promissory fraud doctrine in Tennessee

1991Following the application of the doctrine of promissory fraud in Brungard v. Caprice Records, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn.App.1980) we find that the doctrine of promissory fraud is appropriate in this case because Steed did not have the present intention to carry out certain promises at the time that he made them.

1983First, I believe this court (and by denial of appeal, the supreme court) has already recognized the doctrine of promissory fraud in Brungard v. Caprice Records, 608 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. App. 1980).

2018Id. at *3 (quoting Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1978) (applying the majority rule but concluding that the facts did not support the promissory fraud claim) (quoting Bolan v. Caballero, 220 Tenn. 318, 326 , 417 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tenn. 1967) (first recognizing the possible viability of the tort))); see, e.g., Isaac v. Ctr.

2002In Kandel, we stated: The Tennessee Supreme Court "has not adopted the doctrine of promissory fraud in Tennessee, but has merely indicated a willingness to consider adopting the rule 'in a proper case where justice demands.'" Farmers & Merchant's Bank v. Petty, 664 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tenn. 1978)).

2004It certainly does not show that a statement was made concerning 3 The intermediate appellate court in Petty explained that the Tennessee Supreme Court had not adopted the doctrine of promissory fraud, but that it had expressed a willingness to consider adopting the doctrine “in a proper case where justice demands.” Petty, 664 S.W.2d at 80 -81 (quoting Fowler v. Happy Goodm an Fam ily, 575 S.W .2d 496 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting Bolan v. Caballero, 417 S.W .2d 538, 541 (Tenn. 1967))). -4- a fact material to the transaction, or that Smith’s reliance on the Rankins’ alleged representation was reasonabl

2002In Kandel, we stated: The Tennessee Supreme Court "has not adopted the doctrine of promissory fraud in Tennessee, but has merely indicated a willingness to consider adopting the rule 'in a proper case where justice demands.'" Farmers & Merchant's Bank v. Petty, 664 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tenn. 1978)).

2026Bryant v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 682 So. 2d 3, 5 (Ala. 1996) (affirming summary judgment); see also In re Emery, 52 B.R. 68, 70 (Bankr.

2000Bryant v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 682 So. 2d 3, 5 (Ala. 1996) (affirming summary judgment); see also In re Emery, 52 B.R. 68, 70 (Bankr.

2026Bryant v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 682 So. 2d 3, 5 (Ala. 1996) (affirming summary judgment); see also In re Emery, 52 B.R. 68, 70 (Bankr.

2000Bryant v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 682 So. 2d 3, 5 (Ala. 1996) (affirming summary judgment); see also In re Emery, 52 B.R. 68, 70 (Bankr.

2020A key component of a promissory fraud claim is “a promise of future action without the present intention to carry out the promise.” Keith v. Murfreesboro Livestock Mkt., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

2018For Spine, Joint, & Neuromuscular Rehab., P.C., No. M2010-01333-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2176578 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 1, 2011) (applying the majority view); Houghland v. Houghland, No. M2005-01770-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2080078 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2006) (outlining the elements of promissory fraud as: “(1) an intentional misrepresentation of a fact material to the transaction; (2) knowledge of the statement’s falsity or utter disregard for its truth; (3) an injury caused by reasonable reliance on the statement; and (4) a promise of future action with no present intent to perform.”);

2020Hous., Inc., 983 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

2018Rather, Red Ink’s brief merely states that no written contract between Red Ink and Appellees was necessary to establish the elements of its causes of action and that the documents in the record constitute a written contract.13 See generally Shahrdar v. Global Housing, Inc., 983 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (outlining the elements of a promissory fraud claim); Quality Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Bluff City Buick Co., Inc., 876 S.W.2d 818 , 822–23 (Tenn. 1994) (describing the elements of an inducement to breach a contract claim).

2018Id. at *3 (quoting Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1978) (applying the majority rule but concluding that the facts did not support the promissory fraud claim) (quoting Bolan v. Caballero, 220 Tenn. 318, 326 , 417 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tenn. 1967) (first recognizing the possible viability of the tort))); see, e.g., Isaac v. Ctr.

2018Id. at *3 (quoting Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1978) (applying the majority rule but concluding that the facts did not support the promissory fraud claim) (quoting Bolan v. Caballero, 220 Tenn. 318, 326 , 417 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tenn. 1967) (first recognizing the possible viability of the tort))); see, e.g., Isaac v. Ctr.

2016Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) (1977) (emphasis added); Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tenn. 1997).