Bates standard in Oregon

2018Under the Bates standard, an officer is permitted to take "reasonable steps to protect [the officer] or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with [an individual], the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that [an individual] might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present." 304 Or. at 524 , 747 P.2d 991 .

2018Under the Bates standard, an officer is permitted to take "reasonable steps to protect [the officer] or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with [an individual], the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that [an individual] might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present." 304 Or. at 524 , 747 P.2d 991 .

2024It explained that, in the second part of the Bates test, “ ‘a state-law labeling requirement is not pre-empted by § 136v(b) if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding provi- sions,’ ” and that state law is “ ‘equivalent to’ and ‘fully consis- tent with’ FIFRA where both impose ‘parallel requirements,’ meaning that a violation of the state law is also a violation of FIFRA.” Hardeman, 997 F3d at 955 (quoting Bates, 544 US at 447 ).

2024It explained that, in the second part of the Bates test, “ ‘a state-law labeling requirement is not pre-empted by § 136v(b) if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding provi- sions,’ ” and that state law is “ ‘equivalent to’ and ‘fully consis- tent with’ FIFRA where both impose ‘parallel requirements,’ meaning that a violation of the state law is also a violation of FIFRA.” Hardeman, 997 F3d at 955 (quoting Bates, 544 US at 447 ).

2024It explained that, in the second part of the Bates test, “ ‘a state-law labeling requirement is not pre-empted by § 136v(b) if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding provi- sions,’ ” and that state law is “ ‘equivalent to’ and ‘fully consis- tent with’ FIFRA where both impose ‘parallel requirements,’ meaning that a violation of the state law is also a violation of FIFRA.” Hardeman, 997 F3d at 955 (quoting Bates, 544 US at 447 ).

2024It explained that, in the second part of the Bates test, “ ‘a state-law labeling requirement is not pre-empted by § 136v(b) if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding provi- sions,’ ” and that state law is “ ‘equivalent to’ and ‘fully consis- tent with’ FIFRA where both impose ‘parallel requirements,’ meaning that a violation of the state law is also a violation of FIFRA.” Hardeman, 997 F3d at 955 (quoting Bates, 544 US at 447 ).

2016As the Supreme Court explained in State v. Amaya, 336 Or 616, 625 , 89 P3d 1163 (2004), “an officer’s actions, even if authorized by ORS 810.410 (3)(d), nevertheless must comply with Article I, section 9 [.] ” We recognize that these cases were decided before Jimenez and under the Bates standard.

2016As the Supreme Court explained in State v. Amaya, 336 Or 616, 625 , 89 P3d 1163 (2004), “an officer’s actions, even if authorized by ORS 810.410 (3)(d), nevertheless must comply with Article I, section 9 [.] ” We recognize that these cases were decided before Jimenez and under the Bates standard.

2015Id. at 159 (citing Miglavs, 337 Or at 13 ).

2015Id. at 159 (citing Miglavs, 337 Or at 13 ).

2015Jimenez, 263 Or App at 161 .

2015Jimenez, 263 Or App at 161 .

2010By instead asserting absolute ownership of the property under the deed, the court found that the defendant Lund intended "to wrongfully deprive his wife of her interests as co-mortgagee and to violate his trust relationship with [the Bates defendants]." Id. at 382 , 51 P.2d 1031 .

2010By instead asserting absolute ownership of the property under the deed, the court found that the defendant Lund intended "to wrongfully deprive his wife of her interests as co-mortgagee and to violate his trust relationship with [the Bates defendants]." Id. at 382 , 51 P.2d 1031 .

2019However, "the strictures of the Bates test apply only to unilateral police conduct ( e.g. , conducting an unconsented frisk) in response to perceived officer safety concerns." State v. Toll , 295 Or.

2019App. 277 , 285, 432 P.3d 1131 (2018) ; see also Jimenez , 357 Or. at 434 , 353 P.3d 1227 (Kistler, J., concurring) ("A question is not a search.

2018The defendant moved to suppress both his admissions and the knives, contending that the officer's weapons inquiry unlawfully extended *1138 the lawful DUII stop because that inquiry was not independently justified under the Bates standard. 16 Id. at 378 , 422 P.3d 240 .

2018The defendant moved to suppress both his admissions and the knives, contending that the officer's weapons inquiry unlawfully extended *1138 the lawful DUII stop because that inquiry was not independently justified under the Bates standard. 16 Id. at 378 , 422 P.3d 240 .

2018App. 206 , 212, 325 P.3d 39 (2014), a suppression case involving the validity of a frisk based on officer safety, we explained, citing Bates : "Thus, there are three requirements for an officer's actions to be justified under the officer-safety doctrine: (1) the officer's actions must have occurred during a lawful encounter ; (2) the officer must have had a reasonable suspicion that the individual posed an immediate threat of serious physical injury; and (3) the steps the officer *249 took to protect the officer or others must have been reasonable." (Emphasis added.) It would appear, thus, tha

2016Thus, for example, in State v. Austin, 145 Or App 217, 224 , 929 P2d 1022 (1996), we applied the Bates standard to conclude that an officer’s act of pulling his firearm and directing the defendant down on the ground did not constitute an unlawful arrest where the defendant’s admission that he had a BB gun gave rise to sufficient officer safety concerns to justify the officer’s conduct.

2016Thus, for example, in State v. Austin, 145 Or App 217, 224 , 929 P2d 1022 (1996), we applied the Bates standard to conclude that an officer’s act of pulling his firearm and directing the defendant down on the ground did not constitute an unlawful arrest where the defendant’s admission that he had a BB gun gave rise to sufficient officer safety concerns to justify the officer’s conduct.

1999The Bates principle is based in large part on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), in which the court explained that, under the Fourth Amendment, protective searches are permissible where officers hold a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts" that the suspect is dangerous and could gain immediate control of weapons.

1999The Bates principle is based in large part on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), in which the court explained that, under the Fourth Amendment, protective searches are permissible where officers hold a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts" that the suspect is dangerous and could gain immediate control of weapons.