area inquiry in Ohio

14 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Maurergreen ohio · 1984 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020Maurer at 259, fn. 14 , quoting Palmer at 446.	1	1
Klein v. Hamilton County Board of Zoning Appealsgreen ohioctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003Id.; see, also, Klein, supra, 128 Ohio App.3d at 636-637 , 716 N.E.2d 268 . {¶ 24} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “practical difficulties” are present when an area requirement unreasonably deprives the property owner of a permitted use. 2003Id.; see, also, Klein, supra, 128 Ohio App.3d at 636-637 , 716 N.E.2d 268 . {¶ 24} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “practical difficulties” are present when an area requirement unreasonably deprives the property owner of a permitted use.	1	1
Neftzer v. Neftzergreen ohioctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 1 sentence 2003See Neftzer v. Neftzer (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 618 ; Nester v. Lima Mem.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
Mender v. Chauncey green ohioctapp · 2015 2 sentences 2021“A motion in limine is a means of raising objection to an area of inquiry to prevent prejudicial questions and statements until the admissibility of the questionable evidence can be determined during the course of the trial.” Mender v. Chauncey, 2015-Ohio-4105 , 41 N.E.3d 1289 , ¶ 14 (4th Dist.), quoting Independent State Bank of Ohio v. Hartzell, 4th Dist. 2017"A motion in limine is a means of raising objection to an area of inquiry to prevent prejudicial questions and statements until the admissibility of the questionable evidence can be determined during the course of the trial." Mender v. Chauncey, 41 N.E.3d 1289 , 2015-Ohio-4105 (4th Dist.), ¶ 14, quoting Independent State Bank of Ohio v. Hartzell, 4th Dist.	2	2017–2021
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. green scotus · 1993 2 sentences 2008Id. at 591 . 2008Daubert , 509 U.S. at 591 ; Evid.R. 702(B).	2	2007–2008
Riverside Methodist Hospital Ass'n v. Guthrie green ohioctapp · 1982 2 sentences 1999Assn. v. Guthrie (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 308 , 310 , quoting, in part, State v. Spahr (1976), 47 Ohio App.2d 221 . 1986Assn. v. Guthrie (1982), 3 Ohio App. 3d 308, 310 , 3 OBR 355, 357, 444 N.E. 2d 1358, 1361 .	2	1986–1999
Colbert v. City of Cleveland green ohio · 2003 2 sentences 2008Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215 , 2003-Ohio-3319 , 790 N.E.2d 781, ¶ 8 . 2008Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215 , 2003-Ohio-3319 , 790 N.E.2d 781, ¶ 8 .	1	2008–2008
Foss v. Berlin neutral ohioctapp · 1981 2 sentences 2008The first of these was Foss v. Berlin (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 8 , 3 OBR 9, 443 N.E.2d 197 . 2008The first of these was Foss v. Berlin (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 8 , 3 OBR 9, 443 N.E.2d 197 .	1	2008–2008
State v. Deem green ohio · 1988 2 sentences 2005Serrano argues that the testimony of his live-in girlfriend, Rebecca Rossi, is sufficient to establish serious provocation sufficient to warrant the jury instruction because (1) Liddle’s presence in the area was in violation of a civil protection order Rossi had filed against Liddle after she and Liddle had stopped dating, (2) Liddle was wearing Serrano’s clothing, and (3) Henry allegedly produced a knife and came after Serrano, stating, “Come over here, mother fucker, I’m going to slit your throat.” Again, we disagree. {¶ 22} Under the Deem standard, “[provocation, to be serious, must be reas 2005Serrano argues that the testimony of his live-in girlfriend, Rebecca Rossi, is sufficient to establish serious provocation sufficient to warrant the jury instruction because (1) Liddle’s presence in the area was in violation of a civil protection order Rossi had filed against Liddle after she and Liddle had stopped dating, (2) Liddle was wearing Serrano’s clothing, and (3) Henry allegedly produced a knife and came after Serrano, stating, “Come over here, mother fucker, I’m going to slit your throat.” Again, we disagree. {¶ 22} Under the Deem standard, “[provocation, to be serious, must be reas	1	2005–2005
Duncan v. Village of Middlefield green ohio · 1986 2 sentences 2003Duncan, supra, 23 Ohio St.3d at 86 , 23 OBR 212, 491 N.E.2d 692 . 2003Duncan, supra, 23 Ohio St.3d at 86 , 23 OBR 212, 491 N.E.2d 692 .	1	2003–2003
State v. Plummer green ohio · 1986 1 sentence 2001The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Plummer (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 declared that " [a]bsent a showing of prejudice to a defendant, the results of a urine-alcohol test administered in substantial compliance with Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 are admissible in a prosecution under R.C. 4511.19 ." (Emphasis added.) The majority would now put the burden on defendant to prove his innocence by requiring him to prove that he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence that failed absolutely to comply with one provision of the regulations.	1	2001–2001
State v. Spahr green ohioctapp · 1976 1 sentence 1999Assn. v. Guthrie (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 308 , 310 , quoting, in part, State v. Spahr (1976), 47 Ohio App.2d 221 .	1	1999–1999
Sorensen v. Sorensen green mass · 1975 2 sentences 1982Courts have ranged from undertaking to judicially enunciate certain exceptions, as in Goller v. White (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 402 , 122 N.W. 2d 193 , i.e. “(1) [w]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care” (Id. at 413); to adoption in Gibson v. Gibson, supra ( 3 Cal. 3d 914 ), at page 921, of immunity under a test of “what would an ordinary reasonable and prud 1982Courts have ranged from undertaking to judicially enunciate certain exceptions, as in Goller v. White (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 402 , 122 N.W. 2d 193 , i.e. “(1) [w]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care” (Id. at 413); to adoption in Gibson v. Gibson, supra ( 3 Cal. 3d 914 ), at page 921, of immunity under a test of “what would an ordinary reasonable and prud	1	1982–1982
Gibson v. Gibson green cal · 1971 1 sentence 1982Courts have ranged from undertaking to judicially enunciate certain exceptions, as in Goller v. White (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 402 , 122 N.W. 2d 193 , i.e. “(1) [w]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care” (Id. at 413); to adoption in Gibson v. Gibson, supra ( 3 Cal. 3d 914 ), at page 921, of immunity under a test of “what would an ordinary reasonable and prud	1	1982–1982
Goller v. White green wis · 1963 2 sentences 1982Courts have ranged from undertaking to judicially enunciate certain exceptions, as in Goller v. White (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 402 , 122 N.W. 2d 193 , i.e. “(1) [w]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care” (Id. at 413); to adoption in Gibson v. Gibson, supra ( 3 Cal. 3d 914 ), at page 921, of immunity under a test of “what would an ordinary reasonable and prud 1982Courts have ranged from undertaking to judicially enunciate certain exceptions, as in Goller v. White (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 402 , 122 N.W. 2d 193 , i.e. “(1) [w]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care” (Id. at 413); to adoption in Gibson v. Gibson, supra ( 3 Cal. 3d 914 ), at page 921, of immunity under a test of “what would an ordinary reasonable and prud	1	1982–1982
Hebel v. Hebel Ex Rel. Hebel green alaska · 1967 1 sentence 1982Courts have ranged from undertaking to judicially enunciate certain exceptions, as in Goller v. White (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 402 , 122 N.W. 2d 193 , i.e. “(1) [w]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care” (Id. at 413); to adoption in Gibson v. Gibson, supra ( 3 Cal. 3d 914 ), at page 921, of immunity under a test of “what would an ordinary reasonable and prud	1	1982–1982
Williams v. Williams green del · 1976 1 sentence 1982Courts have ranged from undertaking to judicially enunciate certain exceptions, as in Goller v. White (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 402 , 122 N.W. 2d 193 , i.e. “(1) [w]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care” (Id. at 413); to adoption in Gibson v. Gibson, supra ( 3 Cal. 3d 914 ), at page 921, of immunity under a test of “what would an ordinary reasonable and prud	1	1982–1982

