petition asserts claim in Ohio

2021Champaign No. 2012-CA-33, 2013-Ohio-1921, ¶ 16 . {¶ 39} The untimely filing of a petition for postconviction relief may be excused with a showing that either (1) the defendant was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he or she relies to present the claim, or (2) the United States Supreme Court recognizes a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to his or her situation and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.

2020Champaign No. 2012 CA 33, 2013-Ohio-1921, ¶ 16 . {¶ 12} “Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a), a defendant may not file an untimely or successive petition for post-conviction relief unless (1) the defendant was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he or she relies to present the claim, or (2) the United States Supreme Court recognizes a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to his or her situation and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.” State v. Baker, 2d Dist.

2024Montgomery No. 27596, 2017-Ohio-8602, ¶ 13 .

2022Montgomery No. 27596, 2017-Ohio-8602, ¶ 13 .

2007Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 (A)(1), a court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely filed petition for post-conviction relief unless both of the following apply: "(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitione

2006Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 (A)(1), a court generally may not entertain a delayed or successive petition for postconviction relief unless two conditions are satisfied: {¶ 7} "(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in [R.C. 2953.21 (A)(2)] or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner's situation, and th

2007Pursuant to R.C. *Page 4 2953.23 (A)(1), a court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely filed petition for post-conviction relief unless both of the following apply: "(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the p

2007Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 (A)(1), a court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely filed petition for post-conviction relief unless both of the following apply: "(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitione

2007Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 (A)(1), a court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely filed petition for postconviction relief unless both of the following apply: {¶ 9} "(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the peti

2006Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 (A)(1), a court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely filed petition for postconviction relief unless both of the following apply: {¶ 10} "(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the pet

2007As detailed below, Elko fails to meet this exception for filing an untimely petition. {¶ 7} In State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , the Ohio Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Ohio's sentencing statutes in light of the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 , and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466 .

2006Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 (A)(1), a court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely filed petition for postconviction relief unless both of the following apply: {¶ 13} "(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the pet

2004Pough's petition, filed on July 15, 2003, is untimely. {¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 (A)(1), a court may consider an untimely petition for postconviction relief only if: "(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, [subsequent to the time for filing a petition], the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner's situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right"; and

2003No. 99-T-0143, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 494 , at *5-*6. {¶ 20} R.C. 2953.23 (A)(1) allows a court to entertain an untimely petition for post conviction relief in two narrow circumstances: "(1) where the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts that the petition is predicated upon or (2) the United States Supreme Court has recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to the petitioner and the petition asserts a claim based on that new right." Beaver , supra, at 462 . {¶ 21} Appellant fails to make any argument either in his original petition or in his ap

2023R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)1 states, in relevant part: [A] court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in [R.C. 2953.21(A)] or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless * * * [b]oth of the following apply: (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier peti

2023R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)1 states, in relevant part: [A] court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in [R.C. 2953.21(A)] or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless * * * [b]oth of the following apply: (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier peti

2022“First, he must show either that (1) he was ‘unavoidably prevented’ from discovering the facts he relies on, or (2) subsequent to the 365-day deadline, ‘the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in [his] situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.’” Id., quoting R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a).

2021“First, he must show either that (1) he was ‘unavoidably prevented’ from discovering the facts he relies on, or (2) subsequent to the 365-day deadline, ‘the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in [his] situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.’” (Alteration sic.) Id., quoting R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a).

2023R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)1 states, in relevant part: [A] court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in [R.C. 2953.21(A)] or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless * * * [b]oth of the following apply: (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier peti

2023R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)1 states, in relevant part: [A] court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in [R.C. 2953.21(A)] or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless * * * [b]oth of the following apply: (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier peti

2014Summit No. 26670, 2013-Ohio-3510, ¶ 9 , quoting R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b).

2014Summit No. 26670, 2013-Ohio-3510, ¶ 9 , quoting R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b).

2007State v. Gibson , Washington App. No. 05CA20, 2005-Ohio-5353 , at ¶ 10 , citing State v. Carter , Clark App. No. 03CA-11, 2003-Ohio-4838 , citing State v. Beuke (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 633 , and State v. Owens (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 34 ; State v. McGee , Lorain App. No. 01CA007952, 2002-Ohio-4249 , appeal not allowed, 98 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2003-Ohio-60 ; State v. Hansbro , Clark App. No. 2001-CA-88, 2002-Ohio-2922 .

2007State v. Gibson , Washington App. No. 05CA20, 2005-Ohio-5353 , at ¶ 10 , citing State v. Carter , Clark App. No. 03CA-11, 2003-Ohio-4838 , citing State v. Beuke (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 633 , and State v. Owens (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 34 ; State v. McGee , Loraine App. No. 01CA007952, 2002-Ohio-4249 , appeal not allowed, 98 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2003-Ohio-60 ; State v. Hansbro , Clark App. No. 2001-CA-88, 2002-Ohio-2922 .

