ultra vires exception in Texas

2026“If the injury has already occurred and the only plausible remedy is monetary damages, an ultra vires claim will not lie.” Id. (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 374 ). 17 Officer.” HISD attached TexAmericas Center’s PILOT Program to its pleadings, which showed that the resolution was adopted by TexAmericas Center to promote “economic development upon its property in Bowie County,” which is one of the purposes of TexAmericas Center listed by the Texas Legislature.

2026“If the injury has already occurred and the only plausible remedy is monetary damages, an ultra vires claim will not lie.” Id. (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 374 ). 17 Officer.” HISD attached TexAmericas Center’s PILOT Program to its pleadings, which showed that the resolution was adopted by TexAmericas Center to promote “economic development upon its property in Bowie County,” which is one of the purposes of TexAmericas Center listed by the Texas Legislature.

2026“An ultra vires claim based on actions taken ‘without legal authority’ has two fundamental components: (1) authority giving the official some (but not absolute) discretion to act and (2) conduct outside of that authority.” Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 239 .

2025“An ultra vires claim based on actions taken ‘without legal authority’ has two fundamental components: (1) authority giving the official some (but not absolute) discretion to act and (2) conduct outside of that authority.” Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex. 2017); see Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. 2016) (“[A] government officer with some discretion to interpret and apply a law may nonetheless act ‘without legal 11 authority,’ and thus ultra vires, if he exceeds the bounds of his granted authority or if his acts conflict with the law itself.”)

2025See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621 ; see also Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010) (“Because the claim at issue here is not one involving a government officer’s action or inaction, but is a challenge to a statute, this is not an ultra vires claim to which a government officer should have been made a party.”).

2025As such, the proper defendant to an ultra vires claim is the governmental official “whose acts or omissions allegedly trampled on the plaintiff’s rights, not the [governmental entity] itself.” Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621 (citing 30 Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372–73); see also Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. 2015) (“[S]uits complaining of ultra vires actions may not be brought against a governmental unit, but must be brought against the allegedly responsible government actor in his official capacity.” (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 )).

2025As discussed in Part 1.A., in 2016, the Texas Supreme Court decided Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. and clarified what constitutes an ultra vires claim. 487 S.W.3d at 163 .

2025“An ultra vires claim based on actions taken ‘without legal authority’ has two fundamental components: (1) authority giving the official some (but not absolute) discretion to act and (2) conduct outside of that authority.” Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex. 2017); see Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. 2016) (“[A] government officer with some discretion to interpret and apply a law may nonetheless act ‘without legal 11 authority,’ and thus ultra vires, if he exceeds the bounds of his granted authority or if his acts conflict with the law itself.”)

2015An ultra vires exception in a UDJA suit “must not complaint of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” Tex. Dep’t of Ins. v. Reconveyance Servs., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256, 258 (Tex. 2010).

2015Notably, not only are 28 City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-74 (Tex. 2009). 29 Texas Department of Insurance v. Reconveyance Services, Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256, 258 (Tex. 2010) (emphasis added). 30 See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Original Petition at ¶ 62; C.R. 954. 11 Appellants’ allegations of ultra vires conduct against Dr. Huang untenable, they attempt to have it both ways – Appellants contend that Dr. Huang was not a governmental employee at the time of the allegedly negligent medical care; however, they also contend that the ultra vires exception saves their individual claims aga

2026See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sunset Transp., Inc., 357 S.W.3d 691, 702 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) (“[M]erely asserting legal conclusions or labeling a defendant’s actions as ‘ultra vires,’ ‘illegal,’ or ‘unconstitutional’ does not suffice to plead an ultra vires claim—what matters is whether the facts alleged constitute actions beyond the governmental actor’s statutory authority, properly construed.”). 14 Tex. Woman’s Univ., No. 02-22-00345-CV, 2023 WL 5617129 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Although sovereign immunity generally bars suits against s

2026While the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court certainly plays a role in the promulgation of the rules, Rudder has not set forth facts concerning any actions ostensibly taken by Blacklock against him.3 “Merely asserting legal conclusions or labeling a defendant’s actions as ‘ultra vires,’ ‘illegal,’ or ‘unconstitutional’ does not suffice to plead an ultra vires claim—what matters is whether the facts alleged constitute actions beyond the governmental actor’s statutory authority, properly construed.” Tex. DOT v. Sunset Transp., Inc., 357 S.W.3d 691, 702 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) (emp

2025As such, the proper defendant to an ultra vires claim is the governmental official “whose acts or omissions allegedly trampled on the plaintiff’s rights, not the [governmental entity] itself.” Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621 (citing 30 Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372–73); see also Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. 2015) (“[S]uits complaining of ultra vires actions may not be brought against a governmental unit, but must be brought against the allegedly responsible government actor in his official capacity.” (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 )).

