illegality defense in New York

2004Concrete Corp. v Rivergate Corp., 83 NY2d at 517 [citations omitted]; Murray Walter, Inc. v Sarkisian Bros., 107 AD2d at 178 .) As above, the illegality defense is disfavored where it would work a substantial forfeiture on one party, while allowing the other party, who has already reaped the benefit of the transaction, to avoid the corresponding obligation.

1992These factors and other evidence amply sufficed to permit the jury to reject the illegality defense (see, Murray Walter, Inc. v Sarkisian Bros., 107 AD2d 173, 177-178 , supra; see also, Artache v Goldin, 133 AD2d 596, 599 ).

2008Bank ( 179 Misc 915 [1943], mod on other grounds 269 App Div 762 [2d Dept 1945]), all compel the conclusion that this case also implicates an illegality defense under statutes which have as their “purpose ... [a] regulatory scheme ... to protect the public health and safety.” (Richards Conditioning Corp. v Oleet, 21 NY2d at 896 .) But this does not alone establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, leaving the parties to their own devices.

2008Bank ( 179 Misc 915 [1943], mod on other grounds 269 App Div 762 [2d Dept 1945]), all compel the conclusion that this case also implicates an illegality defense under statutes which have as their “purpose ... [a] regulatory scheme ... to protect the public health and safety.” (Richards Conditioning Corp. v Oleet, 21 NY2d at 896 .) But this does not alone establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, leaving the parties to their own devices.

2008Bank ( 179 Misc 915 [1943], mod on other grounds 269 App Div 762 [2d Dept 1945]), all compel the conclusion that this case also implicates an illegality defense under statutes which have as their “purpose ... [a] regulatory scheme ... to protect the public health and safety.” (Richards Conditioning Corp. v Oleet, 21 NY2d at 896 .) But this does not alone establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, leaving the parties to their own devices.

1996We agree with the Surrogate that there are questions of fact as to the alleged illegality at bar (compare, Matter of O’Rourke, 160 Misc 2d 640, 645-646 ).

1996In our view this action, seeking recovery of attorney’s fees for services rendered which resulted in disbarment, is precluded for the reasons stated in A to Z Assocs. v Cooper ( 161 Misc 2d 283, 292 ) and the pleadings before us gave plaintiff adequate notice of the illegality defense which we hold must now prevail.

1996In addition to the rationale of A to Z Assocs. v Cooper (supra), dismissal of this complaint is warranted on another basis.

1996The Statute of Frauds does not affect a cause of action for a constructive trust (see, Maynor v Pellegrino, 226 AD2d 883, 884 ), and, in any event, we agree with the Surrogate that the pleadings incorporate multiple writings that, in combination, contain all essential terms of the agreement.

1992Because there was a rational view of the evidence to support the jury’s determination on this issue, reversal and dismissal of plaintiffs claim against these defendants is not warranted (see, Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 ).

1985To avoid such a result, courts have severed the lawful from the unlawful obligations of the contract for enforcement purposes (McCall v Frampton, 81 AD2d 607, 608-609 ), estopped the assertion of an illegality defense (Bonta v Gridley, 77 App Div 33, 39 ), or simply held that unless the judgment sought would itself enforce the precise conduct prohibited by the relevant statute, “the courts are to be guided by the overriding general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, ‘of preventing people from getting other people’s property for nothing when they purport to be buying it’” (Kelly v Kosuga, 35

1985To avoid such a result, courts have severed the lawful from the unlawful obligations of the contract for enforcement purposes (McCall v Frampton, 81 AD2d 607, 608-609 ), estopped the assertion of an illegality defense (Bonta v Gridley, 77 App Div 33, 39 ), or simply held that unless the judgment sought would itself enforce the precise conduct prohibited by the relevant statute, “the courts are to be guided by the overriding general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, ‘of preventing people from getting other people’s property for nothing when they purport to be buying it’” (Kelly v Kosuga, 35

1985To avoid such a result, courts have severed the lawful from the unlawful obligations of the contract for enforcement purposes (McCall v Frampton, 81 AD2d 607, 608-609 ), estopped the assertion of an illegality defense (Bonta v Gridley, 77 App Div 33, 39 ), or simply held that unless the judgment sought would itself enforce the precise conduct prohibited by the relevant statute, “the courts are to be guided by the overriding general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, ‘of preventing people from getting other people’s property for nothing when they purport to be buying it’” (Kelly v Kosuga, 35

1982In the absence of any showing of special circumstances, respondents are not entitled to examine petitioners before trial (cf. Matter of Resin Realty Corp. v Lennox, 15 AD2d 794 ; 22 NYCRR 839.2).

1981(Cf. Matter of Great Eastern Mall v Condon, 36 NY2d 544 ; Matter of City of Little Falls v Board of Assessors of Town of Salisbury, 68 AD2d 734, 741 .) To successfully challenge a tax assessment it is not enough for the taxpayer to assert merely the conclusions of the illegality or error.

1981(Cf. Matter of Great Eastern Mall v Condon, 36 NY2d 544 ; Matter of City of Little Falls v Board of Assessors of Town of Salisbury, 68 AD2d 734, 741 .) To successfully challenge a tax assessment it is not enough for the taxpayer to assert merely the conclusions of the illegality or error.

1973With possible prophetic vision as to the nature of the case now before this court, Associate Justice White of the United States Supreme Court, in his concurrence in Gelbard (supra, p. 70 ), declared: “I agree with the court * * * that at least where the United States has intercepted communications without a warrant in circumstances where court approval was required, it is appropriate in construing and applying 28 U. S. C. § 1826 not to require the grand jury witness to answer and hence further the plain policy of the wiretap statute. * * * ‘ ‘ Where the Government produces a court order for th

1912(Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. 96 ; Abb.