Where else courts name it

TX 306 (1972–2026) CA 47 (1961–2026) IL 40 (1962–2023) NY 39 (1942–2014) PA 28 (1971–2021) GA 20 (1976–2024) MD 19 (1959–2023) MO 18 (1960–2023) MA 17 (1965–2025) OH 14 (1982–2021) CT 11 (1983–2018) IN 10 (1950–2014) NJ 8 (1950–2021) LA 8 (1975–2008) NC 8 (2000–2026) RI 7 (1963–2010) NM 7 (1985–2023) SC 6 (1996–2022) KY 6 (1997–2022) AL 6 (1976–2012) NH 6 (1980–2021) AR 5 (1996–2008) VA 5 (1952–2022) KS 5 (1988–2025) OK 5 (1973–2006) OR 5 (1971–2018) FL 4 (1978–2025) AK 4 (1979–2022) DC 4 (1983–2022) WA 4 (1982–2020) SD 3 (2013–2022) CO 3 (1983–2005) MS 3 (1986–1994) NE 3 (1964–1991) ID 3 (1995–2020) ND 3 (1987–1997) WV 2 (2004–2007) IA 2 (1981–2020) TN 2 (2011–2012) WY 2 (1908–1989) AZ 2 (1984–2022) VT 2 (2020–2026) MI 2 (2008–2018)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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