drafting error in California

2024Such offenses, though committed by individual gang members, would seem to present no less a concern about broader patterns of criminal gang activity — that is, collective engagement in crime — than if they had been committed by two gang members acting together.3 Certainly the Legislature that enacted Assembly Bill 3 Amicus curiae Peace and Justice Law Center argues that the reference to predicate offenses committed “on separate occasions or by two or more members” (§ 186.22(e)(1)) contains a drafting error, and that the Legislature intended to replace the preexisting “or” with “and.” We have a

2017For example, we have found judicial correction of language appropriate in instances of drafting error, where it has "appear[ed] clear that a word has been erroneously used." ( People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 , 775, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752 ; see id. at pp. 775-779, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752 [construing statutory provision's use of the word "and" instead of "or" to be inadvertent].) But the court carefully refrains from asserting that a drafting error occurred in Proposition 47.

2022Further, Monique neglects that Estate of Duke cited several Court of Appeal cases involving lost trust documents with approval after recognizing that extrinsic evidence can be admitted to fill gaps in donative documents “other than wills.” (Estate of Duke, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 887 ; see Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586 , 1603–1604 [irrevocable trust]; Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363 , 368–369 [irrevocable trust]; Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51 [after trustors’ deaths, reformation allowed to correct a drafting error].) The absence of a statutory coun

2016(Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51, 82 (Ike); accord, Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1605 ; see Aguilar v. Aguilar (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 35, 39 [“‘“the primary rule in construction of trusts is that the court must, if possible, ascertain and effectuate the intention of the trustor or settlor”’”].) This power extends to situations where “the trust instrument contains some expression of the trustor’s intention, but a drafting error renders that expression ambiguous.” (Ike, at pp. 81-82; accord, Giammarrusco v. Simon, at p. 1605; see Ike, at p. 75 [ambiguity exists wh

2025The court itself relied on case law allowing the use of extrinsic evidence to correct errors in trusts and included a parenthetical description of one case as holding that “after trustors’ deaths, reformation [is] allowed to correct a drafting error.” (Estate of Duke, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 887 [citing Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51 ].) Reformation of a trust is therefore permitted even where the language appears facially unambiguous, so long as clear and convincing evidence establishes: (1) that the trust contains a mistake in the donor’s expression of intent at the time it was dr

2023Code, § 3399.) “In California, the common law equitable power of a trial court to modify or reform a trust extends to situations where . . . the trust instrument contains some expression of the trustor’s intention, but a drafting error renders that expression ambiguous.” ( Ike, supra, at p. 82 .) A court may modify a trust where “(1) a ‘peculiar’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstance made modification necessary to accomplish the purpose of the trustors, and (2) there was some expression in the trust instrument of the purpose of the trustors.” (Id. at p. 83) “[A] drafting error in a trust instrument wh

2016The electorate's intent to withhold relief from juvenile sex offenders who commit serial thefts is unambiguously expressed in section 666. ( People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266 , 1276, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 90 P.3d 1168 ["If the language is clear and unambiguous, we follow the plain meaning of the measure"].) The rule of lenity does not apply because section 666 is not reasonably susceptible to two constructions. ( People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49 , 58, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 38 P.3d 1 .) A person is disqualified if they are "required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act [§§

2016The electorate's intent to withhold relief from juvenile sex offenders who commit serial thefts is unambiguously expressed in section 666. ( People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266 , 1276, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 90 P.3d 1168 ["If the language is clear and unambiguous, we follow the plain meaning of the measure"].) The rule of lenity does not apply because section 666 is not reasonably susceptible to two constructions. ( People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49 , 58, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 38 P.3d 1 .) A person is disqualified if they are "required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act [§§

2024(See Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1074, 1087 [The Legislature “does not engage in idle acts, and no part of its enactments should be rendered surplusage if a construction is available that avoids doing so”].) Appellant argues that it would strain credulity for the People to argue that the plain language of section 1385(c)(2)(B) is the result of a drafting error.

2024(See Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1074, 1087 [The Legislature “does not engage in idle acts, and no part of its enactments should be rendered surplusage if a construction is available that avoids doing so”].) Appellant argues that it would strain credulity for the People to argue that the plain language of section 1385(c)(2)(B) is the result of a drafting error.

2022Further, Monique neglects that Estate of Duke cited several Court of Appeal cases involving lost trust documents with approval after recognizing that extrinsic evidence can be admitted to fill gaps in donative documents “other than wills.” (Estate of Duke, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 887 ; see Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586 , 1603–1604 [irrevocable trust]; Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363 , 368–369 [irrevocable trust]; Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51 [after trustors’ deaths, reformation allowed to correct a drafting error].) The absence of a statutory coun

2016“California courts have long had the equity power to modify the terms of a trust where such modification is necessary to preserve the trust or to serve the original intentions of the trustor.” (Stewart v. Towse (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 425, 428 .) The power to modify includes the “equitable power to reform an irrevocable trust where a drafting error defeats the trustor’s intentions.” (Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363, 369 .) 2.

