rebuttal presumption in Pennsylvania

1982Molnar v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 518 , 397 A.2d 869 (1979).

1982Molnar v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 518 , 397 A.2d 869 (1979).

2020S66031/19 for striking each juror.” (Trial court opinion, 7/22/19 at 8, citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 , Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 629-631 (1972).) Based on our review of the record, we can discern no legal error on the part of the trial court.

2020Id. . . . at 1022 [(emphasis added; citations omitted)].

2016Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a). 6 “This Court’s review in an appeal from a forfeiture proceeding is limited to examining whether findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Commonwealth v. $11,600.00 Cash, U.S. Currency, 858 A.2d 160 , 163 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).

2014As recognized by the trial court, because both parties testified at the evidentiary hearing, the rebuttal presumption discussed in Staudenmayer, supra, does not arise.

2014Moreover, as our Supreme Court further noted in Staudenmayer, the trial court “as factfinder, makes determinations concerning the credibility of witnesses and its conclusions of law based on those determinations will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Staudenmeyer, 714 A.2d at 1022 .

1997Specifically, I am troubled by the assertion that "whether the presumption of *416 legitimacy has been rebutted ... is conditioned upon whether the parties are estopped from relying on evidence leading to a rebuttal of the presumption of legitimacy." Maj.Op. at 403, 690 A.2d at 1173 .

1996Commonwealth v. Griffin, 407 Pa. Super. 15 , 595 A.2d 101 (1991).

1996Commonwealth v. Griffin, 407 Pa. Super. 15 , 595 A.2d 101 (1991).

1982The legislature has created, by section 401(f), a rebuttal presumption of marital property and not merely a permissible inference; 4 and the burden of overcoming that presumption is on the party who is asserting an exception under section 401(e), 23 P.S. §401(e): Paul W. v. Margaret W. et al, 130 Pitts.L.J. 6 , 9 (1981); Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Company, 315 Pa. 497 , 173 Atl. 644 (1934); McDonald v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 348 Pa. 558 , 36 A. 2d 492 (1944).

1982The legislature has created, by section 401(f), a rebuttal presumption of marital property and not merely a permissible inference; 4 and the burden of overcoming that presumption is on the party who is asserting an exception under section 401(e), 23 P.S. §401(e): Paul W. v. Margaret W. et al, 130 Pitts.L.J. 6 , 9 (1981); Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Company, 315 Pa. 497 , 173 Atl. 644 (1934); McDonald v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 348 Pa. 558 , 36 A. 2d 492 (1944).

1982The legislature has created, by section 401(f), a rebuttal presumption of marital property and not merely a permissible inference; 4 and the burden of overcoming that presumption is on the party who is asserting an exception under section 401(e), 23 P.S. §401(e): Paul W. v. Margaret W. et al, 130 Pitts.L.J. 6 , 9 (1981); Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Company, 315 Pa. 497 , 173 Atl. 644 (1934); McDonald v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 348 Pa. 558 , 36 A. 2d 492 (1944).

1982The legislature has created, by section 401(f), a rebuttal presumption of marital property and not merely a permissible inference; 4 and the burden of overcoming that presumption is on the party who is asserting an exception under section 401(e), 23 P.S. §401(e): Paul W. v. Margaret W. et al, 130 Pitts.L.J. 6 , 9 (1981); Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Company, 315 Pa. 497 , 173 Atl. 644 (1934); McDonald v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 348 Pa. 558 , 36 A. 2d 492 (1944).

1942The true rule is that one who calls an adverse party as on cross-examination is concluded by his testimony, if uncontradicted, but plaintiff “shall not be concluded thereby, but may rebut it by counter testimony” : Act of April 15, 1869, P. L. 30, section 2; Dunmore v. Padden, supra; Marach v. Kooistra, 329 Pa. 324, 328 ; Readshaw v. Montgomery, 313 Pa. 206, 209 ; Burke v. Kennedy, 286 Pa, 344, 349, Defendant’s tes *221 timony regarding agency having been rebutted, plaintiff was not concluded by it, and the question was for the jury.

1942The true rule is that one who calls an adverse party as on cross-examination is concluded by his testimony, if uncontradicted, but plaintiff “shall not be concluded thereby, but may rebut it by counter testimony” : Act of April 15, 1869, P. L. 30, section 2; Dunmore v. Padden, supra; Marach v. Kooistra, 329 Pa. 324, 328 ; Readshaw v. Montgomery, 313 Pa. 206, 209 ; Burke v. Kennedy, 286 Pa, 344, 349, Defendant’s tes *221 timony regarding agency having been rebutted, plaintiff was not concluded by it, and the question was for the jury.

1942The true rule is that one who calls an adverse party as on cross-examination is concluded by his testimony, if uncontradicted, but plaintiff “shall not be concluded thereby, but may rebut it by counter testimony” : Act of April 15, 1869, P. L. 30, section 2; Dunmore v. Padden, supra; Marach v. Kooistra, 329 Pa. 324, 328 ; Readshaw v. Montgomery, 313 Pa. 206, 209 ; Burke v. Kennedy, 286 Pa, 344, 349, Defendant’s tes *221 timony regarding agency having been rebutted, plaintiff was not concluded by it, and the question was for the jury.

1939In the Conkle case (at p. 378) the Supreme Court said: “As the contract here provided for payment at the death of Miss Byers, no presumption of periodic payments arose, nor was any part of plaintiff’s claim barred by the statute of limitations: Kauss v. Rohner [Adm’r], 172 Pa. 481 [ 33 A. 1016 ].” The eighteenth assignment of error is also sustained, as the charge sets up an erroneous basis for the jury’s findings under the pleadings and the facts as we have hereinbefore pointed out.

1939In the Conkle case (at p. 378) the Supreme Court said: “As the contract here provided for payment at the death of Miss Byers, no presumption of periodic payments arose, nor was any part of plaintiff’s claim barred by the statute of limitations: Kauss v. Rohner [Adm’r], 172 Pa. 481 [ 33 A. 1016 ].” The eighteenth assignment of error is also sustained, as the charge sets up an erroneous basis for the jury’s findings under the pleadings and the facts as we have hereinbefore pointed out.

1939The alleged contract provided for payment at the death of decedent, and hence in that event no presumption of periodic payments would arise (Conkle v. Byers’ Ex’r, 282 Pa. 375, 378 , 127 A. 848 ); but the rebuttal of the presumption might be said to depend upon the accepted existence of the contract.

1939The alleged contract provided for payment at the death of decedent, and hence in that event no presumption of periodic payments would arise (Conkle v. Byers’ Ex’r, 282 Pa. 375, 378 , 127 A. 848 ); but the rebuttal of the presumption might be said to depend upon the accepted existence of the contract.