drafting error in Texas

2012The law is clear that a drafting error by a party's attorney does not constitute a "clerical error." In re Fuselier, 56 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding); see also Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. 1978) (illustrating, as an example of judicial error not correctable by judgment nunc pro tunc, the judicial determination that the terms of a rendered judgment should be changed); LaGoye, 112 S.W.3d at 784 (holding that the correction of a judgment to add a party was judicial error not subject to correction by nunc pro tunc judgment); In re Rollins Lea

2010Harrison nonetheless contends the error in this case is judicial because Groendyke drafted the final judgment and, under the authority of In re Fuselier , “a drafting error by a party’s attorney does not constitute ‘clerical error.’” 56 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

2012The law is clear that a drafting error by a party's attorney does not constitute a "clerical error." In re Fuselier, 56 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding); see also Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. 1978) (illustrating, as an example of judicial error not correctable by judgment nunc pro tunc, the judicial determination that the terms of a rendered judgment should be changed); LaGoye, 112 S.W.3d at 784 (holding that the correction of a judgment to add a party was judicial error not subject to correction by nunc pro tunc judgment); In re Rollins Lea

2010See In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 249 (Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); LaGoye, 112 S.W.3d at 784 (drafting errors became part of rendered judgment and were properly characterized as judicial errors).

2012See In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 249 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

2012The law is clear that a drafting error by a party's attorney does not constitute a "clerical error." In re Fuselier, 56 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding); see also Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. 1978) (illustrating, as an example of judicial error not correctable by judgment nunc pro tunc, the judicial determination that the terms of a rendered judgment should be changed); LaGoye, 112 S.W.3d at 784 (holding that the correction of a judgment to add a party was judicial error not subject to correction by nunc pro tunc judgment); In re Rollins Lea

2012The law is clear that a drafting error by a party's attorney does not constitute a "clerical error." In re Fuselier, 56 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding); see also Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. 1978) (illustrating, as an example of judicial error not correctable by judgment nunc pro tunc, the judicial determination that the terms of a rendered judgment should be changed); LaGoye, 112 S.W.3d at 784 (holding that the correction of a judgment to add a party was judicial error not subject to correction by nunc pro tunc judgment); In re Rollins Lea

2003The law is clear that a drafting error by a party’s attorney does not constitute a “clerical error.” In re Fuselier, 56 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding); see also Matties v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex.1978) (illustrating, as example of judicial error, not correctable by judgment nunc pro tunc, judicial determination that terms of judgment rendered should be changed); In re Rollins Leasing, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 633, 637 (TexApp.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999) (orig.proceeding) (holding that correction of judgment to reflect dismissal of only one defendant rath

2012The law is clear that a drafting error by a party's attorney does not constitute a "clerical error." In re Fuselier, 56 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding); see also Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. 1978) (illustrating, as an example of judicial error not correctable by judgment nunc pro tunc, the judicial determination that the terms of a rendered judgment should be changed); LaGoye, 112 S.W.3d at 784 (holding that the correction of a judgment to add a party was judicial error not subject to correction by nunc pro tunc judgment); In re Rollins Lea

2003The law is clear that a drafting error by a party’s attorney does not constitute a “clerical error.” In re Fuselier, 56 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding); see also Matties v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex.1978) (illustrating, as example of judicial error, not correctable by judgment nunc pro tunc, judicial determination that terms of judgment rendered should be changed); In re Rollins Leasing, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 633, 637 (TexApp.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999) (orig.proceeding) (holding that correction of judgment to reflect dismissal of only one defendant rath

2024See id.

2020The scope of the warrant should be judged against both the warrant and the probable cause affidavit, rather than by the just the warrant, when the search warrant incorporates the probable cause conceded was im portant to the trial.”). 9 Faulkner v. State, 537 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. Crim .

2012Co. v. Pruitt & Cowden, 902 S.W.2d 143, 147-48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), remanded for rendition of agreed jdmt. and opinion withdrawn from publication, No. 01-94-00457-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st -6- 04-12-00249-CV Dist.] Aug. 3, 1995, no writ) (not designated for publication), which applied the tolling rule to a drafting error by an attorney in preparing a loan modification agreement.

2012In The Vacek Group, Inc. v. Clark, 95 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.), however, the Houston court noted the rationale in the withdrawn opinion in Utica was inconsistent with Burnap.

2001Furthermore, a drafting error by a party’s attorney does not constitute “clerical error.” See America’s Favorite Chicken Co. v. Galvan, 897 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied).

1995The purpose of the Truth-in-Lending Act is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (a); McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir.1978).

1995If it is shown “by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error,” liability will not attach. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (c); McGowan, 569 F.2d at 848 n. 3.