invasion privilege in New York

2013Partners, LLC v Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 52 AD3d 370 [1st Dept 2008]).

2013Partners, LLC v Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 52 AD3d 370 [1st Dept 2008]).

2006(Connell v Bernstein-Macaulay, Inc., 407 F Supp 420 [1976]; Hearn v Rhay, 68 FRD 574 [1975].) The facts in the instant case do not resemble Jakobleff .

1996City v Ambase Corp., 150 FRD 465 [1993]; Connell v Bernstein-Macauley, Inc., 407 F Supp 420 , supra; Hearn v Rhay, 68 FRD 574, supra).

2003Ins. v Wade’s Canadian Inn & Cocktail Lounge, 225 AD2d 863, 864 ), we fail to conclude, upon our review of the privileged documents, that they contain any such vital information.

2002As stated in Williams v Florida ( 399 US 78, 84 ), that a litigant might be forced to elect “between complete silence and presenting a defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.” The Court of Appeals has “decline [d] to extend to civil cases a rule originally designed as a safeguard in criminal proseen tions” (Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d 31, 42 ).

2002As stated in Williams v Florida ( 399 US 78, 84 ), that a litigant might be forced to elect “between complete silence and presenting a defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.” The Court of Appeals has “decline [d] to extend to civil cases a rule originally designed as a safeguard in criminal proseen tions” (Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d 31, 42 ).

2001It is not a mere idle utterance, but a substantial legal principle, that wherever a real right is violated, a real remedy is afforded by the law.” The decision in Foley was grounded, to some extent, on the “Minnesota rule” as set forth in Larson v Chase (47 Minn 307, 50 NW 238 ), which appears to have been the first case in the United States recognizing a cause of action for unlawful autopsy.

1996The courts have also found a waiver where the client places the subject matter of the privileged communication in issue or where the invasion of the privilege is required to determine the validity of the client’s claim or defense and application of the privilege would deprive the adversary of vital information (see, Onco Bank v Proteínas Del Pacifico, 179 AD2d 390 [1992]; Raphael v Clune, White & Nelson, 146 AD2d 762 , supra; Paruch v Paruch, 140 AD2d 418 [1988]; Village Bd. v Rattner, 130 AD2d 654 [1987]; Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 834 , supra; Bowne of N. Y.

1996The courts have also found a waiver where the client places the subject matter of the privileged communication in issue or where the invasion of the privilege is required to determine the validity of the client’s claim or defense and application of the privilege would deprive the adversary of vital information (see, Onco Bank v Proteínas Del Pacifico, 179 AD2d 390 [1992]; Raphael v Clune, White & Nelson, 146 AD2d 762 , supra; Paruch v Paruch, 140 AD2d 418 [1988]; Village Bd. v Rattner, 130 AD2d 654 [1987]; Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 834 , supra; Bowne of N. Y.

1996The courts have also found a waiver where the client places the subject matter of the privileged communication in issue or where the invasion of the privilege is required to determine the validity of the client’s claim or defense and application of the privilege would deprive the adversary of vital information (see, Onco Bank v Proteínas Del Pacifico, 179 AD2d 390 [1992]; Raphael v Clune, White & Nelson, 146 AD2d 762 , supra; Paruch v Paruch, 140 AD2d 418 [1988]; Village Bd. v Rattner, 130 AD2d 654 [1987]; Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 834 , supra; Bowne of N. Y.

1996The courts have also found a waiver where the client places the subject matter of the privileged communication in issue or where the invasion of the privilege is required to determine the validity of the client’s claim or defense and application of the privilege would deprive the adversary of vital information (see, Onco Bank v Proteínas Del Pacifico, 179 AD2d 390 [1992]; Raphael v Clune, White & Nelson, 146 AD2d 762 , supra; Paruch v Paruch, 140 AD2d 418 [1988]; Village Bd. v Rattner, 130 AD2d 654 [1987]; Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 834 , supra; Bowne of N. Y.

1995Corp., 163 Misc 258 , supra, citing Huffmire v City of Brooklyn, 162 NY 584 [1900]; Atwater v Trustees of Vil. of Canandaigua, 124 NY 602 [1891]).

1995Corp., 163 Misc 258 , supra, citing Huffmire v City of Brooklyn, 162 NY 584 [1900]; Atwater v Trustees of Vil. of Canandaigua, 124 NY 602 [1891]).

1995Corp., 163 Misc 258 , supra, citing Huffmire v City of Brooklyn, 162 NY 584 [1900]; Atwater v Trustees of Vil. of Canandaigua, 124 NY 602 [1891]).

1943In Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co. ( 220 N. Y. 249, 258 ) it was held that the son of the deceased had a right to receive the body of his father for burial and no reason existed why he should be obliged to join other next of kin in an action wherein he sought compensation personal to himself-.

1943In Hassard v. Lehane ( 143 App. Div. 424 ) it was held that the right of the mother of a boy to the possession of the corpse of her deceased son in the condition it was in the instant of death, for the purpose of preserving and burying the remains, gave her a cause of action to recover damages, measurable by the injury to her feelings caused by the invasion or violation of the right through an unauthorized autopsy.

1915Nor does the decision in Hiles v. Fisher ( 144 N. Y. 306, 312 ) support the conclusion reached below.

1915It is clear, however, as said by Judge Earl, “ that whenever it intended an invasion of that rule, it made it by express enactment. ” (Bertles v. Nunan, supra, p. 160 .) If the legislature should wholly abrogate that principle it would remove the basis upon which alone a tenancy by entirety rests.

1911(Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551 ; Jackson v. Savage, 109 id. 556 .) It is contended on the part of the respondent that, as coroner’s physician, his acts were authorized and justified.

1911(Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551 ; Jackson v. Savage, 109 id. 556 .) It is contended on the part of the respondent that, as coroner’s physician, his acts were authorized and justified.