area exception in South Carolina

2022Mgmt., Inc., 426 S.C. 202, 213-14 , 826 S.E.2d 285, 291 (2019) ("It is well-settled in South Carolina that a landlord generally does not owe an affirmative duty to a tenant to provide security in and around leased premises to protect the tenant from the criminal activity of third parties."); id. at 214 , 826 S.E.2d at 291 (analyzing the four exceptions to the general rule enumerated in Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D.S.C. 1990): "(1) the affirmative acts exception, (2) the concealed danger exception, (3) the common area exception, and (4) the undertaking exceptio

2019In Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp. , the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina enumerated four exceptions to the general rule: (1) the affirmative acts exception, (2) the concealed danger exception, (3) the common area exception, and (4) the undertaking exception. 741 F.Supp. 1205 , 1209 (D.S.C. 1990).

2022Mgmt., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (D.S.C. 1994) ("The common areas exception simply states that a landlord has a duty to maintain the common areas of a leased property in a safe condition."); Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S.C. 539, 549 , 59 S.E.2d 149, 154 (1950) (finding this duty applies to areas "for the common use of several tenants" and is particularly "applicable to halls, entrances, porches or stairways of which no particular tenant has exclusive possession or control"); Cooke, 741 F. Supp. at 1211 ("This rule clearly has never been applied in South Carolina to anything except physical inj

2022Mgmt., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (D.S.C. 1994) ("The common areas exception simply states that a landlord has a duty to maintain the common areas of a leased property in a safe condition."); Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S.C. 539, 549 , 59 S.E.2d 149, 154 (1950) (finding this duty applies to areas "for the common use of several tenants" and is particularly "applicable to halls, entrances, porches or stairways of which no particular tenant has exclusive possession or control"); Cooke, 741 F. Supp. at 1211 ("This rule clearly has never been applied in South Carolina to anything except physical inj

2022Mgmt., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (D.S.C. 1994) ("The common areas exception simply states that a landlord has a duty to maintain the common areas of a leased property in a safe condition."); Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S.C. 539, 549 , 59 S.E.2d 149, 154 (1950) (finding this duty applies to areas "for the common use of several tenants" and is particularly "applicable to halls, entrances, porches or stairways of which no particular tenant has exclusive possession or control"); Cooke, 741 F. Supp. at 1211 ("This rule clearly has never been applied in South Carolina to anything except physical inj

2022Mgmt., Inc., 426 S.C. 202, 213-14 , 826 S.E.2d 285, 291 (2019) ("It is well-settled in South Carolina that a landlord generally does not owe an affirmative duty to a tenant to provide security in and around leased premises to protect the tenant from the criminal activity of third parties."); id. at 214 , 826 S.E.2d at 291 (analyzing the four exceptions to the general rule enumerated in Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D.S.C. 1990): "(1) the affirmative acts exception, (2) the concealed danger exception, (3) the common area exception, and (4) the undertaking exceptio

2022Mgmt., Inc., 426 S.C. 202, 213-14 , 826 S.E.2d 285, 291 (2019) ("It is well-settled in South Carolina that a landlord generally does not owe an affirmative duty to a tenant to provide security in and around leased premises to protect the tenant from the criminal activity of third parties."); id. at 214 , 826 S.E.2d at 291 (analyzing the four exceptions to the general rule enumerated in Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D.S.C. 1990): "(1) the affirmative acts exception, (2) the concealed danger exception, (3) the common area exception, and (4) the undertaking exceptio

2006Move onto another question.” The trial judge erred in failing to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Perry on the financial card theft. “[W]hen a party introduces evidence about a particular matter, the other party is entitled to explain it or rebut it, even if the latter evidence would have been incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.” State v. Foster , 354 S.C 614, 623, 582 S.E.2d 426, 431 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Beam , 336 S.C. 45, 52 , 518 S.E.2d 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1999)).

2006Move onto another question.” The trial judge erred in failing to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Perry on the financial card theft. “[W]hen a party introduces evidence about a particular matter, the other party is entitled to explain it or rebut it, even if the latter evidence would have been incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.” State v. Foster , 354 S.C 614, 623, 582 S.E.2d 426, 431 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Beam , 336 S.C. 45, 52 , 518 S.E.2d 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1999)).

2006Move onto another question.” The trial judge erred in failing to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Perry on the financial card theft. “[W]hen a party introduces evidence about a particular matter, the other party is entitled to explain it or rebut it, even if the latter evidence would have been incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.” State v. Foster , 354 S.C 614, 623, 582 S.E.2d 426, 431 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Beam , 336 S.C. 45, 52 , 518 S.E.2d 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1999)).