four areas inquiry in Pennsylvania

2025Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers Ass’n, 901 A.2d 991, 1001 (Pa. 2006) (McCandless); Berks, 230 A.3d at 1027 (“A plenary standard of review governs the preliminary determination of whether the issue involved implicates one of the four areas of inquiry encompassed by narrow certiorari, thus allowing for non-deferential review.” (cleaned up)). 4 CBA provides that in disciplinary matters, “the arbitrator shall be limited to determining just cause and may not alter the penalty imposed by the Department.” CBA at art. 28, § 7.

2019While we explained in Town of McCandless that "generally speaking, a plenary standard of review should govern the preliminary determination of whether the issue involved implicates one of the four areas of inquiry ... thus allowing for non-deferential review," we further observed that extreme deference to the arbitrator is required where the preliminary determinations themselves turn "upon arbitral fact-finding or a construction of the relevant CBA." Town of McCandless , 901 A.2d at 1000 . 10 Midland was decided prior to our articulation of the two-prong essence test in Cheyney .

2026City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 768 A.2d 291, 295 (Pa. 2001). [I]f the question of arbitrability turns upon a pure question of law or upon the application of law to undisputed facts, appellate review is plenary; but if arbitrability depends upon fact-finding or an interpretation of the [collective bargaining agreement], ‘the extreme deference standard’ governing Act 111 awards controls.

2026City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 768 A.2d 291, 295 (Pa. 2001). [I]f the question of arbitrability turns upon a pure question of law or upon the application of law to undisputed facts, appellate review is plenary; but if arbitrability depends 10 Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. 111, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.12. 11 See Michael G.

2020A plenary standard of review governs “the preliminary determination of whether the issue involved implicates one of the four areas of inquiry encompassed by narrow certiorari, thus allowing for non-deferential review.” City of Philadelphia v. FOP Lodge No. 5 (Breary), 985 A.2d 1259, 1266 (Pa. 2009).

2010In discussing the scope of review, the Supreme Court reiterated the reasoning contained in Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers Association, 587 Pa. 525, 540 , 901 A.2d 991, 1000 (2006): “Generally speaking, a plenary standard of review should govern the preliminary determination of whether the issue involved implicates one of the four areas of inquiry encompassed by narrow certiorari, thus allowing for non-deferential review.” The Supreme Court stated: “We are bound, however, by all determinations of fact and issues of law not encompassed by the standard of narrow certiorari, even

2020Compare id. at 22 (crediting the standard of review set forth in PSP v. PSTA (Styers), 840 A.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), encompassing an “extreme standard of deference”), with Brief for Appellee at 1-2 (same, with citation to this Court’s decision in Town of McCandless, 587 Pa. at 540 , 901 A.2d at 1000-01 ).

2010See Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers Ass’n, 587 Pa. 525 , 901 A.2d 991, 1000 (2006) (“Generally speaking, a plenary standard of review should govern the preliminary determination of whether the issue involved implicates one of the four areas of inquiry encompassed by narrow certiorari, thus allowing for non-deferential review — unless, of course, that preliminary determination itself depended to some extent upon arbitral fact-finding or a construction of the relevant CBA.”); Betancourt, supra at 90 (“[T]he award must encompass only terms and conditions of employment and may not