affirmative showing error in California

1981First, the record is incomplete in that it does not contain 49 of the deposition questions that Mitchell was re *938 quired to answer. 16 Second, the defendants have failed to specify how the questions and documents relate to their finances. 17 The defendants have not carried their burdens of making an affirmative showing of error by an adequate record (In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91, 102 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 874 , 599 P.2d 65 ]; Rossiter v. Benoit (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 706, 711-712 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 65 ]) or of pointing out reversible error in their briefs (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 74

1981First, the record is incomplete in that it does not contain 49 of the deposition questions that Mitchell was re *938 quired to answer. 16 Second, the defendants have failed to specify how the questions and documents relate to their finances. 17 The defendants have not carried their burdens of making an affirmative showing of error by an adequate record (In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91, 102 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 874 , 599 P.2d 65 ]; Rossiter v. Benoit (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 706, 711-712 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 65 ]) or of pointing out reversible error in their briefs (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 74

2025(See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 .) The Schmids’ discussion in their opening brief as to why collateral estoppel is inapplicable (across the board) touches on other aspects of their administrative mandamus cause of action but contains no discussion or analysis of collateral estoppel as applied to the Topanga issue.13 They have thus abandoned any 13 The County does not address this issue either, but that does not relieve the Schmids, as the appellants, from making an affirmative showing of error to overcome the presumption of correctness we afford the trial court’s ruling.

2022(Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564 .) DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.

2025Applicable Law and Analysis “In [Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin),] the United Stated Supreme Court held that it could not be presumed from a silent record that a guilty plea was voluntarily made with the necessary concomitant, knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights which were forfeited by a plea of guilty. [Citations.] This emphasis on the necessity of an affirmative showing of waiver was grounded on the recognition 21 that a guilty plea, ‘. . . is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains b

2025Applicable Law and Analysis “In [Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin),] the United Stated Supreme Court held that it could not be presumed from a silent record that a guilty plea was voluntarily made with the necessary concomitant, knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights which were forfeited by a plea of guilty. [Citations.] This emphasis on the necessity of an affirmative showing of waiver was grounded on the recognition 21 that a guilty plea, ‘. . . is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains b

2025Just the opposite: “a judgment is presumed to be correct and must be upheld in the absence of an affirmative showing of error.” (See Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1550 .) The Housing Commission protests that the 2017 letter did “not even address the Community Choice Initiative that is now at issue,” referring to its three-tiered approach to setting payment standards.

2017This presumption applies only on a silent record. [Citations.] In contrast, ‘When the record clearly demonstrates what the [family] court did, we will not presume it did something different.’ ” (Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1550 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 259 ].) The family court did not issue a statement of decision, but it did issue a detailed ruling on submitted matter setting forth its reasoning.

2023(People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549-550 .) “An abuse of discretion is shown when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard.” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733 .) In this case, although Nakano had presented the court with documents reflecting his engagement in private counseling and addressed section 1203.3 in his briefing, the trial court’s comments reflect that its justification for terminating his probation early was based entirely on two factors: (1) its belief that it was in “everyone’s interest” that Nakano left the country; and (2

2016(People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549-550 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 ].) Here, it is apparent from the record that the trial court was unaware that it had the discretion both to conduct an inquiry regarding whether defendant was mentally incapable of representing himself and, if necessary, to deny defendant’s Faretta request on that ground.

2021(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 (Rappleyea).) Reversal is appropriate upon an affirmative showing of error, which requires the appellant to address each basis for a trial court’s ruling.

2014(Rappleyea v. Campbell 9 (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985 ; Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125-1126 ; see Flores, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 205 ["The same rules apply to a party appearing in propria persona as to any other party."].) We therefore conclude Jones's failure to provide an adequate record for us to assess error and his failure to state a cogent legal argument supported by authority establishing reversible error require us to affirm the judgment dismissing his action against the County.