2025City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009) (to establish the “ultra vires exception” to sovereign immunity, “a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.”); see also Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 77 (when plaintiffs “challenge the validity of [] statutes and regulations, rather than complaining that officials illegally acted or failed to act, the ultra vires exception does not apply”).

2025Specifically, City Defendants argue that “the State identifies no act by the Officials that actually violates Section 370.003, and accordingly, the State’s suit does not fall within the ultra-vires exception to the Officials’ immunity,” id.

2015A. Becky has not implicated the ultra vires exception to immunity because the City Council’s decision to contract with Milestone was a discretionary act. [Appellant’s Br. at 12-17] 15 Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227-28 (Tex. 2004). 16 Id. 17 CR 38, 40 (“The City hereby incorporates by reference and for all purposes the affidavits and other supporting documentation included in the attached Appendix and asks the Court to consider it when ruling on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.”).

2022Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 587 (Tex. 2015) (quoting City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1994)). 31 See Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. 2017) (“The basic justification for this ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity is that ultra vires acts—or those acts without authority—should not be considered acts of the state at all.” (citing Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. 1945))). 32Honors Acad., Inc. v. Tex. Educ.

2013To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. . . . [T]he rule that ultra vires suits are not ‘suit[s] against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit’ derives from the premise that the ‘acts of officials which are not lawfully authorized are not acts of the State.’” (quoting Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. 1945)).

2024“To fall within this ultra vires exception,” however, “a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” Id. (quoting City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009); and citing Fed.

2022To qualify under the ultra vires exception, a suit cannot complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, “‘but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.’” Id. (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 ); see also Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Assoc., Inc., No. 20-0855, 2022 WL 1815042 , at *2 (Tex. June 3, 2022).

2026Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Tex. 2019) (“Only prospective injunctive relief is available on an ultra vires claim.”).

2025Navigation Dist., 575 S.W.3d at 345 (“Only prospective injunctive relief is available on an ultra vires claim.”).

2025See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621 ; see also Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010) (“Because the claim at issue here is not one involving a government officer’s action or inaction, but is a challenge to a statute, this is not an ultra vires claim to which a government officer should have been made a party.”).

2018Attorney Office for Wood County, No. 03-13-00220-CV, 2014 WL 5420536 , at *2 (Tex. App.— Austin Oct. 24, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (although plaintiff did not specifically characterize his lawsuit as being an ultra vires action, court liberally construed it as such, given the fact that he was claiming his constitutional rights were violated by the action or inaction of government officials); cf. Texas Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010) (concluding that plaintiff's claim was not an ultra vires claim because it did n

2022“For the ultra vires exception to immunity to apply, it must be proved that the state actor either failed to perform a ministerial task or acted without legal authority.” Id.

2022Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 587 (Tex. 2015) (quoting City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1994)). 31 See Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. 2017) (“The basic justification for this ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity is that ultra vires acts—or those acts without authority—should not be considered acts of the state at all.” (citing Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. 1945))). 32Honors Acad., Inc. v. Tex. Educ.

2020See City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368 , 378–79 (Tex. 2011) (“Heinrich clarified that only prospective, not retrospective, relief is available in an ultra vires claim.” (citing City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 376 (Tex. 2009)); Texas Logos, L.P. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105 , 119–20 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (holding that sovereign immunity barred ultra vires claim seeking to invalidate previously executed state contract because that remedy was retrospective in nature).

2017See Texas Logos, L.P., 241 S.W.3d at 120-21 (considering possibility that if violations of a procurement statute rendered the resultant contract 'Void” ab initio, an ultra vires claim to enforce the statute’s requirements might be considered prospective rather than retrospective). .

2025Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. v. City of Houston, 487, S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. 2016) (noting that government officers act without legal authority if they exceed the bounds of their granted authority); Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Comm'n on Env't Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505 , 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that “if the claimant is attempting to restrain a state officer’s conduct on the grounds that it is unconstitutional,” the plaintiff must plead a “constitutional violation” to fall within the ultra vires exception).

2025Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co., 487, S.W.3d at 158 (Tex. 2016) (noting that government officers act without legal authority if they exceed the bounds of their granted authority); Creedmoor- Maha Water Supply Corp., 307 S.W.3d at 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that “if the claimant is attempting to restrain a state officer’s conduct on the grounds that it is unconstitutional,” the plaintiff must plead a “constitutional violation” to fall within the ultra vires exception).

2015Thus, while the ultra vires rule remains This compromise between prospective and retroactive relief, the law, see Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 404 , Epperson's while imperfect, best balances the government's immunity retrospective remedy does not. with the public's right to redress in cases involving ultra vires actions, and this distinction “appear[s] in the immunity of the [13] But this rule is not absolute.

