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14 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re C.R.green2 sentences2026Indeed, Ohio courts have held that, while R.C. 2152.83(D) “requires the juvenile court to consider the outlined factors, nothing in the statute requires the juvenile court to ‘explicitly announce its findings regarding each individual factor before it classifies a child as a juvenile offender registrant.’” (Emphasis in In re C.R.) In re K.T., 2019-Ohio- 4258, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), quoting In re C.R., 2014-Ohio-1936, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.); see In re T. 2025He alleges that the trial court “failed to properly balance the system’s rehabilitative goals with the punitive nature of the registry and evidence of long- term harm.” As a preliminary matter, “we note that although the classification statute requires the juvenile court to consider the outlined factors, nothing in the statute requires the juvenile court to ‘explicitly announce its findings regarding each individual factor before it classifies a child as a juvenile offender registrant.’” (Emphasis in the original.) K.T., 2019-Ohio-4258, at ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), quoting In re C.R., 2014-Ohio-1936, | 2 | 3 |
In re K.T.green2 sentences2025Specifically, J.T. argues that “the trial court’s determination that the statutory factors weighed in favor of classifying J.T. as a [T]ier I sexual offender is not supported by the record.” We begin by noting “that although the classification statute requires the juvenile court to consider the outlined factors, nothing in the statute requires the juvenile court to ‘explicitly announce its findings regarding each individual factor before it classifies a child as a juvenile offender registrant.’” (Emphasis in original.) K.T., 2019-Ohio-4258, at ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), quoting In re C.R., 2014-Ohio- 1 2025He alleges that the trial court “failed to properly balance the system’s rehabilitative goals with the punitive nature of the registry and evidence of long- term harm.” As a preliminary matter, “we note that although the classification statute requires the juvenile court to consider the outlined factors, nothing in the statute requires the juvenile court to ‘explicitly announce its findings regarding each individual factor before it classifies a child as a juvenile offender registrant.’” (Emphasis in the original.) K.T., 2019-Ohio-4258, at ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), quoting In re C.R., 2014-Ohio-1936, | 2 | 2 |
City of Tallmadge v. McCoygreen2 sentences2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact 2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact | 2 | 2 |
State v. Winandgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact 2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact | 2 | 2 |
In re T.C.green1 sentence2026C., 2025-Ohio-4730, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.) (“because the trial court was required to consider the relevant factors under R.C. 2152.83 (D), but not required to specify in its opinion a response to each of the factors, the trial court’s omission of enumerated reasons did not constitute an abuse of discretion.”). {¶32} Yet, A.B. argues that the juvenile court neglected to “engage in a thorough discussion of the relevant statutory factors or the weight it afforded those factors” before arriving at its reclassification decision. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hopfergreen2 sentences2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact 2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lloydgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact 2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Preztak
green
2 sentences2016He further stated that had Oles attempted to leave during the questioning, he would have arrested Oles for an OVI violation based on his observations to that point. {¶8} Based on the above testimony, the trial court granted Oles’ motion to suppress, finding that “based on” Miranda, his rights had been violated thereby excluding Oles’ statement to Lieutenant Sheppard and the results of the field sobriety tests. {¶9} The City appeals and argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence based on Miranda because Lieutenant Sheppard’s questioning of Oles did not rise to the level of cu 2016He further stated that had Oles attempted to leave during the questioning, he would have arrested Oles for an OVI violation based on his observations to that point. {¶8} Based on the above testimony, the trial court granted Oles’ motion to suppress, finding that “based on” Miranda, his rights had been violated thereby excluding Oles’ statement to Lieutenant Sheppard and the results of the field sobriety tests. {¶9} The City appeals and argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence based on Miranda because Lieutenant Sheppard’s questioning of Oles did not rise to the level of cu | 7 | 2013–2016 |
Kinnison v. Advance Stores Co., Unpublished Decision (1-20-2006)
neutral
2 sentences2012Licking County App. Case No. 2011-CA-89 5 {¶18} “(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. {¶19} “(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.” {¶20} This Court outlined the standard of review on a determination of frivolous conduct in Kin 2009We disagree. {¶ 57} This Court outlined the standard of review in Kinnison v. Advance Stores Company , Richland App. No. 2005CA0011, 2006-Ohio-222 . | 2 | 2009–2012 |
Wiltberger v. Davis
green
2 sentences2012Licking County App. Case No. 2011-CA-89 5 {¶18} “(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. {¶19} “(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.” {¶20} This Court outlined the standard of review on a determination of frivolous conduct in Kin 2012Licking County App. Case No. 2011-CA-89 5 {¶18} “(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. {¶19} “(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.” {¶20} This Court outlined the standard of review on a determination of frivolous conduct in Kin | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2005In Terry , the court outlined the standard for a pat down "frisk" in this way: "there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless if he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.