2011Courts should use this power to rewrite statutes ‘with great restraint,’ only where ‘the error is clear and correction will best cany out the intent of the Legislature.’ (Bonner v. County of San Diego (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1346, fn. 9 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 116 ].) In the present case, I cannot be sure the language of [Penal Code section 266i, subdivision (a)(2)] resulted from a drafting error.

2011Courts should use this power to rewrite statutes ‘with great restraint,’ only where ‘the error is clear and correction will best cany out the intent of the Legislature.’ (Bonner v. County of San Diego (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1346, fn. 9 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 116 ].) In the present case, I cannot be sure the language of [Penal Code section 266i, subdivision (a)(2)] resulted from a drafting error.

2004Such circumstances can create a “dangerous potential for drafting errors.” (People v. Alexander (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1250, 1262 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 290 ].) Given the legislative history and the surrounding circumstances we are convinced the 1983 amendment was a drafting error and was not enacted for any deterrent purpose.

2004Such circumstances can create a “dangerous potential for drafting errors.” (People v. Alexander (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1250, 1262 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 290 ].) Given the legislative history and the surrounding circumstances we are convinced the 1983 amendment was a drafting error and was not enacted for any deterrent purpose.

2008At common law, a trial court had the equitable power to reform an irrevocable trust where a drafting error defeats the trustor’s intentions. ( Ike, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 82-83; Lissauer v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 468, 473 [ 114 P.2d 367 ] (Lissauer).) Ike confirms that this authority remains today.

2008At common law, a trial court had the equitable power to reform an irrevocable trust where a drafting error defeats the trustor’s intentions. ( Ike, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 82-83; Lissauer v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 468, 473 [ 114 P.2d 367 ] (Lissauer).) Ike confirms that this authority remains today.

2018(See, e.g., Joshua D. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 549 , 558, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 715 ["Where the terms of a statute are plain and not absurd, a court may not presume a drafting error and thereby substitute its judgment for the Legislature's. [Citation.] To do so would contravene our constitutional role, tread into the domain of a coequal branch, and inject intolerable uncertainty into the drafting and lawmaking process, since neither the Legislature nor the public could rely on a court to follow plain statutory language"].) It is permissible to do so in exceptional circumstances, howev

2018(See, e.g., Joshua D. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 549 , 558, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 715 ["Where the terms of a statute are plain and not absurd, a court may not presume a drafting error and thereby substitute its judgment for the Legislature's. [Citation.] To do so would contravene our constitutional role, tread into the domain of a coequal branch, and inject intolerable uncertainty into the drafting and lawmaking process, since neither the Legislature nor the public could rely on a court to follow plain statutory language"].) It is permissible to do so in exceptional circumstances, howev

2017(People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 38 P.3d 1 ].) A person is disqualified if they are ‘required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act [§§ 290-290.024].’ (§ 666, subd. (b).) Section 666 does not reflect a drafting error; there is no compelling evidence the electorate intended a different result.

2017(People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58 .) A person is disqualified if they are ‘required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act [§§ 290–290.024].’ (§ 666, subd. (b).) Section 666 does not reflect a drafting error; there is no compelling evidence the electorate intended a different result.

2026Applying the framework our Supreme Court adopted in Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213-1214 (Castaneda), for determining the scope of a landlord’s duty to protect tenants and invitees from third-party crime, the trial court identified the specific security measures that Plaintiff 4 Defendants’ remaining seven objections targeted Oliver’s opinions that Defendants did not function independently, that they conducted business in California without proper registration, and that they created a risk at the Chapter House by purportedly “making it clear” to unspecified people that Defenda

2022Section 15002, which falls at the outset of California’s trust law among other provisions of general applicability (§§ 15000–15006 et seq.), supplies the default rule for cases involving trust administration where no statutory provision might directly apply, providing that: “[e]xcept to the extent that the common law rules governing trusts are modified by statute, the common law as to 21 trusts is the law of this state.” (See Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1072 [§ 15002 requires that California courts look not just to trust statutes, but the common law of trusts].) Applying this se

2021A substantive offense defines or sets forth elements of a crime, a sentence enhancement “add[s] ‘an additional term of imprisonment to the base term[,]’” and “‘[a] penalty provision prescribes an added penalty to be imposed when the offense is committed under specified circumstances[]’” and “‘is separate from the underlying offense ….’” (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 898, 899 .) Vehicle Code section 2800.4 sets forth the elements of the crime of willful driving of a vehicle in the direction opposite lawful traffic and the punishment for that crime (People v. Canela (2014)