2007State v. Gibson , Washington App. No. 05CA20, 2005-Ohio-5353 , at ¶ 10 , citing State v. Carter , Clark App. No. 03CA-11, 2003-Ohio-4838 , citing State v. Beuke (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 633 , and State v. Owens (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 34 ; State v. McGee , Lorain App. No. 01CA007952, 2002-Ohio-4249 , appeal not allowed, 98 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2003-Ohio-60 ; State v. Hansbro , Clark App. No. 2001-CA-88, 2002-Ohio-2922 .

2007State v. Gibson , Washington App. No. 05CA20, 2005-Ohio-5353 , at ¶ 10 , citing State v. Carter , Clark App. No. 03CA-11, 2003-Ohio-4838 , citing State v. Beuke (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 633 , and State v. Owens (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 34 ; State v. McGee , Loraine App. No. 01CA007952, 2002-Ohio-4249 , appeal not allowed, 98 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2003-Ohio-60 ; State v. Hansbro , Clark App. No. 2001-CA-88, 2002-Ohio-2922 .

2007State v. Gibson , Washington App. No. 05CA20, 2005-Ohio-5353 , at ¶ 10 , citing State v. Carter , Clark App. No. 03CA-11, 2003-Ohio-4838 , citing State v. Beuke (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 633 , and State v. Owens (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 34 ; State v. McGee , Lorain App. No. 01CA007952, 2002-Ohio-4249 , appeal not allowed, 98 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2003-Ohio-60 ; State v. Hansbro , Clark App. No. 2001-CA-88, 2002-Ohio-2922 .

2007State v. Gibson , Washington App. No. 05CA20, 2005-Ohio-5353 , at ¶ 10 , citing State v. Carter , Clark App. No. 03CA-11, 2003-Ohio-4838 , citing State v. Beuke (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 633 , and State v. Owens (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 34 ; State v. McGee , Loraine App. No. 01CA007952, 2002-Ohio-4249 , appeal not allowed, 98 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2003-Ohio-60 ; State v. Hansbro , Clark App. No. 2001-CA-88, 2002-Ohio-2922 .

2023R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)1 states, in relevant part: [A] court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in [R.C. 2953.21(A)] or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless * * * [b]oth of the following apply: (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier peti

2023R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)1 states, in relevant part: [A] court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in [R.C. 2953.21(A)] or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless * * * [b]oth of the following apply: (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier peti

2020The exception, found in R.C. 2953.23(A), “confers jurisdiction to adjudicate an untimely postconviction petition when the petitioner shows that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he must rely to present his claim for relief, or that a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to the petitioner was recognized by the United States Supreme Court subsequent to the period prescribed in R.C. 2953.21(A)(2), and the petition asserts a claim based upon that right.” Id. {¶ 19} Here, Preston’s petition for post-conviction relief is untimely, as it was filed rou

2012Montgomery No. 20803, 2005-Ohio-5580 . {¶ 10} In order to confer jurisdiction on the common pleas court to consider an untimely petition, the petitioner must make at least one of two alternative showings: that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which the petition must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to [the filing deadline] the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state 4 right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.

2019Summit No. 28412, 2018-Ohio-834, ¶ 8 , quoting R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a).

2019Summit No. 28412, 2018-Ohio-834, ¶ 8 , quoting R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a).

2019Franklin No. 12AP-498, 2013-Ohio-2309 , ¶ 7, quoting State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377 , 2006-Ohio-6679 , 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 58 .

2019Franklin No. 12AP-498, 2013-Ohio-2309 , ¶ 7, quoting State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377 , 2006-Ohio-6679 , 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 58 .

2018R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b). {¶10} In his petition and on appeal, Moore contends that the United States Supreme Court expanded the constitutional right to counsel to the negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected in Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) and Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012).

2014R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a)-(b).1 {¶ 15} Burton argues that Missouri v. Frye, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) stand for a more concrete and broader application of the Sixth Amendment.

2018R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b). {¶10} In his petition and on appeal, Moore contends that the United States Supreme Court expanded the constitutional right to counsel to the negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected in Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) and Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012).

2014R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a)-(b).1 {¶ 15} Burton argues that Missouri v. Frye, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1399 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1376 , 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) stand for a more concrete and broader application of the Sixth Amendment.

2014R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). {¶9} Williams is clearly past the 180-day time frame for filing his motion, so in the absence of an exception to the time requirement, the trial court properly denied his motion without a hearing (a court is not required to hold a hearing on a petition for postconviction relief where the record and the petition fail to demonstrate that the defendant is entitled to relief, State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 , 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999), paragraph two of the syllabus), because the trial court would be without jurisdiction to consider it.

2002As such, "a petitioner receives no more rights than those granted by the statute." Id. {¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 (A), a court may not entertain a petition for postconviction relief that was filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in R.C. 2953.21 (A) unless both the following apply: (1) either the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief or, subsequent to the period prescribed in R.C. 2953.21 (A)(2) or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a ne

2026The first of those, which is applicable here, requires that both of the following criteria be met: 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period described in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition assert

2025Id.

2023Lake No. 2013-L-002, 2013-Ohio-4307, ¶ 32 , and State v. Ruark, 10th Dist.