2015Thus, while the ultra vires rule remains This compromise between prospective and retroactive relief, the law, see Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 404 , Epperson's while imperfect, best balances the government's immunity retrospective remedy does not. with the public's right to redress in cases involving ultra vires actions, and this distinction “appear[s] in the immunity of the [13] But this rule is not absolute.

2026See Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 382-83 (Tex. 2011); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 380 (Tex. 2009). “‘To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.’” Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, 646 S.W.3d 329 , 332 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 ).

2026See Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 382-83 (Tex. 2011); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 380 (Tex. 2009). “‘To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, 15 but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.’” Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, 646 S.W.3d 329 , 332 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 ).

2017See also Friends of Canyon Lake, Inc. v. Guadalupe-Bianco River Auth., 96 S.W.3d 519, 528 (Tex. App.,—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (allegations that agency failed to provide required notice and information as part of application process were insufficient to invoke exception); see also Janek v. Gonzalez, No. 03-11-00113-CV, 2013 WL 1748795 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 17, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (claims that the Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission failed to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements under the Food Stamp Program were insufficient to invoke the

2016Appraisal Dist. v. O’Connor & Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 413, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (concluding that an argument that agency hearings were being conducted in a manner that did not fully comply with statutory procedural requirements was not enough to invoke the ultra-vires exception); Friends of Canyon Lake, Inc. v. Guadalupe–Blanco River Auth., 96 S.W.3d 519, 528 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (holding that for an ultra vires exception to apply, “the environmental group was required to allege that the agency had acted wholly outside its jurisdiction, not merely that

2025Complaints about past actions do not suffice because “only prospective, not retrospective, relief is available in an ultra vires claim.” City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 379 (Tex. 2011).

2020See City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368 , 378–79 (Tex. 2011) (“Heinrich clarified that only prospective, not retrospective, relief is available in an ultra vires claim.” (citing City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 376 (Tex. 2009)); Texas Logos, L.P. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105 , 119–20 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (holding that sovereign immunity barred ultra vires claim seeking to invalidate previously executed state contract because that remedy was retrospective in nature).

2017See Appraisal Review Bd. of Harris Cty. v. O’Connor & Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 413, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (argument that agency hearings were being conducted in manner that did not fully comply with statutory procedural requirements was insufficient to invoke ultra vires exception). 7 An official acting within the scope of his authority can avoid ultra vires liability if his conduct was based on the misinterpretation of a collateral, law, but if the conduct is based on the misinterpretation of the boundaries of his authority, it can give rise to an ultra vires claim.

2016Appraisal Dist. v. O’Connor & Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 413, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (concluding that an argument that agency hearings were being conducted in a manner that did not fully comply with statutory procedural requirements was not enough to invoke the ultra-vires exception); Friends of Canyon Lake, Inc. v. Guadalupe–Blanco River Auth., 96 S.W.3d 519, 528 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (holding that for an ultra vires exception to apply, “the environmental group was required to allege that the agency had acted wholly outside its jurisdiction, not merely that

2026Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d at 576 (stating that “ultra vires claimants are only entitled to prospective relief” and that “[i]f the injury has already occurred and the only plausible remedy is monetary damages, an ultra vires claim will not lie”); Casper v. Moreover, Goodfellow’s pleadings are woefully inadequate with respect to the 8 alleged ultra vires acts.

2025Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d at 576 ; see Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 374 (“[T]he basis for the ultra vires rule is that a governmental official is not 12 following the law, so that immunity is not implicated, but because the suit is, for all practical purposes, against the state, its remedies must be limited.”).

2024On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that their claims fell within the ultra vires exception to the City’s governmental immunity because the defendants were required to award the contract to the “responsible offeror” with the bid “most advantageous to the municipality considering the relative importance of price and other evaluation factors.” Id. at 310 (citing Tex. Loc.

2021Comm’n v. Doe, No. 03-16-00657-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 3466 , at *13-14 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 20, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“an ultra vires claim must challenge the government official’s authority, not whether the government official made an incorrect decision”); City of Austin v. Utility Assocs., Inc., 517 S.W.3d 300, 310 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied) (“Where, as here, a governmental body has been delegated authority to make some sort of decision or determination, immunity jurisprudence has long emphasized a critical distinction between alleged acts of that body that are truly u

2015See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372-73 ; IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 859-60 . 13 Regarding Houghton, our determination of whether his conduct falls within the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity depends on what actions Texas Transportation Code section 203.092 required of the Department.

2015Conservation Very likely, the same claim could be brought against the Comm'n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex.2002), it has appropriate state official under the ultra vires exception, but been used to shield the state from lawsuits seeking other the state agency remains immune.

