.App.2d), 270 N.E.2d 846 and People v. Spates (Ill.App.2d), 270 N.E.2d 848 , that a signed jury waiver in and of itself, in a record otherwise totally silent on the issue of waiver of jury trial, was not sufficient to result in relinquishment of defendant’s constitutional right to trial by jury. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.