hearsay evidence rule in Tennessee

2003Richter v. State, 1 Tenn.Crim.App. 270, 277 , 438 S.W.2d 362, 365 (1968); State v. Hailey, supra. Where, as here, the statement is admitted into evidence merely to show the officer’s reason for going to the car lot, the statement is admissible, because the testimony is not being offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted by the out-of-court declarant, and is clearly not hearsay. -5- State v. John Polk and Diane Jones, C.C.A. at Jackson, opinion filed February 14, 1980; State v. Clemmie Lee Rhyan, C.C.A. at Jackson, opinion filed July 9, 1981.

1987Richter v. State, 1 Tenn.Crim.App. 270, 277 , 438 S.W.2d 362, 365 (1968); State v. Hailey, supra. Where, as here, the statement is admitted into evidence merely to show the officer’s reason for going to the car lot, the statement is admissible, because the testimony is not being offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted by the out-of-court declarant, and is clearly not hearsay.

2001Our supreme court specifically held that the forensic services division’s certification “conforms with the provisions of [the] Tennessee Rules of Evidence, 803(8) as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule.” Sensing, 843 S.W.2d at 416 .

1998We are of the opinion that this procedure to supply records also conforms with the provisions of Tennessee Rule of Evidence, 803(8) as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule. 843 S.W.2d at 415-16 .

1980We noted in Baldwin v. Knight, 569 S.W.2d 450 (1978), that this statute was a legislatively mandated exception to the hearsay evidence rule.

1980We noted in Baldwin v. Knight, 569 S.W.2d 450 (1978), that this statute was a legislatively mandated exception to the hearsay evidence rule.

1980As to the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, the Court of Criminal Appeals could “see no confrontation problem under the facts of this case.” It held that “[a]n extrajudicial statement is inadmissible as hearsay only when offered as evidence of the truth of the matter to which it relates,” but is admissible “if offered merely to show the fact of its having been made.” Citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 , 91 S.Ct. 210 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), the Court held that “[ajdmissible, non-hearsay evidence does not violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause.” Judge O’Brien lodge

1980As to the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, the Court of Criminal Appeals could “see no confrontation problem under the facts of this case.” It held that “[a]n extrajudicial statement is inadmissible as hearsay only when offered as evidence of the truth of the matter to which it relates,” but is admissible “if offered merely to show the fact of its having been made.” Citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 , 91 S.Ct. 210 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), the Court held that “[ajdmissible, non-hearsay evidence does not violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause.” Judge O’Brien lodge

1980He correctly points to the holding of the Supreme Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), in which the Court readily acknowledged “that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,” but admonished that the overlap between the two is not complete. , The record reflects that when the federal court case involving these tapes came before Judge Wilson, of the Eastern District, the government was only allowed to present the tapes covering the conversations between Hofer and the witness.

1980He correctly points to the holding of the Supreme Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), in which the Court readily acknowledged “that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,” but admonished that the overlap between the two is not complete. , The record reflects that when the federal court case involving these tapes came before Judge Wilson, of the Eastern District, the government was only allowed to present the tapes covering the conversations between Hofer and the witness.

1978Breeden v. Independent Fire Insurance Company, 530 S.W.2d 769 (Tenn. 1975).

1978Breeden v. Independent Fire Insurance Company, 530 S.W.2d 769 (Tenn.1975).

1975Declarations, to be distinguished from admissions, as to facts *774 relevant to the matter of inquiry, are admissible in evidence when it appears that the declarant is dead, that the declaration was against his pecuniary or proprietary interest, and that he had no probable motive to falsify the fact declared. 166 Tenn. at 277 , 61 S.W.2d at 673 .

1975Declarations, to be distinguished from admissions, as to facts *774 relevant to the matter of inquiry, are admissible in evidence when it appears that the declarant is dead, that the declaration was against his pecuniary or proprietary interest, and that he had no probable motive to falsify the fact declared. 166 Tenn. at 277 , 61 S.W.2d at 673 .

1972Appellant cites Anderson v. Nichols, 39 Tenn.App. 503 , 286 S.W.2d 96 (1955), which was a suit to avoid an allegedly fraudulent deed from deceased to a man who was subsequently convicted of killing deceased.

1972Appellant cites Anderson v. Nichols, 39 Tenn.App. 503 , 286 S.W.2d 96 (1955), which was a suit to avoid an allegedly fraudulent deed from deceased to a man who was subsequently convicted of killing deceased.