1997In the wake of Fritz , the appellate courts did not remand cases absent an affirmative showing of error. ( People v. Courtney (1985) 174 Cal. App.3d 1004 [ 220 Cal. Rptr. 328 ]; People v. Jackson (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 694, 697-698 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 1026, 1030-1034 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 208 ]; People v. Flint (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 13, 21-22 [ 225 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; People v. Dolliver (1986) 181 Cal. App.3d 49, 57 [ 225 Cal. Rptr. 920 ]; People v. McCutcheon (1986) 187 Cal. App.3d 552, 558-559 [ 232 Cal. Rptr. 159 ]; cf. People v. Jackson (1986) 187 Cal. Ap

1997In the wake of Fritz , the appellate courts did not remand cases absent an affirmative showing of error. ( People v. Courtney (1985) 174 Cal. App.3d 1004 [ 220 Cal. Rptr. 328 ]; People v. Jackson (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 694, 697-698 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 1026, 1030-1034 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 208 ]; People v. Flint (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 13, 21-22 [ 225 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; People v. Dolliver (1986) 181 Cal. App.3d 49, 57 [ 225 Cal. Rptr. 920 ]; People v. McCutcheon (1986) 187 Cal. App.3d 552, 558-559 [ 232 Cal. Rptr. 159 ]; cf. People v. Jackson (1986) 187 Cal. Ap

2026Avram asserts the court erroneously found that dismissal would not “assist the citizens to be in a secure and safe environment,” instead of finding a “likelihood . . . [of] physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Avram contends that this “ ‘secure and safe’ standard would capture almost every crime, including many low level offenses and even misdemeanors.” “ ‘The general rule is that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’ [Citations.] The presumption is overcome by an affirmative showing of error in the record.” (Pe

2025(People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 361 (Mosby).) In making such an assessment, the focus is on whether the admission or waiver was “given with an understanding of the rights waived.” (Ibid.) In the section of his opening brief addressing the issue, Anderson describes only the colloquy that took place after the jury had been discharged—that is, the colloquy 23 concerning only Anderson’s stipulation of the remaining aggravating factors.

2025Applicable Law and Analysis “In [Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin),] the United Stated Supreme Court held that it could not be presumed from a silent record that a guilty plea was voluntarily made with the necessary concomitant, knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights which were forfeited by a plea of guilty. [Citations.] This emphasis on the necessity of an affirmative showing of waiver was grounded on the recognition 21 that a guilty plea, ‘. . . is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains b

2025Applicable Law and Analysis “In [Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin),] the United Stated Supreme Court held that it could not be presumed from a silent record that a guilty plea was voluntarily made with the necessary concomitant, knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights which were forfeited by a plea of guilty. [Citations.] This emphasis on the necessity of an affirmative showing of waiver was grounded on the recognition 21 that a guilty plea, ‘. . . is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains b

2025Applicable Law and Analysis “In [Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin),] the United Stated Supreme Court held that it could not be presumed from a silent record that a guilty plea was voluntarily made with the necessary concomitant, knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights which were forfeited by a plea of guilty. [Citations.] This emphasis on the necessity of an affirmative showing of waiver was grounded on the recognition 21 that a guilty plea, ‘. . . is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains b

2025Applicable Law and Analysis “In [Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin),] the United Stated Supreme Court held that it could not be presumed from a silent record that a guilty plea was voluntarily made with the necessary concomitant, knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights which were forfeited by a plea of guilty. [Citations.] This emphasis on the necessity of an affirmative showing of waiver was grounded on the recognition 21 that a guilty plea, ‘. . . is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains b

2025Applicable Law and Analysis “In [Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin),] the United Stated Supreme Court held that it could not be presumed from a silent record that a guilty plea was voluntarily made with the necessary concomitant, knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights which were forfeited by a plea of guilty. [Citations.] This emphasis on the necessity of an affirmative showing of waiver was grounded on the recognition 21 that a guilty plea, ‘. . . is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains b

2025Applicable Law and Analysis “In [Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin),] the United Stated Supreme Court held that it could not be presumed from a silent record that a guilty plea was voluntarily made with the necessary concomitant, knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights which were forfeited by a plea of guilty. [Citations.] This emphasis on the necessity of an affirmative showing of waiver was grounded on the recognition 21 that a guilty plea, ‘. . . is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains b

2023(People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666 [“On appeal, we presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct, ‘ “[a]ll 9 intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ’ ”].) In any event, even if we were to assume the court applied the wrong standard of proof, that error was harmless.

2022(See Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 [“Where no reporter’s transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters”] (emphasis omitted).) Absent an affirmative showing of error, we presume the trial court’s order was correct.