area inquiry in Connecticut

2005Ed. 2d 270 (1991). “[T]he fact that a person does not have the exclusive use of an area does not bar his having a reasonable expectation of privacy that furnishes standing to object to a government search.” State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323, 330-31 , 541 A.2d 1209 (1988).

2005Ed. 2d 270 (1991). “[T]he fact that a person does not have the exclusive use of an area does not bar his having a reasonable expectation of privacy that furnishes standing to object to a government search.” State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323, 330-31 , 541 A.2d 1209 (1988).

1989Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 , 88 S. Ct. 2120 , 20 L.

1989Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 , 88 S. Ct. 2120 , 20 L.

2018It is doubtful this was the prosecutor's intent, 6 but, the prosecutor, having decided to wade into this area of inquiry, could have led a reasonable jury to understand that Kelly did not "[have] any incentive to testify favorably for the state." State v. Jordan , supra, 135 Conn. App. at 667 , 42 A.3d 457 .

2018It is doubtful this was the prosecutor's intent, 6 but, the prosecutor, having decided to wade into this area of inquiry, could have led a reasonable jury to understand that Kelly did not "[have] any incentive to testify favorably for the state." State v. Jordan , supra, 135 Conn. App. at 667 , 42 A.3d 457 .

2005Whether a defendant's actual expectation of privacy . . . is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves a fact-specific inquiry into all the relevant circumstances." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). "[T]he fact that a person does not have the exclusive use of an area does not bar his having a reasonable expectation of privacy that furnishes standing to object to a government search." State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323, 330-31 , 541 A.2

2005Whether a defendant's actual expectation of privacy . . . is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves a fact-specific inquiry into all the relevant circumstances." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). "[T]he fact that a person does not have the exclusive use of an area does not bar his having a reasonable expectation of privacy that furnishes standing to object to a government search." State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323, 330-31 , 541 A.2

2005Whether a defendant's actual expectation of privacy . . . is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves a fact-specific inquiry into all the relevant circumstances." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). "[T]he fact that a person does not have the exclusive use of an area does not bar his having a reasonable expectation of privacy that furnishes standing to object to a government search." State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323, 330-31 , 541 A.2

2005Whether a defendant's actual expectation of privacy . . . is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves a fact-specific inquiry into all the relevant circumstances." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). "[T]he fact that a person does not have the exclusive use of an area does not bar his having a reasonable expectation of privacy that furnishes standing to object to a government search." State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323, 330-31 , 541 A.2

2005Whether a defendant's actual expectation of privacy . . . is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves a fact-specific inquiry into all the relevant circumstances." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). "[T]he fact that a person does not have the exclusive use of an area does not bar his having a reasonable expectation of privacy that furnishes standing to object to a government search." State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323, 330-31 , 541 A.2

1997In State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 332 , 618 A.2d 32 (1992), we held that a defendant must be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine a witness concerning the witness’ relationship to the prosecuting authorities in a criminal case.

1997In State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 332 , 618 A.2d 32 (1992), we held that a defendant must be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine a witness concerning the witness’ relationship to the prosecuting authorities in a criminal case.

1996Accordingly, a person who makes a telephone call from a public telephone booth may challenge the state’s warrantless interception of the call; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

1996Accordingly, a person who makes a telephone call from a public telephone booth may challenge the state’s warrantless interception of the call; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

1992The conviction in In re Marcel L., 14 Conn. App. 548 , 542 A.2d 340 (1988), was reversed because the trial court foreclosed cross-examination of an entire area of inquiry that could have exposed bias, interest or motive of the only three witnesses the state offered against the defendant.

1992The conviction in In re Marcel L., 14 Conn. App. 548 , 542 A.2d 340 (1988), was reversed because the trial court foreclosed cross-examination of an entire area of inquiry that could have exposed bias, interest or motive of the only three witnesses the state offered against the defendant.

1988We need not consider whether the reasons set forth by the trial court for prohibiting the rebuttal evidence were correct, because in comparing the question objected to with Verrastro’s questions and answers on direct examination regarding the Carvel store keys, the record indicates that the objection could have been sustained because the question was repetitive and the testimony sought was cumulative. 3 State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 719 , 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L.

1988We need not consider whether the reasons set forth by the trial court for prohibiting the rebuttal evidence were correct, because in comparing the question objected to with Verrastro’s questions and answers on direct examination regarding the Carvel store keys, the record indicates that the objection could have been sustained because the question was repetitive and the testimony sought was cumulative. 3 State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 719 , 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L.

1988We need not consider whether the reasons set forth by the trial court for prohibiting the rebuttal evidence were correct, because in comparing the question objected to with Verrastro’s questions and answers on direct examination regarding the Carvel store keys, the record indicates that the objection could have been sustained because the question was repetitive and the testimony sought was cumulative. 3 State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 719 , 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L.

1988We need not consider whether the reasons set forth by the trial court for prohibiting the rebuttal evidence were correct, because in comparing the question objected to with Verrastro’s questions and answers on direct examination regarding the Carvel store keys, the record indicates that the objection could have been sustained because the question was repetitive and the testimony sought was cumulative. 3 State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 719 , 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L.

1988We need not consider whether the reasons set forth by the trial court for prohibiting the rebuttal evidence were correct, because in comparing the question objected to with Verrastro’s questions and answers on direct examination regarding the Carvel store keys, the record indicates that the objection could have been sustained because the question was repetitive and the testimony sought was cumulative. 3 State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 719 , 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L.

1983It was a proper area of inquiry; it was denied in limine. “[T]he prevention, throughout the trial of a criminal case, of all inquiry in fields where cross-examination is appropriate, and particularly in circumstances where the excluded questions have a bearing on credibility and on the commission by the accused of the acts relied upon for conviction, passes the proper limits of discretion and is prejudicial error.” (Emphasis added.) District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 632 , 57 S. Ct. 660 , 81 L.

1983It was a proper area of inquiry; it was denied in limine. “[T]he prevention, throughout the trial of a criminal case, of all inquiry in fields where cross-examination is appropriate, and particularly in circumstances where the excluded questions have a bearing on credibility and on the commission by the accused of the acts relied upon for conviction, passes the proper limits of discretion and is prejudicial error.” (Emphasis added.) District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 632 , 57 S. Ct. 660 , 81 L.