2026See Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387 , 397 (Tex. 2022); Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622 ; see also Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 837, 839-40 . 16 Applicable Statutes and the Regulations and Policy To fall within the ultra vires exception, Nelson’s suit must allege and ultimately prove that Appellants failed to perform the purely ministerial acts of assigning registered 911 addresses and a street name to the private road as required by section 232.0015(f) of the Local Government Code.

2016See id. ("Very likely, (he same claim [for a declaration of rights under a statute] could be brought against the appropriate state official under the ultra vires exception, but the state agency remains immune.”); see also Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 839-40 (plaintiff should be allowed opportunity to amend pleadings if jurisdictional defects can be cured). 115 .

2025There, the Court stated that the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity applies to “suits to require state officials to comply with statutory or constitutional provisions.”10 The Court also found that “the governmental entities themselves . . . remain immune from suit.”11 This is because the ultra vires exception is premised on the idea that the “acts of officials which are not lawfully authorized are not acts of the State.” 12 Thus, “it follows that these suits cannot be brought against the state, which retains 7 Appellees’ Br., 12. 8 City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390 , 391–92 (Tex.

2025Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505 , 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that “if the claimant is attempting to restrain a state officer’s conduct on the grounds that it is unconstitutional, it must allege facts that actually constitute a constitutional violation” to fall within the ultra vires exception); Tabrizi v. City of Austin, 551 S.W.3d 290, 305 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the pleaded facts did not allege a viable ultra vires claim); Andrade, 345 S.W.3d at 11 (holding that when an ultra vires claim is not “v

2024App. P. 47.1. 40 where the jurisdictional analysis of an ultra vires claim would also have the effect of deciding the merits of an APA rulemaking claim under section 2001.038 “that is within the trial court’s jurisdiction by virtue of that statute’s waiver of immunity, a trial court does not err in deferring that overlapping determination until a later time.” Balquinta, 429 S.W.3d at 751 ; see also Salazar, 304 S.W.3d at 903 (where plaintiffs asserted valid APA rulemaking challenge under Section 2001.038, court need not determine whether plaintiffs properly alleged ultra vires claims because t

2020See Balquinta, 429 S.W.3d at 737-38 (noting that claimant must allege facts affirmatively demonstrating trial court’s jurisdiction to hear cause and that mere unsupported legal conclusions do not suffice); see also Matzen v. McLane, 764 F. App’x 402 , 403 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting Matzen’s similar contention that “McLane violated his First Amendment right to associate by not allowing him to contact any person without first obtaining permission.”). 4 We conclude that despite his multiple amended pleadings, Matzen’s freedom-of- speech and peaceable-assembly claims contain no factual allegations

2025“To trigger the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2018The City argues and the court of appeals held, 513 S.W.3d at 128 -29 , that our holding in Klumb precludes the Pension System from bringing an ultra vires claim based on the MCA: "Meet-and-confer agreements are written contracts, and regardless of whether the parties deem the provisions of the contract to be an 'amendment' of the statute, noncompliance with a contract does not give rise to an ultra vires claim." Klumb , 458 S.W.3d at 12 .

2025“To state an ultra vires claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the named officials acted without legal 9 authority or failed to perform a ministerial act.” Id.

2023Agency, 555 S.W.3d 54, 60 (Tex. 2018) (“[I]t is well settled that trial courts may 1 On the other hand, a suit for violation of statutory rights may not be brought against a governmental entity but must be brought against government officials as an ultra vires claim.

2021As the Austin court has recognized, the requirement that a taxpayer action be brought to restrain an illegal expenditure “overlaps somewhat with the ultra vires exception to sovereign or governmental immunity, through which a claimant can sue a government official in his official capacity for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to restrain the official from exceeding statutory authority.” Gattis v. Duty, 349 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Tex.App.--Austin 2011, no pet.), citing Texans Uniting for Reform & Freedom, 319 S.W.3d at 920 .

2012Ultra Vires Exception to Immunity7 The ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity “permits a plaintiff to sue a state official in his official capacity (thereby binding the State through its agent) for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to restrain the official from violating statutory or constitutional provisions.” Texans Uniting for Reform & Freedom v. Saenz, 319 S.W.3d 914, 920 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372-73, 377 ).

2016See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 376 ("[A] claimant who successfully proves an ultra vires claim is entitled to prospective injunctive relief, as measured from the date of injunction.” (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 669 ,' 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (using entry of injunction to distinguish retrospective from prospective relief)));. accord, Lowell v. City of Baytown, 356 S.W.3d 499, 501 (Tex.2011) (per curiam).

2016See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 376 ("[A] claimant who successfully proves an ultra vires claim is entitled to prospective injunctive relief, as measured from the date of injunction.” (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 669 ,' 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (using entry of injunction to distinguish retrospective from prospective relief)));. accord, Lowell v. City of Baytown, 356 S.W.3d 499, 501 (Tex.2011) (per curiam).